

The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War

Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas - BANIM
(Air Warfare Commission for Our Malvinas Islands)



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BANIM**

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The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War



«For those who came back, it is our moral and inescapable obligation to give an account of this feat, it is to dig deep into the fertile soil of our nationality. In the words of our Commander, nothing shall be forgotten, nothing shall be underestimated. We do not count on comparative examples with which to explain what happened in 1982. We only have—and their value is incalculable— memories and a verdict; an answer to hope, and a firm and severe warning to the usurper. A promise and an attitude: *“Tras su manto de neblina, no las hemos de olvidar”* (Behind their misty veil, they shall not be forgotten)¹ is a motto by which we uphold the validity of this cause, which enters into the spirit of the National Glories.»

Brigadier VGM Luis Guillermo Castellano (†)
Comandante del Componente Aéreo Malvinas
(Malvinas Air Component Commander)

¹ Translation into English of a fragment of the Malvinas March, Official Song of Provincia de Tierra del Fuego, Antártida e Islas del Atlántico Sur.

In memory of *Comodoro* VGM (R) Oscar Luis Aranda Durañona,
Secretary of the BANIM Commission and driving force behind
this book.



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We would also like to thank the FAA Language Institute (Centro de Instrucción de Idiomas) Director, *Brigadier* (R) Alberto Raúl Gadea, and the translators Lorena Alejandra Iglesias, María Florencia Alesandrini, Paola Andrea Sosa and Guadalupe Quiroga, who were in charge of translating into English the original Spanish text.

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Foreword by the Air Force Chief of the General Staff, *Brigadier General Xavier Julián Isaac*



In my capacity as Chief of the Argentine Air Force General Staff, I am honored to present the latest work of the BANIM Commission, *La Fuerza Aérea en Malvinas (The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War)*, after almost five years of hard work.

Even though the secrecy on the British side bestows a sense of incompleteness upon some data, it will be only a matter of time until the truth of what is expressed here comes out.

Nevertheless, we still count today on the lively and beating presence of many of the participants in the South Atlantic warfighting actions who have managed to recount their experiences in this book.

Although this work is not aimed at a specific audience, there is no doubt that the Argentine Air Force personnel shall find a considerable number of role models that will leave an indelible mark —on present and future generations— of day-to-day business common experiences. Said experiences, performed during the din of the conflict, enabled this Institution to reach its operational maturity, imprinting an exclusive and specific organizational culture, widely respected all over the world.

The young military may observe that those engaged in combat were their peers, who shared their dreams and hopes, but were driven by such powerful emotions that enabled them to perform exploits that have gone down in the annals of military aviation.

Despite the geopolitical result of the conflict, the Air Force thus tries to hand down to current and future members the spirit of those heroes who gave everything without expecting anything in return, in a chivalric and epic exploit.

Finally, I hope these pages help to make a more generous society in their commitment to the common good; it is my desire that this work encourages Air Force members to give their best in serving the country and, in short, that it inspires our fellow countrymen and women in their honorable task of being Argentinian.

Prologue

The sixth Air Warfare Commission for Our Malvinas Islands (BANIM) Drafting Commission started working in 2017, as per resolution of the Argentine Air Force Chief of the General Staff. It was made up of thirty four members, mainly Malvinas War Veterans, and some others who despite not having participated in the conflict, were committed to this piece of history and contributed their thoughts and knowledge.

Our task was to give a thorough account, as complete as possible, of the Argentine Air Force involvement in the South Atlantic conflict. It involved updating the previous edition with countless research and data contributions that have come out over these years, in order to disclose some facts and mysteries that had remained unknown for more than three decades.

Although we are aware that there is still a lot to be written —not only due to the inevitable selection of statements, but also because of the difficulties posed by finding data 40 years later and the veil of secrecy the opponents have drawn over certain events— we have tried to describe the most important actions performed by the Argentine Air Force, with all the players and specialties involved, adding new perspectives.

In early April 1982, when there was a lot of uncertainty as regards the conflict evolution, the National Strategy assumed that the crisis would be solved through diplomatic channels. Nevertheless, the Operational Strategic Commands, together with the Subordinate Commands reporting to them, were appointed for each theater of operations.

Brigadier Ernesto Horacio Crespo was appointed as Commander of the Argentine Air Force Southern Command, with the mission of supporting the ground forces, which were prepared for possible warfighting from Chile. Likewise, *Brigadier* Roberto Fernando Cambor was appointed as Southern Air Defense Commander. Both understood very early that, while the Argentine Republic was trying to solve the dispute following the crisis management rules, the United Kingdom considered it a *casus belli* from which it was almost impossible to turn back.

Thus, they jointly suggested to their superior level the creation of an independent Air Force at the Southern Theatre of Operations, with the assets allocated to both Commands, but depending on the Strategic Air Commander. Once the strategic situation had been defined, *Brigadier* Crespo was in charge of the Argentine Air Force Southern Command, being the ultimate responsible for commanding the assets during the war, supported by *Brigadier* Cambor, both convinced of fully using the means of warfare in the conflict.

At a General Staff meeting, Crespo clearly and firmly explained the role that our Institution would play in the conflict: «The Argentine Air Force will fight!» From that moment onwards, he became a figure whose undoubted leadership was present in the will to fight of all those who fought at the South Atlantic Conflict, myself included. His astuteness as regards the conflict evolution enabled the Argentine Air Force to prepare and get ready to fight a powerful enemy as the United Kingdom.

The pages of this book seek to clarify the spirit and commitment of the Argentine Air Force members who, despite the fact of being on terribly unequal conditions facing the opponent, managed to find the way to affect and damage it using unprecedented tactics, which gave rise to heroic actions and remarkable sacrifices. They defied fear and technological disadvantage professionally and were convinced of the just cause.

Ironically, the best testimonies about these actions were given by the British themselves, through countless publications and declarations in which they agree that, despite the fact that they counted on the most sophisticated weaponry known so far, they felt vulnerable to the Argentine aviation attacks, because the pilots had shown great determination from the onset of the conflict.

I would like to warmly thank all BANIM Commission members for their dedication and commitment. Throughout these years, they have worked in pursuit of the goal of leaving the testimony of those involved in the conflict for future generations. I also thank the War Veterans who have contributed with testimonies, photographs, and experiences, which have undoubtedly enriched the pages of this book.

I would like to remember the BANIM Commission members that passed away before our work was over: *Brigadier* VGM Manuel Augusto Mariel, *Comodoro* VGM Héctor Manuel Rusticcini, *Comodoro* VGM Rodolfo Emilio Drigatti and, especially, *Comodoro* VGM Oscar Luis Aranda Durañona, the driving force behind this book, and who, undoubtedly, set an example of commitment for the whole Commission.

After *Comodoro* Aranda Durañona left the Historical Studies Directorate, both his successor to that Directorate, *Comodoro* Rubén Lunaklick, and the current Director, *Comodoro* Ricardo Ylla, continued supporting unconditionally this book writing project contributing with documents from the Archivo Histórico (Historical Archives) and the Archivo General de la FAA (Argentine Air Force General Archives). I am grateful to all their staff who have closely collaborated in searching for documents, data and bibliography which have been included in these pages, and I am especially grateful to Mr. Horacio Rodríguez, who was responsible for correcting the content, and who has accompanied me during all these years so that this work came to fruition. I also want to thank the Revista Aeroespacio (Aeroespacio Magazine) staff who have worked with the layout and the image files, as well as the staff of the Secretaría General (General Department) of the Argentine Air Force who promoted this publication at our Baptism of Fire forty-year commemorations.

These pages depict the forty five days of combat as a sort of war diary, where not only the fragmentary orders of every flight made by the different airplanes involved in the conflict were included in detail, but also the different tasks that our men carried out and which affected the Argentine Air Force's war effort. Pursuing that comprehensive goal, some inadvertent errors have been probably made, a missing name, some detail, or a relevant action which has been overlooked. Shall this be the case, we trust it can be rectified in the future.

The Malvinas Conflict marked a turning point in the war veterans' lives. All of us have left something there. Those who were involved in combat, saw ourselves fighting a war which legitimacy is deeply moving. The claimed islands have always been on the Argentinians' minds, in the bosom of every family, at school, in the verses that read «*tras un manto de neblina, no la hemos de olvidar*» (behind their misty veil, they shall not be forgotten). The ones responsible for the war shall be judged by God and History. But once the conflict had started, the Argentine Air Force men did not get out of their commitment to their country and their community. Fifty five heroes remain there.

Brigadier General VGM (R) Mario Miguel Callejo
Chair of the BANIM Commission

Introduction

Four decades have gone by since that historical 1 May 1982, when the Argentine Air Force men received their «baptism of fire» defending their country. Throughout these years, many authors have tried to explain the confrontation between the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom. These two western nations, sharing more reasons to approach than to confront each other, separated 12,000 kilometers by an ocean, started an all-out war.

For 150 years, the dispute between both countries had been resolved using historical and legal arguments through diplomatic channels, while their governments and peoples kept a profitable commercial, social and cultural exchange. Moreover, for ten years before the war, both parties had shown, through specific acts and initiatives, a strong will towards finding a pacific solution to the dispute.

Nevertheless, despite logic predictions, in 1982, the South Atlantic waters and the Malvinas peatlands were stained with young Argentine and British men's blood. The brevity and violence of combats, as well as the courage shown and the way they rigorously adhered to the laws of war, called the attention of strategists and researchers all over the world. Some called it an «unprecedented war», while others considered it «the last fair war in history». The epithets and names used show that most authors have written driven more by emotion than by carefully assessing events. The papers written by vernacular scholars (civilian and military) were also influenced by the institutional and political situation the Argentine Armed Forces were going through at that particular moment in history. Various interests of an ideological, political or sectorial nature, even the interests of the combatants themselves, led to losing objectivity, overestimating rights, hiding wrongs and thus, claiming achievements and holding others responsible for failures.

On the other hand, some anti-military authors emphasized the negative factors of the conflict—such as the hardship endured by the conscripts—while they hid the positive actions carried out by the Security and Armed Forces during the major 20th Century commitment honored to defend National sovereignty.

The Argentine Air Force, the youngest of the three Armed Forces, exercised responsible leadership from the beginning of the actions and showed clear signs of a fighting spirit even in the poorest of conditions, concentrating on a war they had not planned.

Once the war was over, and moved by the determination with which its men had fought, the Argentine Air Force started writing the history in order to exhume the difficult circumstances they had lived, to draw on the experience and pay proper homage to combatants.

Thus, the Drafting Commission for Our Malvinas Islands Air Warfare History¹ was created. In order to depict the official history, plans, orders and reports written during and after the war were gathered. The Commission was renewed as time went by. The undertaking proved not to be simple—the task faced complications due to the natural reluctance of some of the actors to recount their experiences or to hand over documents or testimonies they had kept as real trophies at their homes. It was because of those obstacles that, not until 1999, the Historical Studies Directorate, after having received the files from the commission known as BANIM (*Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas*, Air Warfare Commission for Our Malvinas Islands), managed to publish the two volumes that make up Book 6 of the «History of the Argentine Air Force», *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* collection.

¹ "Directiva del Estado Mayor General 308/83" dated September 23rd, 1983, *Boletín Aeronáutico Reservado*, N°. 2102.

After said publication and before the present one, numerous testimonies and books of national and foreign origin have been received, which information sheds more light on the facts. Therefore, the Argentine Air Force high-ranking officers deemed the search for the truth as regards the 1982 events to be a moral obligation to the Institution history and to the ones killed in action. And thus, the Argentine Air Force Chief of the General Staff ordered the publication of a new version.

Besides enlarging the information on the actions, it was established that the new texts present significant differences as regards the reports provided by the United Kingdom concerning material and personnel actual losses, always minimized compared to the numbers shown in the Argentine records. This ambiguity may probably be resolved once the British Government declassifies their documentation and grants access to said information.

Thus, when preparing this new edition of *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* drafted by the BANIM Commission, special care was taken to include as many research papers as possible, both by national and foreign authors, which could provide solid evidence as regards questioned facts.

Based on the original documents handed down by the previous administration, the following modifications have been introduced:

- Elimination of historical references to the British usurpation and of the subsequent Argentinian claims.
- Summary of events in which the Argentine Air Force and other government agencies had taken part, trying to settle the diplomatic dispute through pacific actions, right before the conflict (1971-1981).
- Correction of names, dates and times.
- Day-by-day arrangement and naming of the air tasks according to the classification included in the Argentine Air Force regulations.
- Only those British actions that help understand Argentine air operations are described.
- Organization and summary of contents according to the Institution's primary responsibility: to exercise the power of weapons through aerospace. Thus, the actions are grouped together according to the command in charge of their planning and control.
- Mention of British declared casualties, extracted from official data and records, closing the daily description of the conflict. Nevertheless, in case of differences between said records and our own, literature or primary sources consulted in order to clarify facts are quoted.
- Most significant events summarized at the end of each chapter.

It is also worth mentioning that the compilation of the Argentine Air Force operations was obtained from the documents kept at the Argentine Air Force General Archives and at the Historical Studies Directorate, corroborated, in turn, by the veterans involved in every weapons system and specialty.

On the other hand, since it is not possible to count on the documentation from the units deployed on the islands, most of the events that took place there were reconstructed using the partial information and direct testimonies provided by the participants.

The only cases in which complete documentation was received from the islands were the VyCA (Spanish acronym for Vigilancia y Control Aéreo: Air Control and Surveillance) and Pucará Squadrons War Diaries. The Malvinas radar detailed activity —compiled in the diary that made it out of the islands to the mainland the day before the capitulation— turned out to be of utmost significance for cross-checking information.

The BANIM Commission has gathered an important number of testimonies, mostly written, provided by the actors themselves, which have been guarded by the Archivo Histórico de la Fuerza Aérea (Argentine Air Force Historical Archives). Moreover, reference has been made in these pages to oral testimonies which have come up during the monthly presentations and meetings carried out for writing this book. The BANIM Commission authorities endorse the authenticity of said testimonies.

Flight missions based on Fragmentary Orders (Frag-Os) are written according to the following format: command, aircraft/s, registration mark, call sign, weapons or cargo, mission, crew, time off ground and time of arrival. In certain cases, information is complemented by more data; in some others, it is complemented by available testimonies or references. If no more information is available, «nda» (no data available) is added.

As far as squadrons or combat aviation sections are concerned, crews are referred to by their specific role; in the case of four aircrafts, the order set forth is: flight leader, wingman number 2, section leader, wingman number 4.

Similarly, as regards helicopters and transport aircraft, the crew members list is led by the aircraft commander and then the rest of the members are ordered according to their duties on board, although only the special combat roles are specified.

The transportation flights performed on the mainland throughout the conflict are not recorded in detail; only the total effort expressed in flying hours and the amount of cargo transported are included. The personnel and Escuadrón Fénix material transportation flights performed on the mainland are not included either due to the lack of supporting documents.

Finally, for the ease of reading, throughout this translated work, Argentine and British military ranks are capitalized and written in upright style, as agreed upon by the author, editor, and translators. For ranks equivalence, please check the “Glossary, Comparison of Military Ranks and Geographic Terms” section.

* * *

In short, this is an institutional book written by the successive Drafting Commissions organized since 1983. Each Commission was validated by a resolution signed by the then Argentine Air Force Chief of the General Staff. This new edition is the result of all the previous studies and was prepared to be published in 2022, forty years after the conflict.

Considering the time elapsed, this will probably be the last official text to be written and revised by the Malvinas war veterans, who directly witnessed and lived the events recounted. The final conclusions convey the experience gathered by the authors hoping that, as a bottle thrown to the sea of times, the message expressing the satisfaction of having fulfilled their duties will reach the Argentine Air Force younger generations.

Setting up of the successive drafting teams

The information gathered and corrected by the successive commissions that started to work one year after the conflict was used to write this book. The officers' ranks are the ones they had when they were members of the commission. As from 2013, complying with an Argentine Air Force Chief of the General Staff directive, "VGM" was used for addressing Argentine Air Force Malvinas War veterans. Moreover, those contributors who have passed away are followed by (†).

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 Comodoro VGM (R) Narciso Juri
 Comodoro VGM (R) Eduardo O. García Puebla
 Comodoro VGM (R) Roberto E. Rivollier
 Comodoro VGM (R) Juan L. Micheloud
 Comodoro VGM (R) Oscar R. Spath
 Comodoro VGM (R) Tulio C. Felici
 Comodoro VGM (R) Héctor H. Sánchez
 Comodoro VGM (R) Gustavo Aguirre Faget
 Comodoro VGM (R) Fernando Robledo
 Comodoro VGM (R) Luis A. Longar
 Comodoro VGM (R) Gerardo G. Isaac
 Comodoro VGM (R) Rubén Sassone
 Comodoro VGM (R) Arnaldo H. Favre
 Comodoro VGM (R) Fernando Espiniella
 Capitán de Navío VGM (R) Washington Bárcena
 Vicecomodoro VGM (R) Ricardo A. Sifón
 Vicecomodoro VGM (R) Rodolfo Yuse
 Mayor VGM (R) Jorge A. Benítez
 Teniente de Navío VGM (R) Oscar G. Vázquez
 Capitán VGM (R) Guillermo A. Ballesteros
 Capitán VGM (R) Carlos E. Cachón
 Capitán (EA) VGM (R) Héctor D. Tessey
 Capitán VGM (Rva.) Emil Williams
 Primer Teniente VGM (R) Enrique G. Felice
 Suboficial Mayor VGM (R) Nicolás C. Dómina
 Suboficial Mayor VGM (R) Víctor Martínón
 Suboficial Mayor VGM (R) José A. Álvarez
 Suboficial Auxiliar VGM (R) Alfredo R. Clariá
 VGM Alejandro Lombardi
 VGM Gerardo Mancisidor
 Dr. Mariano Sciaroni
 Mrs. Haydee Gamen, Vcom. VGM (R) Roberto M. Gamen's widow

Part 1

The Road to War



Chapter 1

Support and Cooperation in Malvinas, 1971-1982



Albatross – the starting point

Since 1945, the Argentine Air Force (Fuerza Aérea Argentina, FAA) had exercised the responsibility of administering and conducting civil and military aviation adhering to the Integral Air Power concept which stated that, in peacetime, Aeronautics as a whole contributed to achieving political objectives more efficiently than the most destructive bombing. That was the reason why, from 1949, after Air Force specialists were made responsible for the Orcadas Islands Meteorological Observatory² and then, after the establishment in 1952 of Río Gallegos Military Air Detachment (Destacamento Aéreo Militar Río Gallegos) to support Antarctic air exploration³, the Institution became familiar with flights over the South Atlantic.

On 16 December 1965, the United Nations General Assembly approved Resolution 2065, by which the governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland were invited to reach an agreement on the Malvinas islands sovereignty dispute. However, the following year, during Teniente General Juan Carlos Onganía's administration, the Argentine Navy studied the military occupation of the archipelago⁴, and on 2 October 1966, ARA *Santiago del Estero* submarine secretly disembarked an amphibious command task group on a deserted beach of Soledad Island, 40 km from Puerto Argentino⁵. Likewise, in 1977, Almirante Emilio Eduardo Massera, Argentine Navy Commander in Chief, submitted a new project to the Military Committee, which was not approved by President Jorge Rafael Videla⁶.

In the meanwhile, encouraged by the UN resolution, the Argentine State Department celebrated a Memorandum of Understanding with its British peer on 14 August 1968 with the purpose of «definitely and amicably settling the dispute [...] duly considering the population's interests.» Said agreement was drafted by the then Argentine Republic ambassador to the United Kingdom, Brigadier (R) Eduardo Francisco Mc Loughlin, who held office between 1966 and 1970. Notwithstanding its «secret» classification, the document was leaked to the press. Diplomacy ran into the resistance of British financial groups investing in the islands which had always denied sovereignty transfer, usurped from 1833.

For that reason, the Memorandum remained at a standstill and the country was forced to postpone the claims and devote herself to win the goodwill of islanders or kelpers. An attempt was made to solve the islands' communications problems and comply with other settlers' needs. The establishment of regular air and maritime transportation lines was offered, as well as the provision of essential life services. Up to that moment, the only connection available was the ship RMS *Darwin* which communicated Stanley with Montevideo every month. Each journey took twenty days of navigation, round trip, plus ten days at the port. Any simple item that was to be acquired by the islanders took, at least, thirty days to arrive.

In 1970, the Conservative Party dislodged the Labor Party in the United Kingdom, and the Argentine offer was seen in a different light. By the end of that year, with the purpose of verifying the air service feasibility and with the determined participation of the Argentine

² "Nueva Comisión para Orcadas", Revista Nacional de Aeronáutica, No. 2, Buenos Aires, Círculo de Aeronáutica, February 1949, page 4.

³ "Creación del Destacamento Aeronáutico Militar Río Gallegos", Decree 1010/52, Boletín Aeronáutico Confidencial, No. 66, 25th of June, 1952, Buenos Aires, Ministerio de Aeronáutica, page 201.

⁴ Comisión de Análisis y Evaluación de las Responsabilidades del Conflicto del Atlántico Sur. *Final Report* (known as *Rattenbach report*), Volume 4, Buenos Aires, Military Junta, 1982, page 636.

⁵ "El desembarco secreto del 66", Clarín, March, 31st, 1996.

⁶ Comisión de Análisis, *Rattenbach Report*, op. cit., Volume 1, page 168; Volume 4, page 636.

Air Force, members of the British Embassy in Buenos Aires and Malvinas islands leaders went around the Patagonia in order to assess port and airport facilities in Puerto Madryn, Comodoro Rivadavia, Puerto Deseado, San Julián, Santa Cruz and Río Gallegos.

Capitanes Oscar A. Vijande and Rubén O. Moro manned aircraft G-II of the I Brigada Aérea (1st Air Brigade) which transported the entourage. The Embassy Secretary Argerich and Subprefecto Adrián Lasalvia (Argentine Coast Guard port specialist) constituted the Argentine delegation. The British representatives who traveled were the Embassy Secretary, Ray Withney; the Falkland Islands Company (FIC) Manager, Alistair Sloggie; the islands Attorney General for the Treasury, Leslie Gleadell; and *Darwin's* Captain, Warren White, native with more than twenty years of navigation experience among different points of the archipelago.

First air transportation

In that spirit of goodwill, on 11 February 1971, the I Escuadrón de Tareas Especiales de la Base Aérea Militar Tandil⁷ (Tandil Military Air Base 1st Special Tasks Squadron) received an order from the Comando de Operaciones Aéreas (COA, Air Operations Command) to perform the urgent aeromedical evacuation of a severely ill individual from Malvinas Islands to Buenos Aires. Landing on the islands would only be possible by water landing.

The only Grumman HU-16B Albatross available, the BS-03, experienced engine failures. The Air Base summoned the retired mechanics through LU-22 Radio Tandil. Thanks to their favorable response, the following day at 2100 the aircraft was already repaired. The test flight was performed that same night. The aircraft crewmembers were: Mayor Carlos A. Quaglini, Commander; Capitán Alfredo A. Cano, first pilot; Primer Teniente Raúl A. Tamagnone, navigator; Suboficiales Mayores Roberto Thomas and Fidel Contin, mechanics; Cabo Principal Héctor O. Rodríguez, radio operator; and, Suboficial Principal Ernesto Llanos, paramedic. At 2000, the Air Operations Command reported the island radio beacon and radio station frequencies. It did not state the water landing site, the air controller language, how to reach the coast or the mooring area.

On 14 February, the BS-03 took off from Tandil and, after 5 hours and 30 minutes, it landed at Comodoro Rivadavia. Dr César de la Vega, Chief of the Gastroenterology Department at Buenos Aires Hospital Rivadavia, and Air Force Doctor, Capitán Eduardo Escribano were waiting for it. The doctors inquired whether the aircraft was equipped with a stretcher, an oxygen system and other items.

Crewmembers were concerned about the aircraft weight. The Albatross maximum weight to water land in protected waters was 13,400 kg. This flight, considering cargo and fuel, would weigh 14,300 kg, i.e. 900 in excess of the authorized weight. Circumstances were worsened since the procedure –to be performed in open seas and with heavy waves due to wind– would be an emergency in itself.

On 15 February 1971, the BS-03 took off at 0600 heading for Malvinas. When flying abeam Puerto Deseado, the sun was rising. The sky was clear and there was unlimited visibility. Fortunately, Stanley radio beacon signal was received. The radio compass provided a constant bearing well in advance since, by Cape Leal at the northern end of Soledad Island, a dense layer of clouds prevented them from seeing the ground. When the crew made contact in English, Stanley's operator answered in perfect Spanish and informed them of the weather conditions. Said conditions forced them to improvise an instrument approach that, curiously, would be used by Albatross in subsequent flights.

⁷ The I Escuadrón de Fuerzas Especiales had been assigned the following aircraft: three Grumman HU-16B Albatross (registration marks BS-01 and BS-03 –both amphibian– and the BS-02, amphibian); one Douglas C-47 modified (TA-05); and two Douglas HC-47 (TA-06 and TA-07); plus one Otter, one DH 104 Dove and one Cessna C-182.



Grumman HU-16B Albatross moored to Port Stanley

Photo courtesy of Brig. VGM (R) Bloomer Reeve

During the operation, the amphibious aircraft exited the clouds 50 meters above sea level. Although visibility was reduced by rain, they caught sight of a red Beaver hydroplane flying 600 meters forward. From that aircraft, they were told in Spanish that the water landing site would be indicated.

The BS-03 was coming closer in zigzags, without passing it, and followed it that way up to Stanley bay (east to west oriented). While the Beaver was water landing, the Albatross made a 360° wide turn and, after overflying the town, entered final.

At 0931, an Argentine Air Force aircraft was water landing at Malvinas islands for the first time. The operator guided them to a mooring buoy anchored near the ramp-equipped hangar, 1500 meters away from the city. An inflatable boat, with two frogmen on board, reached them to carry the personnel to the ground. As the mooring maneuver was delayed, only the two doctors were taken on the first trip, while the commander and navigator followed them on the second trip. Capitán Cano and the two mechanics decided to stay to add two take-off auxiliary rockets (JATO⁸) and test the firing electrical circuits.

At the port office, the BS-03 crewmembers met Miriam Booth and her father. She was the operator and he was the Chief Electrician at Falkland Islands Company (FIC), and the pilot flying the Beaver which had guided the water landing. Then, the ambulance carrying the sick man arrived. He was Mathew Mc Connan, a Scottish descendant who was born in Santa Cruz (Argentina), who had lived and worked at the lighthouse situated at the Bay of Stanley port entrance. A raging alcoholic, he suffered from chronic cirrhosis, stomach bleeding ulcer and nephritis. He received eight transfusions before being taken from hospital.

With the assistance of four city policemen and the harbor master, the crew and doctors put the stretcher on an old lighter and sailed to the BS-03. Once the aircraft ties were loose, two vessels supported the maneuver by sailing around. Capitán Cano, now acting as a pilot, sailed to the take-off point. The 900-meter-wide by 7000-meter-long bay had to be flown across to face the wind blowing from 320° at 65 km/h. With full throttle, the aircraft did not rise within the expected distance due to excess weight (14,300 kg). At mid-length, mounted on the hull *redan*⁹ and with leveled wings, it reached the 150 km/h required to ignite the

⁸ JATO: Jet Assisted Take Off.

⁹ Redan: step amphibious aircraft have below the hull.

JATO¹⁰. When they were fired, the aircraft detached from water and started to climb. It was 1230.

Since the man was acutely ill, in the middle of the crossing, the Commander required the Command a faster machine. That was the reason why Mayor Martín Álvarez, who was performing a Líneas Aéreas del Estado (LADE) flight on board the F-27 registration mark TC-46, headed to Comodoro Rivadavia so as to transport him to Argentina's capital city (Capital Federal). An ambulance, a bilingual nurse, journalists and photographers were waiting for the BS-03. The TC-46 landed at Comodoro at 17:30, it took off at 1810 and arrived at Jorge Newbery Airport at 2150. Mc Connan was admitted to Hospital Rivadavia. It was a vain effort since he died the following Sunday. The family had him buried at La Tablada cemetery.

Joint Statement of Buenos Aires, 1 July 1971

After the aeromedical evacuation experience and within the general framework of the negotiations recommended by Resolution No. 2065 of the General Assembly of the United Nations, on 1 July 1971 the Representatives of both countries signed the Joint Statement of Buenos Aires¹¹. It can be summarized as an agreement of communication and cooperation between the governments of the Malvinas Islands and Argentina. Subject to the approval of the respective authorities, the new measures would contribute to the process of finding a definitive solution to the dispute over the islands, as had been advised by the UN.

Second flight – first one with passengers on board

Given the signed agreement, the BS-02 departed to Malvinas carrying the Embassy Secretary Carlos Louge, from the Dirección General de Antártida e islas Malvinas; Comodoro Ernesto J. Arillo, from the Argentine Air Force Command; the British John Ashey Jones, Richard V. Goss and Richard Hills. On 3 July, 1971 at 0815, the Albatross took off from Río Gallegos flown by Mayor Carlos A. Quaglini and Primer Teniente Antonio A. Bruno. Also, Primer Teniente Raúl A. Tamagnone, the mechanic, Suboficial Mayor Abel Poletto and the radio operator Suboficial Mayor Julio Martín completed the aircrew.

After 3 hours and 15 minutes, on a shiny day, the amphibian water landed in Malvinas. The same as in the first flight, residents received it in joy. At 1440 the return journey started. Due to headwind, the flight to Comodoro Rivadavia lasted 5 hours 11 minutes.

Third flight

On 11 August 1971, a group of civilian and military engineers from both the United Kingdom and Argentina headed to the islands in order to study the ground on which an airstrip would be built. They took off from Comodoro Rivadavia on the Albatross registration mark BS-02, commanded by Capitanes Alfredo A. Cano and Ángel G. Toribio. On their way back, they evacuated a port worker who had suffered an accident and required specialized surgical treatment. Stanley Hospital Director accompanied him to Hospital Británico in Buenos Aires.

Fourth flight – first one carrying mail

It used to take up to seven months for letters sent from the United Kingdom (via Montevideo) to arrive in Malvinas. The *Darwin* ship, which used to sail Malvinas-Uruguay, showed irremediable failures. That was the reason why the Argentine Foreign Affairs

¹⁰ Each JATO provides a 1000 pounds (455 kg) additional thrust during fifteen seconds. Albatross used two for take-off and it could use up to four.

¹¹ Refer to "Annex 1", at the end of this chapter.

Department, the Argentine Air Force, Aerolíneas Argentinas, and the Secretaría de Correos y Telecomunicaciones (Mail and Telecommunications Office) agreed to organize a mail service to the islands. With that purpose, an Albatross was ready in Comodoro Rivadavia to transport the bags that would arrive on an Aerolíneas flight. Aircraft commanders, with the participation of the Post Office, would exchange the bags.

On 20 August 1971, at 0600 in the morning, the BS-02 took off heading towards the islands flown by Mayor Carlos A. Quaglini and Primer Teniente Antonio A. Bruno as co-pilot. The aircraft carried Stanley Hospital Director, who was returning. After 3 hours 50 minutes, it water landed on the rough surface waters of the bay, caused by a strong wind. The islanders, who were keen sailors, had learnt from their previous experience. They arrived on a lighter and placed an inflated rubber tube on the left side of the fuselage to prevent hitting the aircraft. In the middle of the roadstead, they had placed a big dimension buoy which, by means of a rope, they used as a tie-down point for the Albatross.

In spite of the steersman's efforts, waves hindered the mooring maneuver. In a matter of seconds, the lighter deck was 1.5 meters below the BS-02 door and, immediately after, it was 30 centimeters above the flap, which is usually 2.5 meters from the surface in the water. Despite that, crewmembers started jumping to the deck one by one, while the mechanic stayed on the aircraft. During the short trip to the coast, the lighter submerged its bow in the water from time to time. Upon disembarking, they carried the two mailbags to the local office on a Land Rover. A few minutes later, mail distribution had started. To their surprise, settlers confirmed that only seventy-two hours had passed from the postmark date.


Inside the airplane, Suboficial Mayor Fidel Contino felt the violence of the heavy swell which covered him completely from time to time. At noon, Mayor Quaglini started to feel uneasy because neither could he see movements, nor the mechanic answered the VHF; therefore, he asked to be taken to the lighter. However, getting near the BS-02 without running the risk of hitting it was impossible. At 1600, a new attempt was made; a row boat was towed with two men on board. With great effort, they tied two ropes to the Albatross wings and rescued the mechanic. Since the waves exceeded the maximum height allowed for take-off –one meter and a half– they stayed in Stanley overnight.

The following day, although weather conditions were better, aircraft conditions were not. About two hundred liters of water flooded the forward bilge area and the bilge pump was not working. In spite of that, they untied the moorings and tried to start engines. It took Engine No. 1 almost ten minutes to start, and it was during that time that the wind pushed the aircraft too near the coast. Finally, with both engines on, they moved towards the bay eastern end. The wind was blowing from 340° at 75 km/h. The pilot applied full throttle while struggling to keep the wings leveled. Speed increased slowly. The commander ordered to activate JATO before advisable conditions had been reached. The airplane rose, but fifteen seconds later, once rockets had extinguished, it returned to the sea and continued the run. Near the end of the bay, it finally took off and flew at a very low height above the Royal Marines headquarters.

After flying for 6 hours and 45 minutes, the aircraft landed on the airstrip. Then, it continued heading towards Tandil. The commander went to the city post office in a vehicle, where he delivered the bags taken from Malvinas. The chief of the station and the present personnel were deeply taken aback by that attitude.

First airstrip

Sea transportation with the *Darwin* between the islands and Montevideo suffered significant losses. After its decommission, it was sold by the FIC. Without other means of communication, flights with Albatross became a matter of routine. Therefore, Argentine and British authorities decided to move one more step forward towards the integration contemplated in the Joint Statement of 1971.



It was decided that a provisional airstrip for wheel landings would be built, airdrome services to support aircraft operations would be installed, together with an agency to commercialize tickets. The assignment would not be easy –land characteristics presented a challenge by themselves. Surface was uneven and, besides, its geomorphological conditions (humidity logged peat) were the least appropriate for laying any foundations.

In September 1971, a flight departed carrying representatives from both the Argentine Air Force and the Argentine Foreign Affairs Department. The commission should select an airdrome site suitable for Fokker F-27 aircraft. Headed by the Secretary Carlos Rouge, the entourage was made up of Coronel (R) Luis González Balcarce; Vicecomodoro Alcides A. Degand Löb; Mayor Carlos F. Bloomer Reeve, former Business Manager at Líneas Aéreas del Estado (LADE) headquarters; Mayor Luis A. Remorino, an engineer from the Dirección de Infraestructura (Infrastructure Management) that would carry out the job; and the Royal Air Force (RAF) attaché in Buenos Aires.

The airdrome would operate for two years, until the United Kingdom built another one with a paved runway. The project entailed reaching agreements so that the Argentine ships from Transportes Navales could transport machines, aluminum plates —similar to the ones used in Vietnam— and personnel from the then Argentine Air Force Grupo I de Mantenimiento (Group I Maintenance). Likewise, it would be necessary to get authorization to:

- Purchase at least three houses (one of them for the technical personnel of Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales) and some premises to establish Líneas Aéreas del Estado office;
- Install two SSB (single side band) communication stations;
- Take two or more vehicles from the continent, including a fuel truck;
- Prepare access to the runway;
- Temporarily house thirty workers;
- Reconcile accounting mechanisms for funds transfer;
- Authorize the Argentine Air Force officer to issue the White Card that allowed round-trip journeys for the kelpers between the islands and the Argentine continental territory. Issued in Buenos Aires by the *Cancillería* (Argentine Foreign Office) or in Stanley by its representative, it would be a document for native islanders. In the case of citizens with other nationalities, even British, the corresponding passport would be accepted.

From all the inspected areas, the commission chose one near a cape protrusion called Hookers Point, 2 km from Stanley. With a great technical effort, a 720-meter long and

30-meter wide airstrip, without a braking area, could be built on that surface. Dimensions and orientation would condition the F-27s operation. Also, it would be necessary to build a road to connect the airport and the city.

Permanent Argentine representatives in Stanley

The Joint Statement from 1 July 1971 established that both the Argentine and British Special Advisory Commission representatives would live in Stanley. According to that decision, a Vicecomodoro would be designated in December to fill the position for a two-year period.

The Chief Officer would depend on the Director General de Antártida y Malvinas (Antarctica and Malvinas General Director) at the Argentine Foreign Affairs Department.

The public official was assigned different areas of national Government responsibilities involved in Argentine foreign affairs actions intended to win the islanders' goodwill. In the first place, he would be in charge of LADE Directorate; secondly, mainland Argentina government agencies and companies would answer to him, under different levels of dependence, i.e. private and tourism commissions, and work teams from government agencies and companies rendering services to islanders: Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales, Gas del Estado, Transportes Navales, the Argentine Air Force, Secretaría de Correos y Telecomunicaciones, among others. In fact, he would facilitate and coordinate field research from the Sociedad Científica Argentina (Argentine Scientific Association).

A LADE supervisor would assist him as Base Commander and in promoting sales of tickets from Stanley to any place in the world through connections with other airlines; specifically, with Aerolíneas Argentinas. Furthermore, the positions of Argentine aircraft control tower operators, and of the communications service to maintain SSB linkage and teletype communications with mainland LADE agencies would be filled.

The island government assigned one house for the Vicecomodoro, with the symbolic payment of one copper coin, and transferred some premises to LADE, where the radio station was placed. Likewise, houses were rented for Argentine employees.


1972. Vicecomodoro César Alberto de la Colina

He held office between 1972 and 1974, assisted by Supervisor Mario Sassi as Base Commander. During his tenure, forty people under the command of the Capitán Raúl O. Maiorano —from Grupo 1 de Construcciones (1st Constructions Group)— leveled the ground and built the temporary airstrip. Furthermore, workers were always willing to collaborate with islanders. Once, they rescued a Land Rover which had entered the sea as a consequence of its driver's negligence.

LADE first scheduled service

On 12 January 1972, while the future airstrip was being built, LADE started to operate with an Albatross configured for six and eight passengers. In all, thirty 22 crossings with 203 flight hours were performed. The vicissitudes of each water landing with those slow search and rescue airplanes demonstrated the pioneering actions of crewmembers.

The personnel who performed as pilots were Mayor Alberto S. Álvarez, Capitanes Ángel G. Toribio and José A. Demarco, Primeros Tenientes Juan M. Maclay and Antonio A. Bruno; as navigators: Primeros Tenientes Héctor González, Francisco F. Mensi and Raúl A. Tamagnone; as mechanics: Suboficiales Mayores Fidel Contino and Rubén C. Bidegain, and Suboficial Auxiliar Néstor Fernández; and as radio operators Suboficial Mayor Julio Martín, Cabos Principales Juan C. Scianca and Eduardo Castilla, Cabo Primero Jorge Morales and Cabo Ricardo del Río.



Diploma granted by
Governor Gordon Lewis to
the Albatross Squadron for
the services rendered

Photo courtesy of:
Brig. VGM (R) Bloomer Reeve

F-27 aircraft inaugurate the aluminum airstrip

On 15 November 1972, when the airstrip was authorized, LADE started to operate with Fokker F-27. One day before the inauguration event, the I Brigada Aérea (1st Air Brigade) sent six pilots to familiarize them with the airdrome: Vicecomodoros Raúl A. Barcala (Brigade Operations Commander) and Roberto H. López (F-27 Squadron Commander); Mayor Jorge R. Ruiz (LADE Operations Commander); and Capitanes Rubén O. Moro, Carlos G. Novillo and Abel A. Sántora.

Pilots had never landed on aluminum plates before. That was why they observed the arrival from the cockpit. The airstrip did not look as short as its 720 meters long indicated because, in perspective, the few 30 meters wide gave the illusion it had a regular size. Landing short, performing a long landing or exceeding the plates would break the landing gear since there were no shoulders or braking areas. Beyond the aluminum plates, everything was spongy humid peat with no consistency to bear a person's weight. That day a crosswind was blowing, at 90° from the airstrip. Anyway, the Vicecomodoro Barcala, the



The aluminium airstrip, build by Grupo 1 de Construcciones at Hookers Point, 2 km Stanley Port

Photo courtesy of: Brig. VGM (R) Bloomer Reeve

F-27 Commander, landed without inconvenience and he could stop it right before the final with the brakes applied.

On the next day, the inauguration ceremony started at 1100, when the T-43 arrived in Malvinas. Said airplane transported the Air Regions Commander, Brigadier Mayor Higinio González; Líneas Aéreas del Estado Director, Brigadier Eliseo S. Ruiz; General Staff Jefe I Intereses Aeronáuticos (Aeronautical Interests Chief I), Comodoro Roberto J. Rodríguez; the Infrastructure Director, Comodoro Alfredo R. Cabeza; Southern Air Region Commander, Comodoro Ángel M. Zamboni; Jefe del Grupo I de Mantenimiento de Infraestructura (Chief of Group 1 Infrastructure Maintenance), Comodoro Oscar A. Stagnaro; the Chief of the Argentine Air Force Public Relations Department, Comodoro Evergisto Gómez; Chief of the Departamento de Asuntos Civiles del Estado Mayor General (General Staff Civil Affairs Department), Comodoro Alcides A. Degand Löb; Chief of Transportes Navales, Capitán de Navío Guillermo H. Tello; Antarctica and Malvinas Islands Director General, Minister Mario Izaguirre; and the Latin America Department Director, Minister Enrique Ros; among others.

The delegation was welcomed by the British Governor Ernest Gordon Lewis who, on behalf of the Crown, was thankful for the efforts taken to build the airstrip and praised the work done with the amphibious airplanes. Then, Brigadier Mayor Higinio González delivered a speech representing the Nation's authorities. The Catholic bishop and the Anglican reverend blessed the airdrome together and a commemorative plaque was unveiled. Next, Líneas Aéreas del Estado agency was opened, and the ceremony was certified by means of a protocol —the first one signed on the islands since 1833.

From that moment on, the F-27 scheduled flight would be performed on Mondays. It departed from Comodoro Rivadavia at 1000, arrived at Stanley at 1230 and returned one hour later. Each crossing cost £ 9.80 or ARS \$ 230 from Buenos Aires to Comodoro Rivadavia. Commercial airlines charged ARS \$ 295 per ticket. In order to travel to Stanley, it was necessary to have an international vaccination certificate and the authori-



View from the cockpit of an F-27 about to land at Hookers Point - Photo courtesy of: Brig. VGM (R) Bloomer Reeve



Arrival of the F-27 registration mark-44; Vicecomodoro César A. De la Colina accompanied by Governor Gordon Lewis, the aid de camp Richard Goss and the Police Chief Terence Peck - BANIM DEH-FAA

zation from the Argentine Foreign Affairs Department. These requirements were only for Argentine citizens and resident foreigners. Foreigners were required to have a passport. Travelers had to carry, at least, five pounds per day of stay.

At both Comodoro Rivadavia and Stanley, the Customs service fulfilled its functions without further requirements. There, boarding/landing cards were filled out both in Spanish and English, stating nationality, address and identity card number. When traveling to the Argentine mainland, Malvinas settlers had to meet the requirements and get the White Card at the British representative's office.

1974. Vicecomodoro Carlos Felipe Bloomer Reeve

He arrived at Stanley with his family on 26 February 1974. After sharing office with Vicecomodoro De la Colina for a week, he assumed his diplomatic functions and those corresponding to the management of the LADE branch, where Supervisor Sassi continued to be in charge.

Bloomer Reeve had experience on issues related to Malvinas islands. In 1969, while he was working as LADE Business Manager, and the only Argentine newspaper reaching Stanley was the *Buenos Aires Herald*, he recommended the morning newspaper Director to publish an article about the development line. The journalist Bonnie Tucker interviewed LADE Directors, who declared their conviction that the Argentine Air Force operated company was the most suitable instrument to establish a regular connection between Malvinas Islands and Comodoro Rivadavia. For the same reason, he had been designated by the Air Force to be a member of the joint commission with the Argentine Foreign Affairs Department.

During his stay, Foreign Affairs introduced new approach measures. To start with, two Spanish bilingual teachers were commissioned to live in Stanley. In March, the ARA *Bahía Buen Suceso* transported three grumete sailboats for the islands youth group, a donation from San Isidro and Ushuaia yacht clubs. Some months later, they were returned for repair purposes.

Furthermore, the construction of Antares II plant —with seventeen fuel, jet fuel, kerosene and gas oil tanks— a laboratory, and a gas station started. Construction works, under YPF direction, involved the participation of sixty four workers during six months. The vessel ARA *Cabo San Gonzalo* performed two crossings transporting materials. At the facilities, a pipeline supply system was established from the Falkland Islands Company dock. Once it was set up, the British company did not authorize its operation alleging safety reasons, breaching the initial agreement.

Likewise, Gas del Estado rendered a gas tube service, and, also, authorized the use of thirty heaters and stoves. It built some distribution premises and two islanders received installation training on the mainland. LADE was in charge of the management and, by May, it reinforced the personnel with Suboficial Principal Jorge Sossa, who was responsible for communications and operation assistant tasks.

In 1974, the Sociedad Científica Argentina made another contribution to the Malvinas settlers by means of an archipelago agricultural and cattle research and its corresponding report. In 1975, it sent containers with items for sheep artificial insemination, which had been required by the veterinarian Ronald Crosby. Later on, the Dirección de Remonta y Veterinaria del Ejército (Army Remount and Veterinary Directorate) would send purebred horses for breeding purposes. The animals were left under the Turner family's care.

Also, cultural activities were fostered. In May of that year, a group of actors —under the direction of Iris Marga— traveled to the islands. They staged theatrical and musical performances organized by LADE in the Town Hall. It was the first time islanders lived that kind of experience. Most of them attended two performances.



LADE office at Port Stanley

Photo courtesy of:

Vcom. VGM (R) Agnoletti



Fokker F-27 after landing on the aluminum airstrip at Hookers Point - Photo courtesy of: Brig. VGM (R) Bloomer Reeve

On another occasion, through the mediation of Buenos Aires Instituto Salesiano de Artes Gráficas, a special flight transported paintings and sculptures collections which reminded of *Martín Fierro* poem first publishing. The works of art belonged to Castagnino, Pettoruti, Quinquela Martín, López Anaya and De la Vega. On LADE's building top floor, a Spanish language library was established with the collaboration of Argentine publishing houses¹².

In 1975, LADE bestowed awards on those supporting the aeronautical activity: Daniel Borland, Forecaster; Ashmoore, Chief Physician; Cox, Second Physician; Kern, Chief of Local Air Services; Halliday, Customs Chief and Port Captain; and Monsignor Spraggon, Catholic Bishop. During this period, LADE donated spare parts for the Beaver airplanes performing the islands' air service through FIGAS (Falkland Islands Government Air Services).

On 14 October 1976, one of the Beavers, which was equipped with pontoons, declared an emergency over the sea. The pilot, Ian Campbell, died and Bernard Lee, his companion, saved his life. Vicecomodoro Bloomer Reeve requested the search and rescue from the Air Force, which assigned the mission to an F-27 equipped with external auxiliary tanks.

¹² In 1974, a group of islanders visited the Biblioteca Nacional de Aeronáutica, accompanied by Vicecomodoro César A. de la Colina. The islanders left their signatures on an infographic that, at present, is framed on a wall next to the entrance to *Héroes de Malvinas* room.



Fuel plant established by YPF Antares - Photo courtesy of: Brig. VGM (R) Bloomer Reeve

Commanded by Mayor Alfredo Cano, the plane took off at 0625 on 15 October from the I Brigada Aérea, carrying doctors, survival specialists, and photographers.

Through radio communication, the search area was coordinated with Vicecomodoro Bloomer Reeve. They initiated a parallel exploration pattern in a north-south direction. At around 1600, they spotted a strong reflection on the surface of the sea at Punta Aguda, Bougainville Island. The sun glinted on the polished pontoons of the airplane, which remained afloat, inverted and half sunken. Just a few meters away, the sole survivor was waving for help. The discovery was immediately reported to Comodoro Rivadavia, from where the rescue was coordinated with Malvinas Islands. The F-27 remained flying, orbiting until a speedboat arrived.

The Beaver had experienced an in-flight engine flameout. In the emergency, the pilot headed towards the only protruding rock nearby, and attempted ditching. Unfortunately, the plane landed on an algae carpet, the pontoons got entangled, and the aircraft flipped over. The pilot drowned while trying to escape, while his companion survived and reached the rocky outcrop.

The F-27 landed in Malvinas Islands, where Vicecomodoro Bloomer Reeve awaited them and extended the crew an invitation from the governor to visit his house. Once the over-night stay had been authorized, they were accommodated at the Upland Goose hotel. At dusk, as they walked towards the governor's residence, they received unusual displays of affection from the settlers. The following day, the F-27 flew non-stop for the first time from Malvinas Islands to the I Brigada Aérea, El Palomar.

The Argentine Air Force installed a Very High Frequency Omni Range (VOR) to assist aircraft radio navigation. At the same time, they carried out medical evacuation flights and coordinated the crossings of scholarship holders to the mainland. The 1st Constructions Group deployed twenty-five men to maintain the temporary airstrip; the task demanded twenty-one days.

Not all interactions with the islanders were driven by affection. In the summer of 1974-1975, the Argentine Social Welfare Department chartered the Greek ship *Regina Prima* to perform cruises to Malvinas Islands and Antarctica. The contract stated that the vessel would not raise any courtesy flag as it was usually done when arriving at a foreign country. On the first trip, during the ship's stay at the port and while music bands were performing a concert in the Town Hall, local students visited the ship.



Amphibian airplane Beaver, owned by Falkland Islands Government Air Services (FIGAS) - Photo courtesy of: Com. (R) Canosa

On the fourth trip, the Falkland Islands Company committee exerted pressure so that the British courtesy flag be hoisted. Upon consultation, Argentine Foreign Affairs rejected the demand because acceptance would imply a modification of what had been agreed on. As a consequence, the island authorities did not authorize the passengers' disembarking.

In 1975, the United Kingdom awarded the construction of the paved airstrip to Johnston Construction Co. The beginning of works provoked adverse reactions. Argentine ophthalmologists and pediatricians traveled to address preventive medicine issues. As they did not count on the local physician's approval, the meeting was held at Cecilia Gooch's home, a retired nurse married to a resident naval engineer. When necessary, the patients were evacuated to the Alvear Hospital at Comodoro Rivadavia, and the Canadian community religious sisters acted as interpreters. In addition, eminent scientists such as Dr René Favaloro and Dr Amílcar Argüelles visited the archipelago. The latter conducted research on local patients in the endocrinology field.

On 4 February 1976, the oceanographic vessel RRS *Shackleton* was intercepted on the high seas by the Argentine Navy destroyer *Almirante Storni*. This unjustifiable action by the Argentine warship was a serious obstacle for the rapprochement policy. The British vessel just refused to stop and continued sailing and the Argentine ship did not take any punitive actions. When they arrived at Stanley and the news was disseminated, Argentina's opponents found the argument they needed to express themselves against said country. Bloomer Reeve's family returned, stating that living conditions were uncomfortable. The governor made every effort to reverse the situation and indicated that dissatisfaction stemmed from the British company, the airstrip constructor, since only 25% of workers were residents.

In the same year, Lord Edward Shackleton, nephew of the Antarctic explorer and responsible for the South Atlantic island issues, arrived on a LADE (Argentine Air Force) service. He engaged in lengthy conversations with the Vicecomodoro and appreciated in detail the tasks carried out by the airline company.

1976. Vicecomodoro Rodolfo Abel Carnelli

He stayed in Stanley from February 1976 to February 1978. During his office, he preserved a positive image of both the country and the Air Force, and managed to gain trust in his statements and commitments. Along with his family, he maintained friendly and cordial relations with the inhabitants. Like his predecessors, his goal was to win the islanders' goodwill.



VOR established by the Argentine Air Force in the vicinity of Port Stanley airport - Photo courtesy of: Vcom. VGM (R) Agnoletti

There were also unpleasant incidents. On one occasion, after the visit by a group of Argentine tourists had finished, the local authorities turned to the Vicecomodoro to claim an antique plate that had disappeared from the Anglican church. On another occasion, a camera was missing. Although these are defects travelers from any part of the world may have, and the items were returned, it negatively affected the perception of Argentina in the eyes of the islanders.

The senior officers who served as delegates were convinced that time was working in favor of integration. However, they acknowledged that this approach went against the goals of the Falkland Islands Company (FIC) and the United Kingdom Falkland Islands Committee (UKFIC)¹³. These associations' members hindered efforts and influenced the islanders by accusing those who accepted to work for the *argies*¹⁴ of being collaborators.

At the beginning, thirty young people made use of the study scholarships. In the end, the FIC's speeches convinced them that accepting said scholarships amounted to treason. As a result, only a few students received education in Argentina. Another sign of dislike was observed when they left a considerable amount of empty beer cans at Carnelli's doorstep or when the Vicecomodoro noticed that if he ran into a neighbor, he would greet him politely, but if said neighbor was accompanied by someone from the FIC, he would ignore him and even deny him a greeting.

The Falkland Islands Company, which exercised a strong oligopoly over the islands economic activity, received a British government's subsidy to stay in business. In view of that weakness, in 1977, the then President of the Board of Banco Tornquist, Héctor F. D. Capozzolo, conceived an oblique approach to recover Malvinas islands.

The banker estimated that shareholders, who were receiving meager dividends from their investment, could very well be tempted to sell their shares. He presented the plan to Minister Martínez de Hoz, who agreed on it and committed to financing the operation through the Argentine National Treasury.

To conceal Argentina's intention, the negotiation was entrusted in the greatest secrecy to Mrs. Beau, president of France's Banque Occidentale. The transactions were well underway, even an approving nod from the British government had been received, until the local newspaper *La Opinión* disseminated the project and caused an immediate reaction in the House of Commons¹⁵.

¹³ UKFIC: non-governmental organization established in London to defend the interests of the FIC.

¹⁴ Argie: pejorative term used to designate Argentine people.

¹⁵ LOWELL S. GUSTAFSON, *The Sovereignty Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands*, Oxford University Press, 1988, page 101.

In addition to that setback, in 1977, Governor Neville A. French was replaced by James R. Parker, who arrived with instructions to harden relations. Among other measures, he created the Deputy Governor position, thus breaking off direct contact with the Vicecomodoro. Conditions became stricter: only Transportes Navales' vessels that had requested permission in advance were authorized to dock at the pier.

In Comodoro Rivadavia, Gas del Estado trained a Malvinas islander to install natural gas in a hundred houses. When the time came to enable the connections, senior staff members traveled to the islands. Since an inspector found faults in one of the houses, the local radio broadcast the disagreement between the worker and the Argentine company as if it were a



Bienvenido a Las Malvinas.

El Comando en Jefe de la Fuerza Aérea Argentina estableció una agencia de Líneas Aéreas del Estado en Puerto Stanley.

Una pista de aterrizaje será construida por el Grupo 1 de Mantenimiento con materiales y técnicas de avanzada.

Así se establecerá el primer servicio de comunicación aérea entre Las Malvinas y Comodoro Rivadavia. Aviones G-II —de fabricación nacional— operados por LADE, realizarán el transporte de pasajeros y carga.

Como vehículo exclusivo para la base y apoyo en tierra para el servicio, la Fuerza Aérea Argentina seleccionó un Pick-Up Dodge D-200 V8 de 202 HP.

Algo que enorgullece a Chrysler Fevre Argentina

e Igarreta su concesionario oficial para ventas al gobierno por cuyo intermedio se entregó el Pick-Up Dodge.

Este vehículo resulta especialmente apto para misiones en la zona, por su tracción en todas las ruedas, su potencia, su capacidad para 6 pasajeros y equipajes, caja de 6 velocidades de avance y dos de retroceso.

Todo esto demuestra lo que es anticipación automotriz en la Argentina.

Las Malvinas nos dieron la bienvenida por primera vez.

No será la última.



FUERZA AEREA ARGENTINA.
LINEAS AEREAS DEL ESTADO.

Ad showing the delivery of a utility vehicle by Chrysler Fevre Argentina to LADE for its use at Stanley Port

Photo courtesy of: Brigadier VGM (R) Bloomer Reeve



G-II VR-16 radio aid verification aircraft at Stanley Port airdrome - Photo courtesy of: Vcom. VGM (R) Agnoletti

matter of state. In response to the installer's resignation, the Vicecomodoro asked him to reconsider his behavior for the community's sake. When it seemed that there were no more obstacles because the technician had accepted the apologies, required that the bills be paid in Argentine pesos instead of Malvinas island pounds. Eventually, thanks to the governor's mediation, residents had natural gas at home.

On 1 December 1977, in compliance with the 1971 agreements, the company hired by the United Kingdom finished building the airport and the 1,250-meter long asphalt runway on the Freycinet Peninsula, near Cape San Felipe. The first Argentine aircraft to land was the twin-turboprop IA-50 G-II radio aid verification aircraft, registration mark VR-16, flown by Mayor Juan C. Agnoletti¹⁶.

1978. Vicecomodoro Eduardo Julián Canosa

He held the position from February 1978 to 1980. During the Advisory Commission's first official meeting, he expressed the need for finding some land, within the airport area, to build an aviation fuel plant. Furthermore, he required that radio frequencies of Comodoro Rivadavia Flight Information Region (FIR) and of the Search and Rescue¹⁷ service should be answered in both English and Spanish to ensure scheduled flight operation; that the Transportes Navales vessel be granted greater accessibility at the FIC dock; and that a new house or a building site for constructing one —intended for the Argentine representative— was purchased.

On 17 May 1978, the Argentine Air Force's twin-engine jet aircraft Fokker F-28, registration mark TC-52, landed at the newly authorized airdrome, thus inaugurating the new LADE service. The crew consisted of aircraft commander, Mayor Armando E. Buira; co-pilot, Capitán Luis C. Sabolo; aircraft mechanic, Suboficial Auxiliar González; and the cargo handling assistant, Suboficial Mayor Antonio Pereyra. A new period to integrate islanders to the mainland was beginning.

Thanks to the airstrip and the radio navigation (VOR) established by the Argentine Air Force, the advanced Fokker F-28 left islanders just one hour and twenty minutes away from

¹⁶ JUAN CARLOS AGNOLETTI, *Crónicas malvinenses*, Volume 1, Buenos Aires, Cadan Publishing House, 2010, page 43.

¹⁷ FIR: Flight Information Region. SAR: Search and Rescue.



Fokker F-28 at Stanley airport performing a LADE scheduled flight - Photo courtesy of: Brig. VGM (R) Bloomer Reeve

Comodoro Rivadavia healthcare services, the thriving oil capital of southern Argentina. Until 1982, the twin-engine aircraft had flown 639 hours.

The F-28 service made a most auspicious start. In spite of that, Canosa was concerned about the islanders' attitude who were displeased with the negotiations progress. The British part of the Advisory Commission expressed dissatisfaction with aircraft lack of punctuality, and, furthermore, with the pollution caused by Transportes Navales. Some people thought that if in the end sovereignty were transferred, Malvinas Islands would sink into oblivion, the same as had occurred with Tierra del Fuego and Patagonia. According to them, it would become another Isla de los Estados (Staten Island) in a short time. They also stressed the anxiety they suffered every time they traveled to the mainland and the return flight was delayed. Furthermore, difficulties related to vessel-transported cargo arose. Food products were rejected for being unsuitable; for example, there were cereals with weevils and unsealed oils. When winter came, a problem emerged once it was confirmed that the VOR equipment was operating with some deficiencies. The Advisory Commission required a new power line. A month later, the equipment operation was stabilized by technicians from Comodoro Rivadavia.

During the summer, there was a ceaseless influx of tourists and official visitors, mostly British. In meetings, a recurring topic was communications progress, which had changed life on the islands. Another one was the growing political activity of a group of islanders who advocated for maintaining autonomy should the United Kingdom stand apart.

The British Prime Minister's arrival heightened comments and discussions about sovereignty. During the official reception, the official informed Vicecomodoro Canosa that the land requested for the house had been granted.

By the end of the winter, as erosion had undermined the aluminum airstrip base, a storm of wind and rain blew some plates over the route to the airport. Islanders cleared the road and asked the Argentine Air Force to transport them back to the mainland. With the help of local government's machines and other machines hired from the Falkland Islands Company, a group of Argentinian people arranged the freight for sea transportation. They worked for two months and, to the delight of both Catholics and the community, they painted Santa María church.

After a visit from Remonta y Veterinaria del Ejército, a trip was planned with about fifty islanders to visit Argentine cities and the Rural Exhibition. The organization was flawless and, for most of them, it was their first trip to the mainland. Upon returning, the pro-British



Stanley airport runway finished - Photo courtesy of: Com. (R) Canosa

group received them with signs accusing them of traitors. Travelers answered by laughing and clapping.

1980. Vicecomodoro Héctor Ricardo Gilobert

In the early eighties, the United Kingdom started to seek a solution to the sovereignty dispute by means of a lease back, i.e. renting the islands for a long period. Although the proposal did not fully satisfy aspirations, it represented a step forward and a radical change in the British attitude, since it deviated from previous delaying tactics. Furthermore, thanks to the services established under the 1971 agreements, life conditions improved in Stanley. A decade after LADE flights had started operating, Malvinas settlers openly enjoyed the goods they received from Argentina.

That was the situation when Vicecomodoro Héctor R. Gilobert, the fifth Argentine representative on the Special Advisory Commission, arrived. Concurrently with the arrival, the Governor, the Government Secretary and the Anglican Cathedral Reverend were replaced. In other words, except for the FIC's manager, the most influential British authorities were renewed.

Gilobert held office from February 1980 to the beginning of February 1982. Under his command, the following personnel served in Malvinas: Miguel Olachea, as LADE agency Chief; Richard Anderson and Alexander Betts (Malvinas settlers), assistants; Suboficiales Principales Héctor Blanco and L. Peralta, radio operators and tower controllers; Mauricio Matthews and Alicia Zapata Matthews, Spanish teachers; Luis Boursenard and José L. Boscardín, YPF plant Directors; and Carlos Degesse, assistant; Capitán de Fragata Rodolfo Gafoglio (nonresident), Transportes Navales; Richard Anderson (Malvinas settler), Gas del Estado Plant and Marketing Manager.

At first, the new authorities treated Vicecomodoro Gilobert in a smooth and preferential manner which was evident in social or working meetings. The 1971 Agreement implementation or interpretation problems were analyzed without speculations and with an open-minded approach, thus allowing for quick solutions. Also, ideas emerged to increase and deepen cooperation. Both Governor Rex Hunt and Secretary Dick Baker's stance on this improved relationships.

The most significant sign of that policy possibly was approving the construction of the Argentine representative's residence, which was only later surpassed in size and hierarchy by the Governor's residence. The permission had been postponed due to the fierce opposition from contending groups to grant the Vicecomodoro a status equal to that of the British authorities.

British disposition remained unchanged on the personal level, even in the most tense moments. In spite of local inconveniences, problems between the nations were cordially addressed. They always used to reach acceptable agreements without the need of appealing to the Argentine Foreign Office. They clearly knew that the sovereignty conflict resolution depended exclusively on their central governments and not on the position adopted in Stanley. It was clear that the better they understood each other, better conclusions would be reached. In this way, service quality was enhanced, and little by little, the inhabitants' goodwill was being gained.

Nevertheless, contact with the local community was hard. Their cautious attitude and the language barrier posed a problem. Mastering English was decisive to participate in social life and avoid loneliness, as it happened to civilian employees. Natives distrusted both the Argentinians and the British. With the typical islander or farmer's idiosyncrasy, they were elusive and reserved. They preferred to continue isolated. In spite of that, once those barriers were overcome, they were kind and simple. Argentine children used to learn English fast at school and made friends with Malvinas Islands' children who —unaware of the territorial dispute— fraternized with them without prejudice.

Gilbert's wife was three months pregnant when she arrived. As medical care on the island was good, she decided to give birth in Malvinas. By mid-July 1980, Mariana was born in the King Edward Memorial Hospital. The birth accelerated the family's integration into the community, although at first Gilbert family's decision had caused resentment since it was feared that a propaganda maneuver with the baby's Argentine citizenship would be used. Once they were convinced that would not occur, they showed friendliness towards the family.

Unsuspected communication channels opened up, facilitating the family's relationship with even the Resistance's hardest members. Friendship allowed them to be informed about the opinions and true feelings as regards the conflict. Gilbert understood that it would be hard for Argentine claims to be accepted, at least, by that generation.

Out of the people accompanying him during his office, the best known was the YPF assistant. A young and single man who suffered living alone until he started frequenting bars. On Fridays, he participated in the traditional celebration of the weekend's arrival and the habitual fights which were the crowning point of those peculiar meetings, according to British deep-rooted customs. At first, the Vicecomodoro was worried about that behavior. Later, he noticed that those episodes belonged to folklore and tempered friendship, since on the next day they would play rugby as if nothing had occurred. Carlos Degesse seemed to be a native, he felt integrated and respected. During the war, he stayed in Stanley; he acted bravely refueling aircraft, even under fire, and that was why he was given an award by the Argentine Air Force.

Beyond their pleasant attitude, Malvinas settlers traditionally rejected the sovereignty change. They resisted any actions that would represent an advance in negotiations. The opposition expressed itself in different ways, according to how interests, traditions and the way of life were affected.

Senior officials, most of them from the United Kingdom, accepted their central government political decisions without hesitation; though they avoided taking sides or showing sympathy for one side or the other since they were not at all concerned about the island's fate. Another group made up of citizens from the British Commonwealth (New Zealanders, Australians, Canadians) and a few Chileans and Uruguayans showed consi-

derable opposition. They thought they would be adversely affected since, as they were neither British citizens nor Malvinas settlers, they had no rights to claim for benefits.

The third group was made up of the natives, most of them Scottish or Welsh descendants with several generations on the islands. They did not understand or justify the Argentine claims based on history or on titles inherited from Spain. Furthermore, being receptive to propaganda, they considered Argentina a strange country, with a different language, religion, different costumes and habits. The few pieces of news they heard referred to the military government, inflation, strikes and other problems they did not experience because they lived on those far away islands. They suspected the British would abandon them and feared an Argentine invasion.

In short, the population did not want relations to progress; they only accepted business relations since they could be controlled without compromising lifestyle. The greatest resistance was mounted by those who considered their interests were being put at risk and they opposed by taking direct action measures. The Falkland Islands Company (FIC) held the lead.

As it had controlled the economic activity for decades, the FIC feared facing competition and did not foresee good prospects in case sovereignty status changed. On the contrary, they knew they would lose privileges; therefore, they mounted and backed smear actions, supported by the difficult circumstances the country was going through.

The UKFIC delegation, that defended the FIC's interests in London, was made up of natives and British from different social levels. While their actions benefited the company's objectives, their motivations were not the same. They expressed, perhaps too vehemently, the feelings of both the population and other institutions such as the Royal Navy. They were simple people, with deep-rooted nationalist feelings and attachment to the United Kingdom's traditions.

Those groups neutralized the Argentine psychological actions by disseminating information that damaged the Argentine image. Also, by means of cunning tricks, they sought to distort the benefits that the population was effectively receiving from the services they were provided with. Perhaps as a consequence of some form of extortion, the students who were attending British schools both at Buenos Aires and La Cumbre in Córdoba, expressed themselves as if they had been instilled great love for the United Kingdom and some scorn for Argentina. This means that, after years of effort had gone by, instead of supporters, they gained tens of opponents.

Then, it was concluded that the best countermeasure to reduce those effects would be to grant scholarships to attend the Liceo Aeronáutico Militar in Rosario. Later, vacancies for the Liceo Naval Femenino would be negotiated; that idea was not materialized due to the course of events. The young man Paul Betts, who belonged to a family with five generations on the islands, attended the Liceo Aeronáutico.

At first, he had difficulties to adapt himself, particularly due to the language. Later, he managed to find his way thanks to the institute directors' resolution and willingness. Paul was attending the second year when hostilities began. He decided to continue and graduated from high school in 1985, as an Argentine Reserve Alférez. He never returned to Malvinas, he got married and lives with his family in Rosario at present. That isolated case alarmed opponents due to the enthusiasm it generated among other young people who were not stopped by political speculations and kept alive hopes to also wear the *Liceo* uniform.

Líneas Aéreas del Estado was the best instrument found to gain trust. Aware of that, the "anti-Argentinian" acted shrewdly and established a travel agency at the FIC's offices. For some time, they managed to keep settlers away from Argentina since they offered better economic benefits. They even sold LADE and Aerolíneas Argentinas tickets, as well as international tickets in their capacity of British Airways representatives.

With this new modality, Malvinas Islands travelers —most of them FIC's or government's employees— stopped attending the Argentine office. Reservations and payments were made at the company. Moreover, they tried to obtain the totality of seats from LADE so that they could monopolize the sales and control who and when traveled. Also, they prepared travel packages including a LADE flight to Comodoro Rivadavia, a connection flight by Aerolíneas Argentinas or Austral to Aeroparque, and British Airways personnel's coordination, who waited for passengers, guided them to a hotel and, on the next day took them from Ezeiza airport to London. It was an ideal offer for islanders, who felt assisted and protected while traveling through a country "with such a poor reputation."

FIC's campaign was not easy to neutralize since its procedures were legal and complied with the rules of the International Air Transport Association (IATA)¹⁸. Only a better proposal could help to regain passengers. With that purpose, LADE's Director, Comodoro Hugo J. Liernur, changed the F-28 weekly flight route and schedule. It would stay overnight in Stanley and early depart back to Aeroparque, with stopovers in Comodoro Rivadavia, Bahía Blanca and Ezeiza. Thus, the international airport would be reached in good time to get onboard Aerolíneas Argentinas flight to London, which had the advantage of being a direct flight. In contrast, the British Airways flight had stopovers. The innovation halved traveling time and saved the expenses of transportation and overnight stays.

In order to improve assistance at Stanley agency, a trustworthy islander was employed: Alexander Betts, cadet Paul's father. His presence proved to be very useful due to his familiar relationship with the residents. In this way, the FIC's special advantage was equalized: «office run by its own people.»

From the beginning of LADE operation in Malvinas, at the local government's request, Richard Anderson was hired as Base Commander assistant, who barely spoke Spanish. Over time, it was discovered that he was actually an official spy. He kept the government, the FIC and the UKFIC well informed about what happened at the offices and, specifically, at the Vicecomodoro's office. As uncomfortable as the situation was, it had to be accepted and discreetly dealt with. It even allowed for taking counterintelligence measures by spreading news that would misinform the opponent.

Also, the incorporation of two Malvinas island young girls as flight attendants (stewardesses) to assist LADE flights to Stanley was contemplated. The initiative aroused great expectations, but potential candidates were still underage, and those over eighteen were already married and had children. Finally, war thwarted the idea.

As an additional service, LADE used to coordinate exchange orders. Each aircraft used to arrive with fresh food supplies, fruits and vegetables, free of charge, as well as household items and appliances which had been repaired in the mainland. Comodoro Rivadavia personnel prepared the orders and favored the performance of the Argentine representatives in Malvinas.

Neither the FIC, nor the UKFIC tried to impose restraints on that matter; maybe because their members made frequent use of that good will service. They only raised their complaints to the government when orders included potatoes claiming phytosanitary reasons. Though, their real purpose was to prevent Malvinas settlers from abandoning the tradition of growing their own vegetable garden, a stronghold of self-supply.

During Vicecomodoro Gilbert's office, extension works at the liquid gas cylinders and bottles storage facilities were carried out with the purpose of satisfying the daily growing demand. Indeed, consumption had spread among the population due to the intrinsic advantages of fuel and its low sale price in Stanley. Residents seemed to be determined to abandon the time-honored and hard practice of extracting and using peat.

¹⁸ IATA (International Air Transport Association): encourages the safety, reliability, trust and economy in the air transport field for the benefit of airline companies.

Gas del Estado engineers, by means of presentations and demonstrations, revealed the advantages of the fluid usage and the company's efficiency to develop trust about continuity and due supply. Once the armed conflict was over and the Argentine depot was out of stock, Malvinas settlers returned to peat for a long time since the supply from the United Kingdom rendered the price unaffordable. Nowadays, they are supplied from Chile.

The FIC allowed the entry of goods only if they obtained good profits. In their capacity of dock owner, they charged a high price for loading, unloading, transportation, and handling. In the end, due to docking fees, the national company ended up paying more than what it collected from sales. As a countermeasure, it was proposed to adjust the price by adding the costs imposed by the FIC. The 45 kg-cylinder price rose from 7 to 14 pounds. On a percentage basis, that accounted for a 100% increase.

Gas del Estado did not have its own personnel in Malvinas. Container sales and distribution were entrusted to Richard Anderson. However, the company's engineers traveled frequently to Stanley. 2 April 1982 surprised them on the islands and that night, while they were under arrest with other Argentine citizens, they lived recapture alternatives under the armed surveillance of the British strength.

YPF's investment in Malvinas was huge. Some years before, they had built a large-sized plant in the adjacent bay to perform fuel supply with tankers. The depot was not opened because the British authorities required a special dock to unload in the safest way possible therefore preventing water contamination.

That way, YPF efforts failed while the FIC took advantage since, as fuel could not be unloaded in bulk, it was transported in drums to their dock. Gas del Estado was in the same situation. The impossibility to use the plant and the high transportation costs led YPF to limit the supply of jet fuel for LADE aircraft, of gasoline for vehicles and of kerosene. The FIC maintained the sale of gas oil for the Land Rover vehicles and fuel oil for the power plant.

Teachers' activities did not face any problems. The task was performed by a young Scottish married couple, which facilitated contact with the local educational community. Moreover, children's level of prejudice was lower. The rest of the colleagues did not get interested or involved in the territorial dispute. Different was the case of the relationship established between the Argentine representative and the British authorities, which had started to show thorny problems.

While crises started to occur on a daily basis, solutions were harder to be reached. The need to state they were the government and would impose their decisions based on their interests was always present. In turn, Gilobert had to reject the measures that evaded agreements or hindered national agencies' action in Malvinas. Both the Government Secretary and the Governor reserved themselves the referee role.

In that context, significant public conflicts arose and their development was closely monitored by the Argentine Foreign Office. The FIC invalidated the criteria established for Transportes Navales ships' arrivals, from docking time to unloading time. Agreements were reached through the Advisory Commission intervention. Certainly, the FIC always won since they charged the time spent at the dock.

After the visit of the Foreign Office¹⁹ Secretary, Nicholas Ridley, tensions rose. UKFIC's members painted inscriptions on YPF facilities repudiating both the negotiations and the Argentina. When the claim was made, the authorities made light of it and, implying that they did not consider it important to identify those responsible, they left things as they were. In order to force a reaction, the Vicecomodoro Gilobert told the Government Secretary he suspected that the fuel could have been adulterated and, in consequence, he would suspend LADE flights until doubts were resolved.

¹⁹ Foreign Office: British Foreign Office.

The good quality verification required sending samples to YPF laboratories on an aircraft whose endurance would allow it to perform a round trip without refueling in Stanley.

In other words, the solution would be delayed and, in the meantime, the services would remain suspended unless the responsible parties declared that there had been no adulteration. Upon being warned about the damages, the residents reacted. The affected parties would be passengers with scheduled vacations and local stores due to the absence of tourists. The government changed its attitude. That same afternoon, the perpetrators were located and assured that the fuel was in good condition. The authorities ensured the assertion veracity and took over responsibility for cleaning up the plant. Terry Peck was the head of the young people who painted inscriptions. The residents became aware of the inconveniences and unanimously condemned the group. They turned from heroes to villains. That made them calm down and they did not cause any trouble for some time.

On another occasion, some moments before the F-28 weekly flight arrival, Fitzgerald Cheek, the airport manager told LADE manager that, from that moment on, that company's signalman would not enter the platform to perform his duties since aircraft would be guided by an airdrome's employee. Although the measure —which seemed unimportant— could have been considered an attempt to relieve the burden of tasks, the UKFIC's policy was intended to gradually dislodge the Argentineans until their presence in Malvinas became unnecessary.

As the airport manager was an active member of that committee, his decision did not draw anybody's attention. Upon knowing about that pretension, the Vicecomodoro Gilbert ordered Suboficial Principal Peralta —Spanish tower operator for LADE aircraft— that the F-28 returned to the runway threshold and held position there until the restriction was modified. The delay created a climate of tension among the passengers and those who were waiting for them at the station.

Without delay, Gilbert met the governor who was in the airport waiting for his son who was arriving from London. This circumstance gave the situation a certain seriousness. Hunt listened to the Vicecomodoro and deemed his arguments reasonable: no airline would trust non-certified personnel to guide taxiing to the hydrant and, least of all without certification. Nobody tried to implement that arbitrary measure ever again.

The massive presence of visitors from the mainland and their eagerness to buy every single cheap trinket offered in Stanley did the Argentine image no good. Representatives were always worried about moderating that behavior by means of pre-arrival recommendations. Every effort was useless. Although they were eager listeners, they could not help being noisy when the time came.

Many fellow countrymen who visited the islands contributed to show positive aspects of the Argentine society. Aircraft crews had great prestige and appreciation. Also, they were admired for their operational professionalism. No LADE flight underwent an emergency. The same occurred with teachers and YPF and Gas del Estado's personnel. Residents fondly remembered Vicecomodoros De la Colina, Bloomer Reeve, Carnelli and Canosa, and their families.

The opening of LADE House residence coincided with the tenth anniversary of air services to Malvinas and generated another disagreement. A social meeting that would be attended by authorities of the Argentine Air Force, the Argentine Foreign Office and the islands was organized. Upon learning about it, UKFIC's members showed their opposition and threatened to manifest repudiating Argentina's representatives. The reaction was so hard and determined that the local government and the Vicecomodoro were concerned about it: the celebration could turn into an embarrassing episode and complicate relations.

The previous week to the scheduled date, tension had risen so much that the British proposed to cancel the ceremony and, in replacement, hold a modest open house without the presence of Argentines. Gilbert, who was about to accept that condition, visited the UKFIC's most

influential members to especially invite them; he nicely appealed to the proverbial British chivalry. The celebration was a success. Most people attended and fraternized with the authorities. At present, LADE House is a war museum and it is called Britannia House.

By mid-August 1981, the local dairy farm owner visited the Vicecomodoro's house. He expressed his distress because, due to an unexpected delay in the ship's arrival, many farms had run out of animal feed and they feared they would die in a few days. In response to the emergency, Gilobert informed the residents he would arrange a flight to address emergencies. Under the approval of the Argentine Foreign Office, the Argentine Air Force sent an Hercules C-130H. Three days later, despite the British displeasure, the shortage was solved. It was the first time Malvinas settlers had by-passed rulers and fulfilled their needs at LADE's office.

In retaliation, the authorities showed obstructive behaviors. The most evident was the customs officer's intransigence when denying permission to unload from the C-130H three sacks of potatoes which were coming from Comodoro Rivadavia and intended for the Argentines. He sheltered behind phytosanitary regulations: the sacks could not touch the ground. The real reason was they wanted to reaffirm the British authority. Fortunately, the goods had been placed behind the access door blocking the rest of the load. The Vicecomodoro decided that if the potatoes were not unloaded, the bags with livestock feed would not be unloaded either. As it was a Saturday afternoon, most residents were at the airport. Some of them eagerly awaited the goods; others only wanted to see the C-130H operation. Everyone witnessed the situation.

Gilobert went to the Government Secretary's house and, to his surprise, he was told the Secretary had left and his return date was unknown. He went to the Governor's residence, whose presence was also denied under the pretext of walking in the fields. A couple of hours later, the order had not been revoked yet because the authorities did not appear. Meanwhile, the people present watched in distress how the food intended to save their animals' lives were kept inside the plane, with the possibility of returning to its place of origin.

The Vicecomodoro resorted to the neighbors and told them that only Secretary Baker or Governor Hunt could reverse the situation. They immediately went to trace them. Half an hour later, the order was countermanded, after receiving a severe reprimand for having addressed LADE's Manager without previous notice to the government.

The fact that White Cards were issued by Argentine authorities hurt the British pride, especially that of the UKFIC's members, who resisted going to LADE to obtain it. Avoiding that provision, which subjected them to the *argies'* control, represented a challenge for some islanders. On one occasion, Desmond Peck, a native and UKFIC's member, decided to travel to the United Kingdom thanks to the prosperity achieved selling trinkets to tourists. While processing the ticket, he stated that he held the White Card from the times of Vicecomodoro Carnelli and that he would show it before boarding the plane.

On the departure day, Peck arrived just in time and passengers were already on board. When LADE's Chief asked him for the White Card, he said it was in the suitcase he had sent to the cargo hold—he had speculated that, in the rush of departure, he would not be asked for it—and he hurriedly got onto the plane. Once the Vicecomodoro was informed of that, he got on board the plane and, adopting a friendly attitude, he reminded him that he would be able to fly only if he showed that document. He was forced to postpone the trip until he met the requirement. Both Peck and the population reacted with a sense of humor to the episode. Furthermore, it was made clear that it was hard to evade said control and the White Card requirement had to be seriously taken.



Provisional certificate known as "White Card"

1982. Vicecomodoro Roberto Manuel Gamen

Gamen was the last commanding officer appointed to live in Stanley and hold the position of Argentine representative on the Special Advisory Commission and LADE agency's Director. He arrived in Malvinas on January 27th 1982 with his family. His term overlapped with that of Gilbert's until February 3rd, when he moved into the brand new LADE House.

In welcome gatherings and during the early days, a friendly and optimistic atmosphere as regards the islands sovereignty future was sensed. That situation began to change from the early days of March and reached a crisis point on the 19th, when Davidoff's team disembarked on Georgia Islands. He was an Argentine businessman who had been hired by a British company to scrap three obsolete whaling factories²⁰.

Before moving to Malvinas, Vicecomodoro Gamen was aware of the secret plan to recover sovereignty by employing the Armed Forces, though he did not know the exact execution date.

By the end of February, he participated in the coordination of a secret mission devised by the Argentine Air Force *Jefatura III*: a Malvinas VOR verification task would be simulated but, instead of being executed by the INAC²¹ radio aid verification Learjet 35 A, the flight would be performed by a photo reconnaissance Learjet 35 A of the II Brigada Aérea (2nd Air Brigade), with the purpose of carrying out a photographic survey of Puerto Stanley and its adjacent areas. The material would be used to plan the islands' recapture operation.

Gamen coordinated that an INAC's NCO would do the reception on the island for that operation ground support so that the British would not be suspicious of the aircraft change. Due to unfavorable weather conditions and because the verification process could not last more than three days, the Learjet returned to Paraná without having completed the required survey.

²⁰ Haydée Gamen's testimony, widow of Vicecomodoro Roberto Manuel Gamen.

²¹ Instituto Nacional de Aviación Civil (Argentine Civil Aviation National Institute).

On a second secret mission with the purpose of completing the previous one, Gamen participated directly. On 12 March, he adduced his wife was sick and, with the excuse of treating her, he traveled to Buenos Aires on a LADE scheduled flight. The mission consisted in returning him to Malvinas.

On 19 March, Vicecomodoro Gamen went aboard a photo reconnaissance Learjet 35 A. It took off from Río Gallegos and, when overflying Malvinas, the aircraft commander pretended he had a landing gear failure; he performed several verification passages over the airport control tower and, therefore, completed the photographic task they had started in February. The photographers and the material used were left back in Río Gallegos. Then, it departed again towards Malvinas carrying Vicecomodoro Gamen, who got off on Stanley Port platform with the engines on. The Learjet returned to Río Gallegos immediately.

On 22 March, because of the protests sparked off by Davidoff's disembarkation on Georgia Islands, LADE offices were attacked. The life of the Gamen family, as well as that of the Argentine residents, got complicated. From that moment on, they would be watched. Some days later, when it was known Task Force 40 had departed from the mainland towards the islands, they were confined to their houses, under the custody of armed islanders, members of Civil Defense.

From 2 April to 1 May, Vicecomodoro Gamen gave advice and fulfilled reconnaissance tasks on probable British task forces landing sites, by flying the plane Britten Islander²².

Situation by 31 March 1982

Argentine actions seeking Malvinas settlers' welfare were at their height. Islanders enjoyed, without reservations, the services they received thanks to 1971 agreements.

It is worth mentioning the most important ones:

- Two weekly LADE F-27 and F-28 flights, which permitted tourists' visit and stay, with the subsequent profits for the trade and hotel industries.
- Postal and cargo services in all flights enabling the regular arrival of mail, newspapers, magazines, videos, films to be projected at the local cinema, supply of vegetables, fruits and medicine.
- Through YPF, regular provision of fuel and kerosene. Gas oil, fuel oil and lubricants were traded by the Falkland Islands Company.
- Liquid gas in bottles and cylinders provided by Gas del Estado, which had to enlarge its storage plant to fulfill demand.
- Transportes Navales, under the Argentine Navy, offered sea transportation with a four-month frequency that ensured the supply of gas, fuel and other products such as flour, corn, balanced food and groceries.
- Spanish lessons at Stanley's schools, taught by Argentine bilingual teachers.
- Scholarships for attending High School at British schools in Argentina.
- Increase of both Argentine and international tourism, and of the related trade industry.

For ten years, the Argentine Air Force carried out 1515 sorties adding up to 3553 flight hours, during which 21597 passengers and 465763 kgs of cargo were transported. After considerable efforts, and working jointly with other Argentine State agencies, in spite of Falkland Islands Company and UKFIC committee's interferences, the islanders' life quality

²² British Government's official aircraft intended for local flights which, occasionally, distributed correspondence among settlers from the islands interior.

was improved. The already popular islanders, who lived in a group of islands, did not have citizenship and constituted a colony unknown to the British. In fact, they knew about its location on the map on 2 April 1982.

Unfortunately, the peaceful actions seriously and positively carried out for both nations, with the purpose of negotiating sovereignty within a reasonable time frame, were not properly understood by the beneficiaries.



Annex 1

Joint Statement of Buenos Aires of 1st July 1971

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship

Special conversations were continued in Buenos Aires from the 21st until the 30th of June 1971 about communications and movement between delegations of the Government of the Argentine Republic and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the latter including participants from the Islands. The conversations were held within the general framework of the negotiations recommended by resolution 2065 (xx) of the General Assembly of the United Nations and in accordance with letters addressed to the Secretary-General of the Organization by the Permanent Representatives of both countries on the 21st of November 1969 and the 11th of December 1970.

The delegates concluded that, subject to the approval of their Governments, the following measures should be adopted on the understanding that they may contribute to the process of a definitive solution to the dispute between the two Governments over the Islands which is referred to in resolution 2065 (xx) mentioned above.

- 1. In order to deal with questions which might arise over the setting up and promotion of communications between the Argentine mainland and the Malvinas Islands in both directions, including questions relating to the movement of persons, those which might arise for residents of the Islands while on the mainland and those concerning residents of the mainland while on the Islands, a special consultative committee should be set up, consisting of representatives of the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the British Embassy, with its headquarters in Buenos Aires. The committee should have its representatives in Port Stanley who would keep it informed.*
- 2. The Argentine Government shall issue a document, according to the annexed model, to residents of the Malvinas Islands irrespective of their nationality who wished to travel to the Argentine mainland, which would allow them free movement within it.*

A document in the same form issued by the Argentine Government shall be the only document needed by residents of the Argentine mainland for journeys to the Malvinas Islands.

- 3. Residents in the Malvinas Islands shall be exempted by the Argentine Government from all duties, taxes, and any other obligations arising from activities in the Malvinas Islands. In addition, residents of the Malvinas Islands who go to the Argentine mainland in order to provide services connected with communications shall be exempted from taxes on their salaries and other emoluments which they receive from their British employers.*

The British Government shall not demand tax payment to residents of the Argentine mainland providing services in the Malvinas Islands for activities related to communications on their salaries and other emoluments they receive from their Argentine employers.

- 4. The Argentine Government shall take the necessary practical measures so that the normal luggage of residents of the Malvinas Islands who travel between the Malvinas Islands and the Argentine mainland in either direction be free from the payment of all duties and taxes.*

Residents of the Malvinas Islands shall be exempted from the payment of all Argentine duties and taxes in respect of their luggage, household effects and motor cars passing directly through the Argentine mainland towards the Malvinas Islands or going abroad through the Argentine mainland.

The British Government shall take the necessary measures so that the normal luggage of residents of the Argentine mainland who travel between the Argentine mainland and the Malvinas Islands in either direction will be exempted from the payment of all duties and taxes.

5. *The Argentine Government shall take the necessary measures so that each resident of the Islands who establishes a permanent residence on the Argentine mainland may bring in once only free of all duties and taxes all personal effects, household effects and a motor car.*

Equally, the British Government shall take the necessary measures so that each resident on the Argentine mainland who establishes a permanent residence in the Malvinas Islands, may bring in once only free of all duties and taxes all personal effects, household effects and a motor car.

6. *The Argentine and British Governments shall facilitate on the Argentine mainland and in the Malvinas Islands respectively, the transit, residence and work of persons directly concerned with practical measures adopted in order to implement and promote communications and movement.*
7. *The British Government shall take the necessary measures to arrange for a regular shipping service for passengers, cargo and mail between the Malvinas Islands and the Argentine mainland.*
8. *The Argentine Government shall take the necessary measures to arrange for a regular service of weekly frequency by air for passengers, cargo and mail between the Argentine mainland and the Malvinas Islands.*
9. *Pending the completion of the airfield at Port Stanley, the Argentine Government shall provide a temporary service by amphibian aircraft between the Argentine mainland and the Malvinas Islands for passengers, cargo and mail. This service shall be reviewed from time to time in the light of progress in the construction of the airfield mentioned above.*
10. *Both Governments shall cooperate over the simplifications of administrative practices, regulations and documentation for sea and air transport bearing in mind the need to promote and speed up communications.*
11. *In order to facilitate the movement of persons born in the Malvinas Islands, the Argentine Government shall take the necessary measures to exempt them from all obligations related to enlistment and military service.*

The British Government shall declare that in the Malvinas Islands non-obligations for military service enlistment exist.

12. *Both Governments shall study and exchange views on measures to facilitate trade and to permit a greater ease of commercial transactions.*
13. *The Argentine and British Governments shall take the necessary measures so that postal, telegraphic and telephone communications in both directions between the Argentine mainland and the Malvinas Islands are as effective and expeditious as possible.*
14. *The tariffs for postal, telegraphic and telephone communications in both directions between the Argentine mainland and the Malvinas Islands shall be at a rate equivalent to the internal rate at the place of origin of the communications.*
15. *Postage stamps on mail travelling between the Argentine mainland and the Malvinas Islands in either direction shall be cancelled with a mark referring to this Joint Statement. Mail bags shall be similarly marked.*

16. *The Argentine Government shall be prepared to cooperate in the health, educational, agricultural and technical fields if so requested.*

The Argentine Government shall arrange for places to be available in schools on the Argentine mainland for the children of residents of the Malvinas Islands and should offer scholarships which should be published from time to time, the number of which shall be decided upon in the light of local requirements.

Both Governments shall continue to exchange views on the matters referred to in this paragraph.

17. *Conversations shall be continued through the customary diplomatic channels and the next meeting should be held in Port Stanley in 1972.*
18. *If either Government shall decide to terminate the measures referred to above, it shall give six months' notice of its decision to the other Government.*

Minister Juan Carlos Beltramino
Head of the Argentine Delegation

Minister David Aubrey Scott
Head of the British Delegation



Chapter 2

On the way to April 2nd



International political context

First of all, it is necessary to remember that British claims over the Malvinas Islands are based on the use of force principle instead of on the right granted by discovery or first occupation. The causes forcing the natives of the Río de la Plata Argentine Confederation in 1833 out of the Islands and the taking back of the archipelago in 1982 were only concordant with the United Kingdom's strategic need to defend its interests as a naval sea power and to keep the dominance of the sea.

At a glance, it is easily understood that the Malvinas archipelago is a key to controlling naval and vessel traffic on the South Atlantic, thus, controlling the islands was a long-standing objective which did not depend on the government in office, but on the British imperial concept still valid in the 21st Century.

In 1824, Bernardino Rivadavia, in his capacity of Minister of the Argentine Government, obtained a one-million-pound-loan from the British company Baring Brothers for investing in harbor and sanitary infrastructure works in Buenos Aires. These works were never undertaken and the loan set limits on the strategic situation, to such extent that, in 1828 due to non-payment, the naval squadron was worked off, and two frigates under construction in the United Kingdom were part-exchanged. Thus, there was no naval force to counteract the Malvinas Islands usurpation in 1833.

Only three years after the Malvinas Islands were taken by force, Mariscal Santa Cruz, President of the Peru-Bolivian Confederation, started a war against Argentina and Chile (1836-1839), influenced by France, who supplied weapons, and counted on the diplomatic support of the UK. This opened up a second front for the national government which would make it even more difficult to pay the loan.

While this was going on, the Argentine Confederation waged an 11-year-war (between 1838 and 1849) against France and the UK, caused by the French naval blockade against Buenos Aires, who wanted free navigation for European commercial and naval fleets on the Paraná River.

The war fought between the Argentine Confederation and the alliance consisting of the Empire of Brazil, Uruguay, and the Argentine provinces of Entre Ríos and Corrientes (1851-1852), was part of a long-standing dispute between Argentina and Brazil for influence over Uruguay and Paraguay, which was supported by the United Kingdom in order to reduce Argentine dominance and open up the De la Plata and Paraná Rivers for international navigation.

During the War of the Triple Alliance (1864-1870), the United Kingdom covertly incited Brazil and Argentina to act against Solano López, President of Paraguay. The conflict would historically destroy the latter.

In short, ever since our independence, the UK has been a main protagonist in the history of our country, sometimes in an underhand manner and sometimes resorting to force, with a non-declared but otherwise existing intent, which would be reinforced when the Shackleton Report was known — a British research, carried out in 1976, on the potential of energy resources around the Malvinas Islands.

Argentina's process of diplomatic claims for the Malvinas archipelago started twelve days after the British usurpation of 1833, i.e. as soon as news about the violation reached Buenos Aires. Argentina, as a Confederation at first and as a Republic since 1860, for generations, would start on a long path of firmly-based claims, constantly and periodically repeated, with no possibility of their legitimate rights being granted.

When the United Nations was created in 1945, another option opened up for Argentina in terms of the new rules of the public international law; mainly, after the adoption of Resolution 1514, which states the need to decolonize the world, thus improving relationships among men and peoples.

In 1965, diplomatic negotiations over the Malvinas dispute, took a favorable turn for Argentina as from the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2065 (XX). It recognized the existence of a sovereignty dispute between the United Kingdom and Argentina over the Malvinas archipelago, requesting the former to immediately end the colonial situation²³. Resolution 2065 was the starting point for bilateral conversations, with highs and lows as regards possible agreements. Only occasionally did the United Kingdom agree to negotiate on the sovereignty issue.

Meanwhile, the first sign that an attempt to fight for possession and sovereignty recapture of the South Atlantic islands could be made, appeared in 1966 with the Malvinas military occupation secret plan²⁴ considered by the Navy and the clandestine landing on the islands from the ARA *Santiago del Estero*²⁵ submarine, which objective was to identify suitable beaches for an amphibian assault.

On 14 August 1968, through a Memorandum of Understanding, the British government expressed it would agree to a sovereignty transfer on the essential condition that the islanders' interests be respected. The Memorandum was rejected by the islanders and strongly criticized by the British press and Parliament.

Under those circumstances, the United Kingdom deviated from this line of thinking and, from then on, would emphasize agreements on the economic exploitation of the sea, particularly after the Shackleton Report. Every time an attempt was made to move forward on the subject of sovereignty, they stopped Argentine efforts using the islanders' principle of self-determination as an excuse, a concept which they used with different viewpoints, depending on the circumstances.

As from the 1973 oil crisis, the British reluctance to negotiate on sovereignty was supported by the proliferation of supertankers crossing from one ocean to the other across the Drake Passage, in search of new hydrocarbon sources. The Malvinas Islands recovered their relevance as key to the South Atlantic naval traffic. Moreover, there was the growing need to count on food and fresh water, e.g., the fishing resources of the Argentine continental shelf and the increase in value of Antarctica as the world fresh water reserve.

Some years later, in 1977, the Argentine Navy Chief of the General Staff, Almirante Emilio Massera, submitted to the Military Junta of Commanders in Chief a project to recapture the islands, similar to the one of 1966, which was rejected²⁶ by the Comité Militar (Military Committee, COMIL, its acronym in Spanish, high-ranking leading authority of the Armed Forces). That same year, the Navy deployed a scientific station on islas Thule (Thule Islands, archipelago of the Sandwich del Sur islands) named *Corbeta Uruguay*. This action triggered the planning of the Journeyman operation in London, which consisted in the deployment of a flotilla made up of a nuclear submarine, two frigates and tenders, with the aim of removing the Argentine garrison. In the end, the British decided not to resort to force and the station remained active until they were expelled five years later, during the armed conflict.

²³ PABLO OTERO, "Malvinas: el célebre alegato de José M. Ruda" (Malvinas –José M. Ruda's famous statement), *La Prensa* newspaper, Buenos Aires, April 4th, 2017. In 1964, under Arturo Illia's administration, José M. Ruda was sent to the UN as representative to defend Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands. His statement was unanimously approved and it laid the foundation for the historic Resolution 2065.

²⁴ JUAN JOSÉ LOMBARDO, *Malvinas: errores, anécdotas y reflexiones* (Malvinas –mistakes, anecdotes and thoughts), internal publication by Naval War College Library, Argentine Navy, Buenos Aires, 2001, pages 27 through 29.

²⁵ *Clarín* newspaper, Buenos Aires, March 31st, 1996.

²⁶ COMISIÓN DE ANÁLISIS..., (Rattenbach report), Final report..., op. cit.

During the second fortnight of February 1982, President Galtieri informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs Costa Méndez that the possibility of carrying out a military occupation of the Malvinas Islands was under analysis. According to his own declarations, the Foreign Minister believed that it involved conducting studies, that no decision had been taken to occupy the islands, let alone a specific date. Moreover, he was not entrusted, in his capacity of Minister of Foreign Affairs, with preparing diplomatic support for that request, he just had to take it into consideration.

On February 26 and 27, the round of negotiations took place in New York, in which Ambassador Carlos Ortiz de Rozas and Foreign Undersecretary Enrique Ros were members of the Argentine delegation. The representatives of the United Kingdom were Ministers Richard Luce and Robert Fearn, and Ambassador Anthony Williams, together with two councilors from the islands. This delegation was to insist on prioritizing the islanders' wishes.

The round ended with the British delegation apparently intent upon recommending the Argentine proposal to the London government. This submission, known as Reactivation Proposal, favored the establishment of a permanent negotiating Commission which was to meet the first week of each month, alternating between the two capital cities, in order to keep the negotiation force going. Argentina looked for an agreed conversation period to be established through said Commission, as well as a date for the handing over of the islands. The British party tried to indefinitely delay the subject, as they had historically done.

On March 1, a communiqué was issued, which main content was as follows:

The meeting was carried out in a positive and congenial atmosphere. Both parties reaffirmed their decision to find a solution to the sovereignty dispute and thoroughly considered an Argentine proposal on procedures to make more progress in this regard. They agreed to inform their respective governments about it.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Costa Méndez considered it necessary to publish on the next day, i.e. March 2nd, in Buenos Aires, the following text approved by the National Executive (Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, PEN):

For more than fifteen years, Argentina has negotiated with Great Britain on the resolution of the dispute about the islands sovereignty, patiently, loyally and in good faith, within the framework established by the UN relevant resolutions. The new system is a forward step towards the rapid solution of this dispute. Furthermore, should that fail, Argentina maintains the right to put an end to this arrangement and to freely choose the procedure best suited for their interests.

This communiqué, affecting the foreign affairs of the country, was issued without prior discussion with the Argentine Air Force and Navy Commanders in Chief. Later, it was used by the United Kingdom as a sign of the Argentine intention.

After the failure of the ninth meeting for the negotiations suggested by the United Nations at New York on March 1st, 1982, the positions defended by both governments hindered any negotiated solution of what was already seen as a conflict escalation.

What Argentina did not have to do was to remove the sovereignty issue from the United Nations framework, even if the English obstructed and set limits on the negotiations. In case this was done by force, Argentina would be involved in a bilateral aggression problem, outside the UN negotiations, which had been so hard to achieve²⁷.

As regards the political situation prior to the conflict during Margaret Thatcher's government, Clive Ponting, a senior official from the then British Ministry of Defense, pointed

²⁷ MARCELO NOEL URIONA, Thesis: *"Los Principios de la Guerra aplicables a las Fuerzas Aeroespaciales"* ("The principles of war applicable to aerospace forces"), Buenos Aires, Air Command and Staff College, 2017.

out: Anyone trying to understand the background of the Malvinas War campaign, should consider two important factors:

First, the position of the Royal Navy. The year before the Falklands conflict John Nott had carried out a major review of Defence spending in which I had been heavily involved. The bulk of the reductions had fallen on the Navy and in particular on the surface fleet. The pride of the Navy, the new aircraft carrier HMS *Invincible*, was to be sold to the Australians; the assault landing ships *Fearless* and *Intrepid* were for disposal and the number of destroyers and frigates was to be cut from sixty to at best fifty and of these about fifteen per cent were to be non-operational in the stand-by Squadron. The Royal Navy had never accepted these cuts and fought hard to try and get them reversed. By the end of March 1982 the point of no-return was rapidly approaching when some ships would be sold and others sent for scrap. The Argentinian invasion [sic] of the Falkland Islands on 2 April suddenly provided an unrivalled and unexpected opportunity for the Royal Navy to show that it could help the politicians who were in difficulties and thereby save itself. The Royal Navy had one fear: that the Task Force would sail all the way to the South Atlantic and back again without a fight. There had to be a conflict if the Royal Navy was to prove its effectiveness and indispensability²⁸. This feeling was allied to the normal military tendency to see any problems in terms of a solution by force of arms. They left it to others to find a peaceful solution if they could.

The second factor was the political position of the Government and in particular the Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher. In March 1982 public opinion polls were showing that the Government was spectacularly unpopular; the Social Democratic Party in alliance with the Liberals seemed to be the new political force. Then despite clear indications stretching over many months and subsequently chronicled by the Franks Report the Government lost British territory to a foreign invader [sic] — something that had not happened since the Second World War.

The Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, and his junior Ministers resigned. The Government was in disarray. The immediate response was the despatch of the Task Force, announced by Mrs Thatcher in the historic Saturday debate in the Commons on 3 April. Would it be used or could a diplomatic solution be found? What would such a solution entail? Could the Government survive a diplomatic solution that eventually transferred power to Argentina? Could the Argentinian Government accept anything less?

Almost imperceptibly an alliance emerged between the politicians and the Royal Navy. They needed each other. The Royal Navy wanted to convince the politicians that they could do what was wanted. The politicians wanted them to do it to save the Government²⁹.

While the Royal Navy needed to justify its surface fleet, the British government was undergoing an unpopularity period. For these reasons, the United Kingdom decided to escalate the conflict. On more than one occasion, London had implicitly suggested — having a global vision of the kingdom's problems— the possibility of dissociating the Malvinas Islands from their territory, a position that confronted the strong opposition of local-interest groups, the Falkland Islands Company (FIC) and Governor Rex Hunt in the first place. These groups actively opposed any project involving a transfer of sovereignty and, at the same time, they disapproved the inactivation of the surface fleet, the reduction of Antarctic activity and the British prestige overseas.

²⁸ Editor's note: The NATO would have a new mission: the control of the Soviet Navy mainly by way of the underwater weapon, which would reduce the number of surface units.

²⁹ CLIVE PONTING, *The Right to Know - The Inside Story of the Belgrano Affair*, Londres, Sphere Books, 1985, pages 71 and 72. In July 1984, Clive Ponting sent two documents, nicknamed «the crown jewels», to Labor MP Tam Dalyell concerning the sinking of the Argentine navy warship ARA *General Belgrano*. He faced a trial for revealing classified information.

They just had to wait for an event to trigger the conflict, and it finally happened: the crisis over the South Georgia Island.

National political context

As from 24th March 1976, the Argentine Republic was governed by the Armed Forces. In December 1981, Teniente General Roberto Viola was the President of the Nation, whereas the second Military Junta, the State Higher Authority was made up by Almirante Jorge Isaac Anaya, Brigadier General Arturo Basilio Lami Dozo and Teniente General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri. The need to reinstate political power and revitalize the military government, which was showing clear signs of exhaustion, created a favorable atmosphere for the understanding between Anaya and Galtieri to replace president Viola and to plan for the Malvinas Islands recapture by force, as an alternative to the diplomatic negotiations³⁰.

On 15 December 1981, Anaya ordered the Naval Operations Commander, Vicealmirante Juan José Lombardo, to elaborate a Plan to recapture the Malvinas Islands. Since the 1960s, the Navy had considered the islands a probable source of conflict which could demand, in time, the action of said Force. This possibility was not envisaged within the conflict hypothesis and, accordingly, neither within the military joint planning; therefore, it had never been taken into account in the short, medium and long-term equipping and development programs³¹.

Nevertheless, there was a document at the Argentine Department of Planning called National Strategic Intelligence Plan (Foreign Sector) which envisaged a conflict hypothesis with the United Kingdom, and which principal points were drawn up at said Department during 1981. In said document, this conflict was assigned priority 2 (below the Southern Conflict) and was described as «Serious Conflict» and «War Hypothesis in the short-term» (pages 2, 3 and 4 of the previously mentioned document at the Central Nacional de Inteligencia, National Intelligence Central Agency)³².

Under Anaya's orders, Vicealmirante Lombardo devised a plan to recapture the islands which, in short, did not entail major difficulties since it would only face opposition at Port Stanley Seat of Government, where they relied on a force of forty Argentine Navy Marines, unlike the rest of the territory. A joint operation could be carried out using the available assets, without extra personnel, weapons or special budget items requirements. No tentative date was specified. It was just necessary to count on the surprise factor but, then what?³³

On December 29th 1981, Malvinas Islands' British Governor, Rex Hunt, organized a social gathering for the end of the year. Standing apart from other guests, he spoke freely to Vicecomodoro Héctor R. Gilobert — Argentine representative before the Special Advisory Commission — about his distrust of the new President³⁴. He was worried about the presence of a General with a reputation for being hard. Hunt thought relations could turn difficult. Personally, he had a downbeat attitude and could not see a pacific way out of the sovereignty dispute.

At the same time, on that same day, once the brigadier promotion ceremony at the Condor Building was over, Galtieri informed Lami Dozo about the possible South Atlantic campaign. By the end of the year, the Malvinas issue was on the National Government agenda and, under Galtieri's orders, a joint Working Commission made up by General de

³⁰ OSCAR CARDOSO, RICARDO KIRSCHBAUM Y EDUARDO VAN DER KOOY, *Malvinas, la trama secreta*, Buenos Aires, Arte Gráfico Editorial Argentino, 2007, page 21.

³¹ COMISIÓN DE ANÁLISIS... (*Rattenbach report*), op. cit., fl. 27.

³² COMISIÓN DE ANÁLISIS... (*Rattenbach report*), op. cit., paragraph 116.

³³ JUAN JOSÉ LOMBARDO, op. cit., page. 31.

³⁴ "El General Galtieri inicia en Argentina un gobierno firme y riguroso" ("General Galtieri introduces a firm and severe government in Argentina"), *El País* newspaper, Madrid, Spain, December 22nd, 1981 edition.

División Osvaldo García, Commander of the 5th Corps of the Army, Vicealmirante Juan José Lombardo, Brigadier Mayor Sigfrido Plessl, and General de Brigada Julio Ruiz, Second Commander depending on García.

The commission prepared a 14-page handwritten document called Outline Plan for Recapturing the Malvinas Islands. It envisaged a joint operation which consisted in landing after being transported by helicopter and taking the airport so as to enable the landing of transport aircraft. This document also specified a minimum 15-day notice for the execution. No part of the plan envisaged any subsequent defense in case of a British military reaction.

At the Military Junta meeting on January 5th 1982, the operation turned into a State issue which was decided to be carried out should the round of negotiations, within the United Nations framework, to be celebrated at New York on February 26 through 28 fail. Around mid-January, when bidding Vicecomodoro Gilobert farewell, Governor Hunt once again expressed his concern about the activities performed at the time by the Argentine businessman, Constantino Davidoff, and the working team at the Georgias Islands. He added that he was afraid Galtieri might be tempted to use the force and highlighted that Argentinians were wrong if they supposed the United Kingdom would not fight back.

Georgias Islands crisis

The Argentinian businessman, Constantino Davidoff, used to buy and sell industrial equipment and, in 1979, he had signed a contract to purchase the material that could be recovered from the inactive factories on the South Georgia Islands. The contract was entered into in Scotland and he paid three hundred thousand American dollars for all he could obtain at the Puerto Leith facilities.

Besides the dismantling, the main problem lay in the transportation of the material from that faraway region. He was involved in discussions with the British to charter the HMS *Endurance*, but without success. By mid-1981, after consulting with the Argentine Foreign Office, he chartered the vessel ARA *Bahía Buen Suceso* from the Navy for transporting the workers.

He traveled a couple of times by his own means to Puerto Leith in order to assess the scale of the works and, finally, once the team was organized, he went to the British Embassy at Buenos Aires in order to inform them about his movements and the immediate beginning of the task. He requested White Cards for his forty one workers, and the Embassy set no objections at all. It was the beginning of March 1982.

All the arrangements made by Davidoff were public and verified actions; there was nothing in the formalities that the British authorities did not know about, neither in the workers' transportation nor in the vessel chartering. It was just a commercial operation.

On March 19, the *Bahía Buen Suceso* chartered by Davidoff arrived at Puerto Leith. The workers disembarked. It was an abandoned place, nobody lived there. Shortly after that, a group of British people appeared to demand the lowering of the Argentine flag raised on a metal tower as well as the workers getting back on board. Moreover, they filed a complaint stating that the men had been hunting, an activity they had been trying to prohibit.

The British had arrived from Grytviken, the most important settlement on the island, a few kilometers away, but from which it was necessary to make a detour circumventing considerable heights to arrive at Puerto Leith. The British presence was not a matter of chance, they had been previously informed and it had been explicitly done to oppose the Argentinians' disembarkation.

Several publications have stated that, on March 19, Mr. Davidoff's workers were infiltrated by Argentine military men. That was not the case. It was only some days later and after the excessive British reaction led by the Malvinas Governor, Rex Hunt, who sent the icebreaker HMS *Endurance* with a group of Marines on board, that the Navy General



Workers arriving at Puerto Leith - Photo taken from the ARA *Bahía Buen Suceso* by Captain Héctor O. Caime, maritime pilot at the Río de la Plata

Staff ordered the icebreaker *Bahía Paraíso* to go to Puerto Leith carrying the then Teniente Astiz³⁵ and his group of ten men³⁶.

On the same day of the Georgias incident, Port Stanley LADE's premises were attacked at night. This incident, insignificant in itself, shows that the British on Malvinas carefully followed Davidoff's movements 1480 kilometers away. That trading operation in a remote archipelago could mean that London was giving up power and that the Argentine Government was strengthening its rights in the area.

Neither the British in London nor the Argentine Government were capable of controlling these reactions and easing the impending crisis. In order to face the Georgias problem, the decision to occupy the Malvinas Islands was taken. A minor incident turned to a war started which catalyst had been the Falklands Government.

Towards April 2nd

Military and strategic context

The geographical features of the theater, the weather conditions and the personality of the leaders are the factors to be considered in order to understand the operational environment in which an armed conflict air operations shall take place. The South Atlantic confrontation in 1982 took place in the Malvinas archipelago, which is made up of two main islands, the Gran Malvina (western) island with a surface of 4532 km², and the Soledad (eastern) island with a surface of 6308 km². About a hundred of small islands complete the group totaling a surface of 11,718 km².

The climate on the Malvinas islands, 720 km away from Argentina and 7200 km from Ascension Island, is harsh maritime weather, characterized by cold, strong and persistent winds; hail, clou-

³⁵ The Grupo Alfa (Alpha Group) commanded by Teniente Astiz had the mission to establish –by mutual agreement with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs– a scientific station on South Georgia Islands, which was occupied by the British Antarctic Survey, a British government scientific organization.

³⁶ JUAN JOSÉ LOMBARDO, op. cit., page 56.

diness, night frost and frequent fog. During May and June, the average minimum temperature is 6 °C while the maximum one is 8 °C. South, southwest and west winds cause wind-chill factors below -10 °C.

The South Atlantic Conflict was an unexpected confrontation for both countries. It was unexpected both for the British forces — measured and trained to be part of the NATO and fight against the Warsaw Pact troops — and for the Argentine Armed Forces which, save for the Navy, had never considered this hypothesis, regardless of the fact that the preliminary planning was secretly done and, thus, they lacked minimum state of readiness.

Despite the fact that the Rosario Operation³⁷ initiative to recapture the islands was led by Argentina, the United Kingdom counted on more time to prepare for an armed conflict, since the islands recapture was already planned as from April 2, before the Military Committee (COMIL) had even planned how to defend them.

Most of the members of the Argentine Armed Forces did not find out about the upcoming conflict until April 2. And since the high-ranking leaders had ruled out an armed response, it was not until April 4, after having confirmation that the British task Force was getting ready to sail south, that they started to put the material into commission, to obtain equipment suitable for flying over water and to train in order to fight naval targets.

As far as intelligence is concerned, it was not until March 9, when the Argentine Armed Forces Joint Staff was alerted to the operation, that the necessary process of information about the enemy capabilities started. When the Secretaría de Inteligencia del Estado (SIDE, Secretariat of State Intelligence) received the order to address the Malvinas issue, they placed on record that the Essential Elements of Information (EEI) would not be ready until June.

As regards the use of air assets, it is worth mentioning the difficulty caused by the doctrinal differences that emerged among the Military Power components equipped with fighter aircraft, from the very moment in which the operational commands were set up. They were deep-rooted disagreements, casting suspicion among sister forces which just had to cooperate with each other, and that would be the main obstacle for using the Air Power of the Nation in a comprehensive manner.

Poles apart from local institutional contrasts was the vast experience the British Forces counted on. The Command was the exclusive responsibility of the Admiral of the Fleet John Fieldhouse, who was then the Royal Navy Commander-in-Chief. The leadership stood out due to the fact that it was a joint one, and because of the command relationships in effect, which were pre-established and accepted by all ground, naval and air forces.

As far as combat experience is concerned, the Argentine Armed Forces only counted on the relative lessons learned in domestic confrontations. On the other hand, the United Kingdom rested on a long-established warfighting tradition, with the younger generations enriched by participating in realistic air operations exercises, such as Exercise Red Flag or similar ones. If we add to this training their permanent willingness to operate in the North Atlantic harsh weather conditions, similar to the ones on the Malvinas Islands, their clear advantage can be deduced.

Another factor that influenced the operational environment configuration of the confronting forces was the presence of a non-neutral third party. The conflict hypothesis that Argentina considered was the recent confrontation with Chile over the marking out of the far south they shared which almost led them to war in 1978 and 1979. Given the traditional friendship between the United Kingdom and Chile, the possibility of our neighbo-

³⁷ The operation lacked a final name and "Rosario" was suggested to Contraalmirante Carlos Büsser by Teniente Coronel Mohamed Seinedín aboard the troop carrier ARA *San Antonio*, some hours before disembarkation, in honor of Liniers before the final assault to recover Buenos Aires in August 1806. See CARLOS BÜSSER, *Operación Rosario*, Buenos Aires, Atlántida Publishing Company, 1983, page 64.

ring country helping the former was not ruled out, and this in fact was the case, although covertly. This assessment, well-founded according to the recent statements made by the then Chilean commanders, prevented the Argentinian effort from focusing on maintaining operations on Malvinas for fear of weakening the defensive attitude towards the Trans-Andean country.

Moreover, although this was known thirty years later, Chile's collaboration enabled the Task Force to be informed, almost in real time, of any air movements at some Argentine airports detected by the surveillance radar at Punta Arenas. Moreover, the Chilean government made available the operation from San Félix Island, on the Pacific Ocean, of British electronic intelligence aircraft Nimrod that flew over the South Atlantic Ocean. Due to the limited operation on the island runway, these aircraft had to take off with minimum fuel; then they landed and refueled at Concepción (*Carriel Sur*) Airport during the night-time, when *Carabineros* closed and protected the airport for the mission to remain veiled. Support to San Félix Island came from Easter Island and the continent, with British C-130 aircraft bearing the Chilean Air Force insignia painted on them —although they were clearly distinguished by their forward air refueling probe— which transported 50-gallon fuel tanks for the Nimrod operation³⁸. Thanks to this resource, the British forces knew about Argentina's deployment of communications and radar information at the Patagonia and Malvinas Islands.

Events leading to the conflict

Between 1971 and 1981, in line with the foreign policy of gaining the kelpers' goodwill, the Argentine Air Force had used men and resources. Meanwhile, in the diplomatic arena, other initiatives were put forward in order to solve the dispute. In December 1973, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) once again expressed their concern over the scarce progress achieved in negotiations. In 1974, the Inter-American Juridical Committee of the Organization of American States (OAS) made a statement along these same lines in 1974 and emphasized the feeling of unease the persistence of foreign-power occupied territories caused in the American continent.

In March 1975, the Department of Geology Sciences of the University of Birmingham submitted a report called "Geology of the Region around the Falkland Islands" according to which there were real chances of finding oil on the islands and adjacent seas. As a result of this report, a survey mission to the Malvinas area was organized in October and led by Lord Shackleton, on board of the icebreaker HMS *Endurance*. Faced with this situation, Argentina filed a protest. Diplomatic relationships were strained up to a breaking point.

On 16 January 1976, the OAS Inter-American Juridical Committee stated that exploring the potential of energy resources on the Malvinas islands was a threat to hemispheric security and, at Rio de Janeiro, it declared that Argentina had unobjectionable sovereignty rights over the Malvinas archipelago.

The tension breaking point was reached on 4 February that same year, when the destroyer ARA *Almirante Storni* tried to stop the oceanographic research ship RRS *Shackleton* by force, 78 miles (145 km) south of Port Stanley, claiming it was sailing on Argentine territorial waters. The British captain, under orders radiated by the Malvinas governor, Neville French, given on the radio, did not come to a halt and refused to receive a group of inspectors on board, or to continue sailing up to Ushuaia guided by the *Storni*. In order to pressure further, the Argentine destroyer actions were supported by an SP-2H Neptune aircraft, while the *Storni* was firing at the *Shackleton* bow, which continued towards Port Stanley.

The incident caused the ambassadors to be withdrawn and the interruption of negotiations. The «positive» side to the Shackleton Report was the assertion that exploiting resources in the area would not be rational or profitable without the Argentine govern-

³⁸ SIDNEY EDWARDS, *My Secret Falklands War*, London, The Book Guild, 2014, page 53.



HMS Endurance anchored in Port Stanley roadstead - Photo courtesy of: Brig. VGM (R) Bloomer Reeve

ment's cooperation and approval. When it was clear that the Foreign Office tried to reach an understanding with Argentina, the UKFIC managed to increase the number of Island representatives at the Legislative Council at Stanley.

Thus, the prevailing principle was that, when discussing sovereignty, the settlers' wishes should be considered before their interests, as our country maintained. Despite the fact that Argentina operated an airline for them, and provided assistance and services that increased their well-being, the beneficiaries blocked government initiatives that might help to solve the dispute.

If the Shackleton Report is understood to be one of the reasons that triggered the conflict, it is worth considering its content.

The main motivation of the Shackleton mission was to study the possibilities to develop the islands' traditional economy based on wool (a declining world market), and on the hunting and exploitation of seals and whales. These activities had been monopolized by the Falkland Islands Company since 1851, cornering more than half of the economically exploitable lands, almost all domestic trade and the complete control of foreign trade. Public finances had been negative since 1968 and depended on the contributions from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund.

In general terms, the Shackleton Report estimated that the Malvinas Islands were surrounded by a sea which was probably home to the largest resources of protein in the world.

The document was published in July 1976 and sold at Port Stanley for eight pounds. It was 450 pages long and divided into two volumes, and elaborated by a group of experts from the finance, wool, fishing and oil industries. It aimed at assessing the potentials to be exploited in the colony, which could be summarized as follows:

- Fishing: the waters surrounding the islands, in a 200 mile-radio, were home to a great population of fish; bluefish alone could account for the same volume of British har-



Oceanographic research ship RRS *Shackleton* - BANIM DEH-FAA

vesting at the time. In the vicinity of the South Georgias Islands, there were large amounts of krill (the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union were greatly interested in the extraction of 75-million tons a year of this protein-rich small crustacean, whose potential return exceeded the total of world fishing). Fishing: the waters surrounding the islands, in a 200 mile-radio, were home to a great population of fish; bluefish alone could account for the same volume of British harvesting at the time. In the vicinity of the South Georgias Islands, there were large amounts of krill (the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union were greatly interested in the extraction of 75-million tons a year of this protein-rich small crustacean, whose potential return exceeded the total of world fishing).

- Seaweed: for producing alginates, which have great economic return.
- Skins: due to the growing population of seals and walruses in the South Georgia Island waters.
- Oil: the surveys indicated the existence of hydrocarbon in the Southern Argentine Sea, which confirmed previous presumptions and reports.

Although it was indicated that oil exploitation would not be profitable without the Argentine Government cooperation, this statement reflects the British intention of conjointly exploiting Argentine resources in the area, which enabled the sustainability of the islands during the long term that would entail reaching a solution similar to Hong Kong. The difficulty in this line of business was its commercial development. Besides the high costs, there was the political need to coordinate a status with Argentina for seeking and prospecting oil in an area claimed as her own and, thus deemed as part of the Argentine natural resources.

Moreover, the research addressed problems such as transportation, the development of dairying and horticultural production, redistribution of lands, and the like. Despite its eminently technical nature, the Shackleton Report did not escape the political field. It concluded, although not explicitly, that the islands should not be handed over to Argentina.

In 1977, the Labor Party Foreign Minister, David Owen, informed the House of Commons that both countries' governments had agreed to negotiate the political future of the Malvinas,

South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands, including its sovereignty, as well as to economically cooperate in said territories and in the South West Atlantic.

The rapprochement took place when Héctor Francisco Domingo Capozzolo, Argentine, made an offer to buy the Falkland Islands Company, with the Government's support which, through Martínez de Hoz, had agreed to pay on a non-reimbursable basis.

The operation was prepared in the greatest secrecy and it was advanced until Jacobo Timerman, for the *La Opinión* newspaper, leaked the news to the press, which resulted in a big scandal in the House of Commons³⁹. This delay of 1977 coincided with the new project to recapture the islands by force submitted by the Almirante Emilio Massera to the Commanders-in-Chief Committee, which was not approved by President Videla.

In 1979, on the initiative undertaken by the Argentine Foreign Affairs Department, it was agreed that ambassadors would be reinstated in 1980. In May of that same year, the Labor Party handed over the Government to the Conservative Party, led by Margaret Thatcher. In June, the new Foreign Office Undersecretary, Nicholas Ridley, visited Stanley. Temporarily in Buenos Aires, he met with the Foreign Undersecretary, Comodoro Carlos R. Cavandoli, with whom he agreed to improve bilateral relationships and to give negotiations a new boost. Ridley and Cavandoli analyzed different alternatives to solve the dispute. The most interesting one was to carry out a Hong King-like lease back, i.e., to share the administration of the islands for ninety nine years before handing over the sovereignty. The Argentine Government would guarantee the Islanders' possessions and way of life and they would maintain their British citizenship. Their children would have dual citizenship and their grandchildren would be Argentinian.

In September 1980, during the United Nations General Assembly, at New York, the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, Brigadier Carlos W. Pastor, met with his British counterpart, lord Peter A. Carrington and expressed that the Malvinas issue was vital for Buenos Aires. On the contrary, Carrington replied that the South Atlantic issue was almost at the end of the Foreign Office list. In November, before his second trip to the islands, Ridley mentioned to Cavandoli that he favored the leasing alternative and that, although the Prime Minister, Ms. Thatcher, did not support those negotiations, he had managed to get the Cabinet's approval to ask for the opinion of the Islanders on a basic plan towards that solution. According to the British historian, Peter Beck⁴⁰, Ridley's negotiations and proposals transformed the dispute since the Government of the United Kingdom publicly stated its disposition to consider handing over the sovereignty to the Argentine Republic.

Ridley went to Malvinas convinced his proposal would be accepted since it looked logical and suitable for both parties, from a neutral standpoint. Nevertheless, when he arrived at the airport, a loud demonstration took him by surprise. The activists, carrying placards and singing, rejected the presence of the diplomat. On the way to Stanley, painted messages could be read demanding that he should take his proposal elsewhere.

Then, in at a public hearing at the Town Hall, the objections of the groups spokespersons opposing the option were made public and broadcast by the radio for the inhabitants living in the country. Through the analysis of the recording, the Dirección General de Antártida y Malvinas de la Cancillería (Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malvinas and Antarctica General Directorate) was able to know the opinion of the population. The Malvinas settlers did not spare their condemnation at Nicholas Ridley's farewell either. In short, the islanders only accepted having commercial relationships with Argentina.

In February 1981, a new round of negotiations took place in New York. On this occasion, the Falklanders were members of the British delegation, as *de facto* negotiators. In September, Nicholas Ridley left the Foreign Office.

³⁹ LOWELL S. GUSTAFSON, op. cit., page 101.

⁴⁰ PETER J. BECK, *The Falkland Islands as an International Problem*, New York, Routledge Revivals, 1988.

During Vicedomodoro Gilbert's administration (1980-1981), his relationship with Malvinas and Antarctica General Directorate had been smooth and productive. The Foreign Minister Carlos Blanco and his advisor, Coronel Luis González Balcarce, followed closely the requirements they received. The developments of the ever more difficult situation were sent to the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Argentine Air Force, once a week and through diplomatic channels. A file summarized the approach actions as compared to the profits. Results were poor due to the fact that the beneficiaries themselves blocked the actions and no support could be expected from them unless they were offered some advantage. Given the state of things, from the Malvinas settlers' point of view, they had everything to lose.

The conclusion awoke Foreign Minister Oscar Camilión's interest so much that he met with Gilbert and listened to his reasons. For the first time after Capozzolo's initiative, the idea of offering financial compensation as an incentive for the islanders to reconsider their rejection was entertained. Camilión was not excited about it but he had no objections. Later on, General Leopoldo Galtieri took office and Nicanor Costa Méndez was in charge of Argentine foreign affairs and the turn of events already described took place.

Meanwhile, the program to reduce the number of Royal Navy surface ships involved removing from service the icebreaker *Endurance*, belonging to the British Antarctic Survey⁴¹ (BAS), assigned to the Malvinas Islands. Notwithstanding, around mid-December 1981, at the request of the Legislative Council at Stanley, the Parliament called for an increased naval presence in the area, aiming at the Antarctic projection.

The authors of this initiative, who were deeply reluctant to negotiate sovereignty, were part of the most recalcitrant group of islanders. They, together with the British corporations having economic interests in the islands, who were afraid of losing their privileges, prevented Argentina from consolidating her bonds with the islanders and demanded military protection from the United Kingdom, that would dissuade any armed actions.

The members of the UKFIC saw in this demand the best excuse to create lobby groups in the British Parliament. The Houses, made up of Members of Parliament with radicalized ideas, the far-right press and the admiralty itself joint forces to ensure sovereignty was not handed over to Argentina. On the pretext that they aimed at protecting the natives' wishes, they coerced both the UK Government and public opinion. Moreover, they counted on Governor Rex Hunt's collaboration.

Chronology of the crisis

1979-1981. Businessman Constantino Davidoff, through his representative Collin Shap, an Argentine-naturalized British citizen, contacted the company Christian Salvesen Limited at Edinburgh, a UK Crown contractor, in order to scrap three abandoned whaling factories at Stromness, Husvik and Leith, at Stromness Bay, on South Georgia Island.

The contract approval process began in September 1979. It was not executed until December 1981, after several discussions and studies. It included the option to purchase equipment and ships. The contract price was 27 million US dollars. Before signing the agreement in London, Davidoff went to Malvinas and met with Governor James Roland Walter Parker. On the other hand, the Scottish firm Salvesen also informed the Governor about the operation.

Moreover, in 1976, the Argentine Navy (ARA) had established a scientific base on the South Sandwich Islands. This action only triggered a tepid reaction from Britain. In August 1981, in view of this alleged lack of interest, the Navy, in mutual agreement with the Argentine Foreign Affairs Department, planned a similar operation on the South Georgias, occupied by the British Antarctic Survey. In order to carry it out, a Task Group made up of ten scientists and military personnel was drafted, known as Grupo Alfa (Alpha Group).

⁴¹ British Antarctic Survey, United Kingdom's national polar research institute.



Naval transport ARA *Bahía Buen Suceso* - BANIM DEH-FAA

20 December 1981. On board the icebreaker *Almirante Irizar*, the Grupo Alfa sailed to Tierra del Fuego in order to train in cold weather areas. Having nothing to do with them, Davidoff and six other people were also on board the *Irizar* heading for South Georgia Island in order to survey the terrain for scrapping. The businessman returned to Ushuaia, from where he flew to Buenos Aires in order to procure authorization at the British Embassy. He chartered the ship ARA *Bahía Buen Suceso* from Transportes Navales to carry personnel and the salvaged ferrous material.

In the meantime, the Military Committee had set up a joint Working Commission that planned to recapture the Malvinas Islands by force. Its members did not know about Davidoff's workers' trip and assumed that any actions hindering the execution of plans would be avoided.

2 February 1982. The military government ordered to postpone both departures (Grupo Alfa towards the Georgias Islands and Davidoff to South Georgia) until the round of negotiations was over, which took place in New York on February 27 and 28 with no positive result for Argentina. Foreign Minister Costa Méndez published a statement according to which the country reserved the right to «freely choose the most convenient procedure according to her interests»⁴².

9 March 1982. The Grupo Alfa boarded the vessel ARA *Bahía Paraíso*, assigned to the Antarctic Campaign, which departed towards the Orcadas Islands.

11 March 1982. Counting on no formal permit issued by the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Commanders-in-Chief Committee, but in the exercise of its power since it involved a private commercial transaction, Transportes Navales authorized the *Bahía Buen Suceso* to carry Davidoff's forty one workers to the Georgias Islands, holding their corresponding White Cards⁴³.

⁴² RUBÉN OSCAR MORO, *La trampa de Malvinas - Historia del conflicto del Atlántico Sur (Parte 1)*, Buenos Aires, Edivern, 2005, page 93.

⁴³ Ibidem, page 94.

19 March 1982. The UK Ambassador at Buenos Aires, Anthony Williams, had advised Davidoff that the ship should first arrive at Grytviken, an entrance and control port designated by the British Government. Nevertheless, following the order of the Chief of Transportes Navales, the Captain of the *Bahía Buen Suceso* went directly to Puerto Leith where technicians and workers disembarked to dismantle one of the whaling stations. It was not a capricious decision. Should British supervision be accepted, sovereignty would be implicitly acknowledged.

After the arrival, members of the British Antarctic Survey, reporting to the Malvinas' governor, claimed that the expedition had used Navy ships, that military were part of the contingent, that firearms were fired and that they raised the Argentine flag; actions that showed an assertion of Argentine rights on the islands. This information, handled by the UK Parliament and the press, worsened the situation and helped to disseminate propaganda causing the British people's dissatisfaction.

Immediately, the Argentine government was accused of ordering an action that was a real threat to the Malvinas inhabitants some 800 miles (1480 kilometers) away from the Georgias. On March 20th, 1982, ambassador Anthony Williams formally filed the claim before the Argentine authorities. He stated that his government had taken the incidents seriously and, as an ultimatum, he threatened to take measures if the crew members did not abandon Puerto Leith immediately.

On that same day, National authorities denied having any links with Davidoff and his people, as well as the presence of military personnel among the workers. The Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained that although the *Bahía Buen Suceso* belonged to the Navy, it was a ship which operation was chartered by a commercial firm, through Transportes Navales, in order to carry out a task approved by the UK and that the events lacked importance.

Later on, it was established that the accusation that had allegedly triggered the conflict was unsubstantiated. To begin with, the shots had been supposedly fired by the French crew members of the French-flagged *Isatis* yacht. Hoisting the flag was an insignificant action carried out by civil workers, who refused to abide by the formalities because they were following orders.

The British government stuck to its position even though the nature of their claim it made was not in keeping with the 1971 Communications Agreement. Article 2 specified that unilateral events, by either party, did not bring any advantages as regards sovereignty claims.

21 March 1982. The Military Committee ordered the Outline Plan for Recapturing the Malvinas Islands to be reactivated, which had been carried out by the Working Commission and presented a few days before. None of the scheduled ships (*ARA Bahía Paraíso*, *Bahía Buen Suceso* and *Almirante Irizar*) were available, they were assigned to Antarctic tasks. An alternative plan had to be developed.

The icebreaker *Endurance* sailed from Stanley towards Leith with Marines on board, in order to remove the workers and to enforce the Malvinas' governor demand to leave within twenty-four hours. 22 de marzo de 1982.

22 March 1982. The British Antarctic Survey claim was submitted to the captain of the *Bahía Buen Suceso* vessel, assuming the workers depended on him. The latter answered his vessel was only complying with a charter agreement and, without further procedures, he set sail from Leith. The workers remained on the island. Meanwhile, at Stanley, activists broke into LADE's offices and damaged the premises. Answering Governor Hunt's call, foreign reporters arrived to cover the events.

23 March 1982. The British government notified that it would expel the workers and again stated that their presence posed a threat to the Malvinas inhabitants. According to the UK,

the Argentine attitude was an act of aggression, without considering the fact that Davidoff had visited the embassy several times and consulted about requirements to carry out his project.

In turn, the National government considered the use of British Marines as a clear provocation and that the United Kingdom would probably send naval units to dissuade a military escalation. The transport ARA *Bahía Paraíso*, which was at the Orcadas Islands, was released from the Antarctic Campaign and sent to protect Davidoff's workers, together with the Grupo Alfa, before the *Endurance* arrived.

Argentina found herself at a crossroads. On the one hand, if Argentina let the workers be removed by force without opposition, she would be accepting British sovereignty over the islands, according to the doctrine of Estoppel⁴⁴. On the other hand, if she accepted Governor Rex Hunt's proposal arbitrarily requiring that passports be stamped at Grytviken, it implied waiving the rights *ipso iure*.

24 March 1982. In view of the development, the Argentine government decided to speed up the studies to recover the islands sovereignty through the use of military force. On that same day, the English supply vessel *John Biscoe* set sail from Montevideo carrying on board the relief crew of Marines for the British garrison at Malvinas, which would double the strength⁴⁵.

25 March 1982. The ARA *Bahía Paraíso* left Grupo Alfa at Leith, a crew of ten Marine officers⁴⁶, in order to protect the workers, together with enough elements and supplies for a long stay. The Naval Operations Commander sent two corvettes (ARA *Drummond* and *Granville*) to intercept the HMS *Endurance* in case civilians had been captured. Once its implementation was arranged, the order became ineffective due to the Navy's intervention before the COMIL to prevent Argentina from being portrayed as an aggressor.

In turn, the joint Working Commission reported that the military operation to recapture the islands could be conducted starting from April 1, thanks to the advanced readiness of the task force intended to carry out the assault⁴⁷.

26 March 1982. The logistical transport RFA *Fort Austin* at Gibraltar was the first ship to depart southwards to resupply the *Endurance* at Malvinas. A day later, the fleet auxiliary tanker RFA *Appleleaf*, which was passing through Curacao, in the Netherlands Antilles in the Caribbean, was diverted to Gibraltar to load general cargo and also head to the South Atlantic to support the two ships.

29 March 1982. In secret, a nuclear submarine departed from the United Kingdom. Another submarine preparations began, and the destroyer flotilla in Gibraltar was put on alert. Admiral John Woodward was appointed to organize the task force⁴⁸.

30 March 1982. A severe storm delayed the maritime progress of the Argentine task force and postponed disembarkation one day. British intelligence detected the naval movement, while the Argentine Air Force deployment went unnoticed⁴⁹. That day, by order of the

⁴⁴ Doctrine of Estoppel (Anglo-American law) or Doctrine of own actions in Argentine Law: it is a legal principle that prevents someone from asserting or denying certain rights that contradict what they previously said or agreed to by law, contrary to their statements or acts regarding such facts or rights. By way of an irrebuttable presumption, a person is prevented from refuting, within the legal process, those facts that are immediate consequences of their statements or actions (as they may also be bound by facts that they have implicitly established, not only through their words but also through their own behavior).

⁴⁵ CARLOS ALBERTO BÜSSER, "La Recuperación de Malvinas" ("The Recapture of the Malvinas Islands"), Boletín del Centro Naval (Naval Institute News Bulletin), No. 748, January-March 1987.

⁴⁶ JUAN JOSÉ LOMBARDO, op. cit., page 56.

⁴⁷ CARLOS ALBERTO BÜSSER, "La Recuperación...", op. cit.

⁴⁸ Idem.

⁴⁹ Idem.

Argentine Air Defense Command, a squadron of four M-III/EA interceptor-fighter aircraft with five pilots and technical personnel on board was deployed to the Río Gallegos Military Air Base (BAM).

Planning prior to the conflict

Background

The territorial organization, both prior to and after the conflict with Chile, established theaters of operations under the responsibility of a senior Armed Forces officer. The planning of the Southern Theater of Operations had three components led by senior officers from the three Forces, in which the appointment of the Commander of the Componente Aéreo del Teatro de Operaciones Sur (Air Component of the Southern Theater of Operations (CATOS) traditionally fell on the Chief of the 4th Air Brigade.

In 1981, at the Department of Planning, the National Strategic Intelligence Plan already considered the hypothesis of an armed conflict with the United Kingdom, although it was not yet included in the joint military planning. However, up to that year, the Argentine Armed Forces had not jointly planned an armed action to recapture the Malvinas Islands⁵⁰.

In mid-1981, the Military Committee ordered the newly created operational strategic commands to update their respective campaign plans in case the ongoing mediation to resolve the border dispute with Chile failed.

In general terms, Military Strategic Directive (DEMIL) 1/81 envisioned the organization of:

- Two joint commands for which the Army was primarily responsible:
 - Western Theater of Operations Joint Command
 - Southern Theater of Operations Joint Command
- A Northeast Strategic Security Area for which the Army was primarily responsible
- A Southern Strategic Security Area for which the Navy was primarily responsible
- Two specific commands:
 - Strategic Naval Command with Navy assets
 - Strategic Air Command with Air Force assets
- Two joint commands led by the Air Force:
 - Air Transport Command
 - Air Defense Command subdivided into four Air Defense Zones:
 - Central Air Defense Zone
 - Southern Air Defense Zone
 - Northwest Air Defense Zone
 - Northeast Air Defense Zone

Each theater was assigned an air component by the Air Force Command in the form of tactical air forces, known as the Fuerza Aérea Oeste (Argentine Air Force Western Command, FAO) and the Fuerza Aérea Sur (Argentine Air Force Southern Command, FAS). It was also clarified that until achieving adequate air superiority, these organizations would receive orders from the Strategic Air Command, and as the offensive against enemy aviation succeeded, the assets would be made available to the Theaters of Operations Commands to provide air support for ground maneuvers.

The given briefing did not even remotely contemplate the possibility of engaging in an armed conflict with the United Kingdom as regards the Malvinas Islands sovereignty.

⁵⁰ COMISIÓN DE ANÁLISIS..., (*Rattenbach Report*), op. cit., *Final Report*, pages 25 and 26.

Working Commission and Joint Staff

On January 5th, 1982, after a meeting to designate governors, the Military Junta decided, by mutual agreement, to initiate planning for the recapture of the Malvinas Islands in utmost secrecy, since it was based on the scenario that the operation would only be feasible if the United Kingdom did not increase its military strength. The involvement of the Joint Staff and the Armed Forces Staffs was primarily ruled out. Instead, a Working Commission was set up with deeply trusted personnel: Vicealmirante Juan J. Lombardo, General de División Osvaldo J. García and Brigadier Mayor Sigfrido M. Plessl⁵¹.

When the joint Working Commission met on January 15th to plan the Malvinas recapture, planning only existed for the Chilean scenario. Each Force appointed their respective Commission assistants: the operation Commanders representing the Navy —Contraalmirante Walter Allara, Commander of the Naval Fleet; Contraalmirante Carlos García Boll, Commander of the Naval Aviation; and, Contraalmirante Carlos Büsser, Commander of the Marine Infantry—, General de Brigada Julio Ruiz, representing the Army; and Comodoro Knud Erik Andreasen, representing the Air Force.

In the notes sent to the commanders drafting the Outline Plan called «for Recapturing the Malvinas Islands,» Brigadier Lami Dozo requested the preparation of a National Strategic Directive (DENAC 1/82), a document that must be drawn up for each conflict hypothesis. A Military Strategic Directive (DEMIL) is then developed based on the DENAC, and it is completed with the necessary military plans.

The COMIL briefing indicated that the operation should be unexpected and bloodless, since the sole purpose was to negotiate sovereignty from a more favorable position. The Working Commission met at Puerto Belgrano and would complete the Campaign Outline Plan, using the one already prepared by the Navy as a reference and adding the actions to be executed by the Army and the Air Force.

The plan considered the only opposing forces would be the ones existing in the Malvinas, and anticipated the temporary creation of a theater of operations that would encompass the Malvinas archipelago and the South Georgia Islands. Secondly, it called for the establishment of a joint command that would exercise operational leadership, as well as a joint task force (Task Force 40, TF-40) as the higher tactical element that would simultaneously conquer the insular objectives. In practice, this implied a coordinated landing of a helicopter assault force combined with an air assault⁵²; the participating ships would be the ARA *Almirante Irizar*, ARA *Bahía Paraíso*, and ARA *Bahía Buen Suceso*. Finally, it expressly specified that the operation would not be executed before May 15, 1982, as long as the element of surprise remained. The plan did not include any military response from the United Kingdom, nor did it consider a possible subsequent defense of the islands. It is important to highlight that at no time did the COMIL impose a probable execution date for the Plan on the members of the Working Commission.

The latter discussed the readiness of assets and personnel training, which was particularly critical for the Army, as it was in the process of incorporating the 1963-Class conscripts. An initial deadline of July 9 was set, but it was objected by the Argentine Air Force, which advised a date later than September, given that most combat aircraft lacked night offensive capabilities.

After recapturing the islands, an Argentine Army garrison of around 500 men would remain on the Malvinas. Their aim was not to provide defense against any reconquest attempt, but rather to maintain local control and collaborate with the government. The Navy and the Air Force would leave a minimum number of personnel for specific tasks.

⁵¹ HERNÁN DOBRY, "Entrevista al brigadier Lami Dozo", *Revista Perfil*, April 3rd, 2010.

⁵² "DEMIL 1/82", Annex 5, Strategic Concept, paragraph 4, 1), pages 1 through 4. DEH-FAA Archives.

By the end of February, the DENAC 1/82 and a handwritten fourteen-page document called “Outline Plan for Recapturing the Malvinas Islands” were ready.

On March 9th, the COMIL gave intervention to the Joint Staff and ordered them to prepare the DENAC 2/82, extending the previous one without considering any UK military reaction, except for the local one. Additionally, they were tasked with preparing the corresponding documents: the Military Strategic Directive (DEMIL) and the Campaign Outline Plan.

The preparation of a new Campaign Outline Plan started on the basis of the previous one, creating the Malvinas Theater of Operations (TOM, for its acronym in Spanish) under the command of General de División Osvaldo García. General de Brigada Américo Daher was appointed as Chief of the Ground Forces, Brigadier Luis Castellano as Chief of the Air Component, Contraalmirante Walter Allara as Chief of the Amphibious Force, Contraalmirante Carlos Büsser as Chief of the Landing Force, and General de Brigada Mario B. Menéndez as the military governor. In short, this would be the leadership for Operation Rosario.

On March 20, after Davidoff-related events at the Georgia Islands, the Military Committee ordered the reconvening of the Working Commission to outline an alternative plan since the Navy ships initially planned were assigned to Antarctic tasks.

On March 23, General García, in charge of the Working Commission, submitted the rough draft of the alternative plan to the Military Committee, which was immediately approved. It would be a joint operation consisting of an amphibious landing launched from a single transportation vessel, the *ARA Cabo San Antonio*.

The closest date set for the landing force departure was 28 March. In just five days, the alternative plan was completed, maintaining the high-ranking leaders from the Joint Staff plan. The ground, naval, and air forces were assembled, and the necessary coordinations were carried out. The operation was initially called *Azul* and later designated *Operation Rosario*. There were no plans for or precautions against any enemy reaction other than a local one.

On 26 March, the Military Committee decided to take the Malvinas Islands, which took the Joint Staff by surprise, who had not yet finished the DEMIL or the Campaign Plan. Therefore, the islands recapture would be carried out using the alternative plan proposed by the Working Commission.

Finally, on 30 March 1982, the Military Committee approved the DEMIL 1/82 drafted by the Joint Staff to plan the use of the force and urge the United Kingdom to negotiate the Malvinas Islands sovereignty. The Directive maintained the Chilean case precautions and established that, in the event of an armed reaction after recapturing the islands, a defensive strategic military stance should be adopted, and that, depending on the circumstances, British maritime traffic should be interdicted to deter the dispatch of troops and/or the theater of operations established on the Malvinas Islands should be supported.

The estimation that the United Kingdom would not respond with a military operation was of particular influence on the development of the conflict. Appendix 1) through “Annex 6” of the DEMIL 1/82 specified the enemy’s capabilities and subsequently determined the following adoption probabilities:

1. Capability No. 2: «Not responding with a military operation, but attempting to recapture the islands submitting claims before international organizations, the Vatican, and various forms of pressure.»
2. Capability No. 4: «Wearing down our own forces through the actions of 1 or 2 nuclear submarines and command operations on installations and personnel.»
3. Capability No. 1: «Deploying an Infantry Brigade (+) with the ability to subsequently provide logistical support, antiaircraft, anti-surface, and anti-submarine warfare detection and interception capabilities. Arrival as from D plus 30.»

4. Capability No. 5: «Engaging in general harassment actions throughout the island and the mainland territories by disrupting maritime traffic, blockades, etc., with or without a declaration of war.»
5. Capability No. 3: «Attempting the recapture of the islands through the use of a coordinated Task Force and the simultaneous attack by Chile in the Southern Theater of Operations (TOS) and the Área Naval Estratégica Austral (Southern Strategic Naval Area, ANEA)⁵³.»

The assessment carried out by the Joint Staff, and approved by the Military Committee, indicates that Britain was not expected to commit to a significant military effort, estimating that the British would deem it a minor and distant conflict.

Later on, this critically important document for the preparation of the islands defense campaign plan would no longer be valid as the conflict developed.

Since the geographical scope of operations was the South Atlantic, their leadership fell under the specific responsibility of the Strategic Naval Command, and in accordance with the dictates of the Military Committee Resolution 1/69, the air interdiction actions against ships and submarines were the primary responsibility of the naval aviation assets. This was the organizational and doctrinal framework that served as a reference for issuing the National Strategic Directive (DENAC 2/82) to regain sovereignty over the islands.

Tasks assigned to the Air Force

Before “D-Day”

- Conducting photographic reconnaissance of the target area
- Infiltrating personnel so as to gather information for the Joint Command and operate the Elemento de Control de Transporte Aéreo (Air Transport Control Element, ECTA, in Spanish). For this purpose, Vicecomodoro Gilobert was supposed to travel to the Malvinas Islands, monitor the movements of British troops, and organize the LADE Command Group to facilitate the air assault.

During “D-Day”

- At “H-hour,” seizing control of the Stanley airport (Operation *Alfil*) through coordinated actions with the amphibious and air assaults.
- Carrying out an air transport operation with landing deliveries and establishing an airlift between Soledad Island and the mainland.
- Exercising airspace control upon the deployment of the air assets.

After “D-Day”

- Establishing and organizing flight support services at the Stanley airport and ensuring the continuity of air operations.
- Fulfilling the Joint Command air transport requirements.
- Exercising control of the airspace within its jurisdiction.
- Deactivating the assets assigned to the Joint Command as from “D plus 5.”

The planning was carried out by the Air Operations Command. The execution was ordered in absolute secrecy and personally communicated to the unit commanders and the personnel involved in the recapture and the establishment of the Malvinas Military Air Base (Malvinas BAM). Plan No. 1/82 *Azul y Blanco* (Blue and White) was handwritten, and the 1st Air Brigade was tasked with developing a complementing plan. With this plan,

⁵³ “DEMIL 1/82”, Annex 6. DEH-FAA Archives.

named “Aries 82,” this unit scheduled the airlift tasks to transport personnel, as well as the Army’s and their own equipment.

After “D plus 5,” the planning included the following: keeping a contingent of 120 to 130 men and operating the airport services; maintaining surveillance and exercising air control; ensuring the operation of a Pucará squadron and a helicopter squadron; and providing security with the Grupo de Operaciones Especiales (Special Operations Group, GOE, in Spanish).

Formally, Plan *Azul y Blanco*⁵⁴ was not signed, but its execution was moved forward to April 1 (with alternative dates of April 2 or 3) to defend Davidoff’s group of workers on the Georgias Islands. According to Brigadier General Lami Dozo, the date was also advanced due to political and strategic circumstances⁵⁵.

By advancing the execution to April 1, and despite the fact it bore no signature, Plan *Azul y Blanco* was the basis of the oral briefing to carry out the Islands recapture tasks unaffected by the change of date⁵⁶.

Air Operations Command internal considerations

As the possibility that negotiations to solve a conflict may end up in warfighting operations should never be ruled out, it was essential in 1982 to deem correct the supposition that the United Kingdom would seek to recapture the islands by force after they had been recovered by Argentina. Consequently, it was necessary to plan for a minimum level of Armed Forces readiness to oppose the most dangerous enemy capability with some possibility of success.

The representative of the Comando de Operaciones Aéreas (COA, Air Operations Command), during the presentation at Puerto Belgrano, upon learning that the Military Junta was considering the hypothesis of recovering the Malvinas Islands, did not hesitate to consider the United Kingdom a belligerent country. However, he received the directive not to prepare more air units than those involved in the recapture. Furthermore, the Contraalmirante in charge of the briefing emphasized the need for the Commission to limit itself to planning actions just to install a provisional Argentine government on the islands.

The speaker emphatically refused the idea of developing alternative plans as there was reliable evidence indicating that there would be no violent reaction from the United Kingdom and that the United States would remain neutral.

Based on that briefing, the analysis carried out at the Air Operations Command stood by the “Responsibilities and Competencies of the Argentine Armed Forces in War Operations” established by the Joint Staff Resolution 1/69, signed on January 1, 1969⁵⁷. Regarding the Argentine Air Force, point 2.2.1.1 states that:

«Direct air support to surface, submarine, and amphibious naval operations, including: exploration, reconnaissance, anti-submarine warfare, mining, and anti-mining, attack, air defense, and auxiliary operations for such purposes, is a primary responsibility of the Navy and a collateral responsibility of the Air Force when involved in such types of operations.»

Based on the knowledge of the available assets in Argentina, the Air Operations Command assumed that, although it was a collateral responsibility for which it could not incorporate specific elements, it could be requested to conduct distant and close air-maritime exploration using Argentine Air Force aircraft that were somewhat suitable for such responsibility.

⁵⁴ Plan de Operaciones Azul y Blanco, pages 2 through 13, DEH-FAA Archives.

⁵⁵ COMISIÓN DE ANÁLISIS..., (*Rattenbach report*), *Final report...*, op. cit.

⁵⁶ Plan de Operaciones Azul y Blanco, last page 1-1, copy 01 typewritten in September 1982, DEH-FAA Archives.

⁵⁷ “Responsibilidades y Competencias de las Fuerzas Armadas Argentinas en Operaciones de Guerra” established by Resolution 1/69, 31 January, 1969, DEH-FAA - C10/3B Archives.

On the contrary, the Argentine Air Defense Command never interpreted that the “control of airspace” that it was required to exercise using the air control and surveillance systems designed to detect and identify airborne targets could be used to control maritime spaces and detect naval targets.

Air Force Planning

In early January 1982, as was done once a year, the Commander of Air Operations (COA), Brigadier Mayor Hellmuth C. Weber sent a directive, to his dependent units, stipulating the setting up of and list of personnel for the Strategic Air Command (CAE), Argentine Air Force Southern Command (FAS), Argentine Air Force Western Command (FAO), and the corresponding Military Operational Deployment Air Bases. As far as the FAS is concerned, Brigadier Ernesto Horacio Crespo was appointed Commander, Brigadier Luis Guillermo Castellano was appointed Chief of Staff of the FAS, and Comodoro José Antonio Juliá was appointed Chief of the Operations Department (A-3).

On 25 January 1982, the Commander of Air Operations, upon learning of the planning imposed on the Working Commission, ordered his Planning Department to present the initial assessment on 2 February. After hearing it, the Commander concluded that none of the assumptions made by the Military Junta were right. Under his responsibility, he gave the order to accept as fact that the United Kingdom would launch a military response and anticipated it as an alternative for the occupation phase of the Plan *Azul y Blanco*. Furthermore, he ordered the planning of the necessary tasks to be executed afterwards.

When assessing this new plan, assumptions were made not only concerning the British reaction but also the procedures that the Military Junta of Commanders in Chief, the Army, and the Navy would choose when the enemy fleet attacked the troops on the Malvinas Islands, and what would be the best response by the Argentine Air Force to face an air-maritime offensive.

The Operations Plan 2/82 *Mantenimiento de la Soberanía* (Sovereignty Maintenance) — which would be completed in early April — assigned: tasks of exploration and reconnaissance in coordination with the commander of the South Atlantic Theater of Operations in the areas adjacent to the Malvinas Islands (500 nautical miles, or 925 km); strategic interdiction tasks against the United Kingdom fleet and tactical air operations on the islands through exploration and reconnaissance, close fire support, offensive reconnaissance, and direct air defense. It also established coordination measures with the Theater of Operations (TOM and subsequent TOAS⁵⁸) and with the command that would exercise the leadership of the Air Force assets (FAS), specifying that the initial attack order would be given by the Theater Commander and confirmed by the Strategic Air Command. It further stated that the latter should assist the requests made by its subordinate command — the FAS — during the operations without interfering in their action.

The plan was drafted with the level of detail necessary for the FAS to carry out its complementing planning with appropriate freedom of action, establishing the priority target to be attacked and the coordination measures.

As the planning progressed, orders were given to obtain detailed images of the Malvinas area. Two secret missions were carried out. The first one, in February, simulated that one of the *Comando de Regiones Aéreas* (Air Regions Command) verification aircraft was inspecting the radio aids at the Malvinas airport; in this way, the true aerial photographic activity was concealed. The second mission, in March, during a transportation flight of Vicecomodoro Roberto Gamen, an emergency landing gear situation was simulated in order to complete the aerial photographic task. The crews of the Aerial Photography Squadron of the 2nd Air

⁵⁸ TOM: Malvinas Theater of Operations [TOM, its acronym in Spanish]. South Atlantic Theater of Operations [TOAS, its acronym in Spanish].

Brigade, flying Learjet 35 A aircraft, conducted surveys of Port Stanley and surrounding areas without knowing the real purpose.

As the studies continued, the planners at the Air Operations Command concluded that they should set up a cargo terminal at Stanley airport and deploy an air control and surveillance squadron, an antiaircraft artillery squadron, and an air attack unit on the Malvinas Islands to carry out offensive actions to support ground forces. This action required a prior deployment to the Patagonian coast and the preparation of military air bases in favorable relative positions. The tasks of the existing capabilities plan, developed on the basis of the Chilean conflict hypothesis, were reviewed. The planned device for organizing that order of battle could be easily adjusted to the operation in the Malvinas.

Combat aircraft would reach the Malvinas at their operating range limit, taking off from the Patagonian airfields. Confidence was placed on the pilots' skills and attitude, but the lack of preparation and appropriate weapons to face a capable air-naval adversary equipped with advanced technology was a concern.

Significant deficiencies were recognized:

- Limited endurance of the Argentine Air Force aircraft.
- Lack of on board radars for air-maritime exploration.
- Lack of in-flight refueling systems for the Mirage III/EA and M-5 Dagger.
- Poor number of jettisonable fuel tanks.
- Only two KC-130 Hercules tankers.
- Lack of air-to-air self-defense equipment for the IA-58 Pucará.
- Scant helicopter weapons.
- Complete lack of a radar warning system (RWS⁵⁹) and countermeasures to neutralize the approach of anti-aircraft missiles.
- Insufficient length of the Stanley runway and small unloading platform.
- Lack of anti-exposure suits for the crews.
- Lack of night vision devices.
- Lack of fire-and-forget weapons.

Lives could be saved by addressing some of these problems. This understanding led the Air Operations Commander, Brigadier Mayor Hellmuth Weber, and the Defense Commander, Brigadier Mayor Jorge A. Hughes, to pursue the acquisition of these items in a race against time. Although the chances of success were slim, the most critical instructions were given. In the moment of truth, aware of the risks and limitations, the Argentine Air Force accepted the challenge imposed by destiny, but on one condition: they assumed that the «occupy to negotiate» criterion, repeatedly expressed by the Military Junta, would be strictly observed.

For this reason, it was taken for granted that in the face of a UK armed response threat, Argentina would do everything possible to prevent confrontation. And if it was inevitable, the government would agree to a ceasefire without surrendering. The Argentine Air Force, with all available assets, set the objective to contribute to deterrence and, if necessary, to wear down the enemy's air-naval power in order to provide time and arguments for the ones in charge of the country's foreign negotiations.

As a first step, the Air Operations Command authorities decided to expedite readiness. Only the runways in Comodoro Rivadavia and Río Gallegos were considered usable from the air squadron peace-time bases. For this reason, it was necessary to deploy most of the units to the Patagonian coast as soon as possible. To maintain secrecy, the deployment should not take place before recapturing the islands. Additionally, since it had not been anticipated in the Working Commission, authorization from the Military Committee was needed.

⁵⁹ RWS: Radar Warning System.

For the previous fifteen years, the Argentine Air Force had been preparing airfields to operate with mobile air squadrons based on regional conflict hypotheses. After some exercises, the facilities had been examined, and the main deficiencies had been addressed. The capacity for accommodation, rationing, health care, supply, fuel depots, communication facilities, transportation infrastructure, headquarters, and security at each potential deployment airfield had been assessed. The analysis also took into account the deployed personnel's demands and the needs of the local population to ensure they would not suffer supply shortage faced with a sudden increase in consumption.

Each air squadron had repeatedly been relocated to the Patagonian airfields and had operated with the appropriate personnel for that area, including training, rationing, and accommodation. Some sites were suitable to serve as support bases for South Atlantic operations. The only thing missing was the Military Junta's authorization and moving the Air Force to the south of the country. Galtieri did not justify the deployment, despite acknowledging its potential deterrent effect. He firmly believed that there would be no war. However, the Air Operations Command insisted and used arguments related to the regional framework and the responsibility to take preventive measures in order to avoid surprises. It added that if they were caught at the peace-time bases, their response would be slow, difficult, and ineffective.

Furthermore, the planning included the totality of the Argentine Air Force assets and a portion of State and private aircraft with the necessary crews to be mobilized. The initial effort would fall on the Air Transport Command, made up of elements from the 1st Air Brigade at El Palomar and reinforced with civil aircraft. The Argentine Air Force Southern Command, which was traditionally organized according to the Regional Framework planning, would bear the greatest burden of operations. This higher tactical command was assigned most of the combat units (aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery) and operational support (communications, photography, surveillance, and air control).

The Materiel, Air Regions, and Training Commands would form the Air Force Logistics Command, which would provide support with elements both available and to be acquired, for the future Air Defense Command (CAD), Strategic Air Command (CAE), Air Transport Command (CAT), and the Air Force Southern Command (FAS) and would lead the deployed air assets. Additionally, if the hypothesis of war due to Chile's intervention was broadened, it would support the elements of the Air Force Western Command (FAO). This course of action aimed at keeping the Institutional doctrine unmodified and avoiding the introduction of new procedures beyond those practiced in operational exercises, whether in simulators or on the field.

1st Air Photographic Group Secret Missions

In the months leading up to the recapture of the islands, and in order to conduct photographic surveys at Port Stanley and the airport surrounding areas, the Air Operations Command, in coordination with Jefatura III Planificación (III Planning Division), ordered the 1st Air Photographic Group and the Learjet Squadron, both from the Paraná 2nd Air Brigade, to deploy to Río Gallegos Military Air Base.

The first mission took place between February 23 and 26. The overflight zone specified for the aerial photographic operation was Port Stanley, the airport, and its surroundings. The crew consisted of Primer Teniente Eduardo Bianco, Capitanes Carlos Ronconi and Marcelo Lotufo, Suboficial Auxiliar Víctor Martínón, Suboficial Ayudante José Antonio Gordiola, and Cabo Primero Juan Mothe.

The T-22 aircraft flew to Río Gallegos, where it was prepared for the photographic survey. During the approach to the Malvinas Islands, the crew had to pretend to verify the VOR⁶⁰ equipment markings at the Port Stanley airport and photograph the runway

⁶⁰ VOR: Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range. Radionavigation aid system used by aircraft in order to fly following a pre-defined route.

and the nearby areas, especially the coastlines, while maintaining the circulation required for the alleged study.

The operation was coordinated with the Air Survey Squadron personnel, which was already deployed on the island. The pretended mission was effectively concealed since the new VR-17 Learjet 35 aircraft, equipped for the task, had previously conducted other verifications at Port Stanley.

The mission was partially accomplished due to weather conditions, as some of the requested areas were covered by clouds that prevented the photographic survey.

The flights in February were as follows:

- February 23: Paraná-Rosario-Aeroparque-Comodoro Rivadavia-Río Gallegos, navigation and transportation flights..
- February 24: Río Gallegos-Malvinas-Río Gallegos, operational flight.
- February 25: Río Gallegos-Malvinas-Río Gallegos, operational flight.
- February 26: Río Gallegos-Malvinas-Río Gallegos, operational flight.

After completing the mission, they returned to *Aeroparque* on the same day. Total flying hours for aerial photography: 10 hours 30 minutes.

The second mission was executed between March 16 and March 19 with the Learjet 35 A registration mark T-23. The overflight zone selected for the aerial photographic operation was Port Stanley, the airport, and its surroundings. The crew consisted of: Capitán Narciso Juri, Teniente Enrique Felice, Suboficial Auxiliar Víctor Martinón, Cabo Principal Ernesto Guevara, and Cabo Alejandro López.

On the 19th, a flight to the islands was coordinated under the pretext of transporting Vicecomodoro Roberto Gamen, the Argentine representative and Malvinas LADE Chief. The sky condition that day appeared to be broken; if they flew through the gaps among the clouds, they could take high-quality photographs⁶¹. It was the second attempt they made to reach Malvinas, as the previous day, on the 18th, they were not able to make it due to bad weather conditions. As soon as they took off, they opened the ventral door of the photography compartment on the Learjet 35 A floor so that the pressurized glass could quickly come into contact with the outside temperature. Thus, flying relatively low, they approached Malvinas.

During the flight, they were detected by the HMS *Endurance* radar, sailing towards the Georgias Islands. The ship's operator requested them in English to identify themselves, but the pilots did not respond. They only made radio contact with the control tower at Port Stanley. They approached the city after entering into the inertial navigation system the coordinates for the points they would vertically overfly.

During the first aerial photography passage, they took advantage of the sunlight on the beach. The system automation allowed them to take some oblique photos with a 35mm camera. The Port Stanley TWR continuously made calls, sometimes in English and sometimes in Spanish, requesting the reason for their passage over the city. The pilots replied that they were trying to solve a landing gear problem, that they had an instrument indication it was not down and locked but remained unlocked and in motion.

During the third approach turn of the aerial photography passage, the questions became more incisive, and they were ordered to descend. Ignoring all indications, they completed two more passes; they already had five perfect passages taped and stored. However, weather conditions quickly turned unfavorable, with increasing cloud cover between the airplane, the city, and the beaches which, as the crew later learned, would be the landing points.

⁶¹ Written statement given by Suboficial Mayor VGM (R) Víctor Martinón before the BANIM Commission.



Air Photographic Group T-23 Learjet - Photo courtesy of: My. VGM (R) Caballero

Considering the time and after about 40 minutes in the area, they understood they had no more excuses to continue and that weather conditions were not suitable to carry on. They decided to abort the mission and informed the control tower that, since they were unable to fix the landing gear failure, they chose to return to Río Gallegos, where they would have better safety conditions in case of an emergency landing.

Upon their return to Río Gallegos, they also simulated the same situation, anticipating possible Chilean espionage scenarios. They declared an emergency to the control tower, and the latter instructed the departing aircraft to take off and the landing aircraft to land immediately. The Learjet, with the landing gear extended, performed a low-altitude fly-by parallel to the runway and over the aircraft platform, while the TWR radioed that they could observe the landing gear seemed locked.

They prepared to land with emergency services, an ambulance, and fire trucks positioned by the runway threshold, ready to act. When the Learjet landed, it was followed until the plane came to a stop on the apron. There, the maintenance personnel pretended to repair the landing gear. Later, inside a hangar, the photography staff got off with the films. The crew went for lunch, and after a reasonable length of time, the pilots ordered refueling and presented a new flight plan with Port Stanley as its destination in order to fulfill the declared mission: transporting Vicecomodoro Roberto Gamen to the islands.

The Learjet took off again towards Port Stanley. Once landed, Vicecomodoro Gamen got off while the plane engines were still running. The aircraft immediately returned to the runway threshold and took off, avoiding being inspected by the British military.

At the 2nd Air Brigade in Paraná, the photographic material taped during both flights was processed, and the mosaic that would be used in the planning of the April 2 landing was prepared. The work and effort of the 2nd Air Brigade (Paraná) Photographic Squadron would prove invaluable for planning Operation Rosario

The flights in March were as follows:

- March 16: Paraná-Aeroparque-Río Gallegos, navigation and transportation flights.
- March 18: local flight in Río Gallegos, the operational flight could not be carried out due to poor weather conditions.
- March 19: Río Gallegos-Malvinas-Río Gallegos, operational flight.
- March 19: Río Gallegos-Malvinas-Río Gallegos, second operational flight

On that same day, March 19th, the T-23 aircraft returned on a navigation and transfer flight from Río Gallegos to Paraná with a stopover at Bahía Blanca. Total flying hours for aerial photography: 6 hours 10 minutes.

Preparations to recapture the Malvinas Islands

On March 26th, when the recapture operation was advanced, Brigadier Mayor Weber, Air Operations Commander and also Chief of the Strategic Air Command, called the commanders of the units involved. He verbally ordered them the tasks they were to fulfill in order to execute the complementing Plan *Azul y Blanco*.

Among those present were Brigadier Luis G. Castellano, who would serve as the Air Component Commander in Malvinas, and Brigadier Enrique R. Valenzuela, the Air Transport Commander. Weber pointed out that the Military Committee estimated that the troops presence on the islands would be limited to a maximum of five days. Afterwards, a small joint force would remain to support the islands' military government.

After the presentation, Brigadier Castellano requested that the personnel appointed to his Staff should turn up at Comodoro Rivadavia no later than Sunday, March 28th. Orders to act were also given to the Chiefs of the Special Operations Group, the Air Transport Control Element (ECTA), and the so-called LADE Command Group, led by Vicecomodoro Roberto Gamen, which was to facilitate the airborne assault on Stanley Airport. Subsequently, these groups would be responsible for temporarily setting up the air base at the airport, while the VyCA Squadron would set up the TPS-43 radar for airspace surveillance and control.

On March 27th, on board an IA-50 G-II aircraft, the first members of the Malvinas Air Component Staff traveled to the 9th Air Brigade, including Mayor Antonio F. González Iturbe. Upon arrival, he appeared before Brigadier Castellano, who at that time was holding a meeting with Comodoro Guillermo Mendiberri, appointed Chief of the A-2 Intelligence Department. Both officers were the first to learn about the purpose of their presence in Comodoro Rivadavia.

On Sunday, March 28, at 0900, under the covert pretext of participating in an operation related to the Chilean conflict hypothesis, a B-707 aircraft transported most of the personnel who would work in the Malvinas and the Argentine Air Force Southern Commands, along with members of the Special Operations Group (GOE) and the Air Surveillance and Control Group (VyCA). The following day, these men learned the true purpose of the deployment. From that moment on, they remained quartered at the 9th Air Brigade, attentive to the developments in the South Atlantic.

Tasks of the Grupo 1 de Transporte Aéreo (1st Air Transport Group)

On March 28, at 0230, the Air Transport Command Chief of Operations and Transport Group Commander, Comodoro Jorge F. Martínez, was summoned to Brigadier Weber's office at 0900. He was informed of the situation and ordered to plan «an airborne assault operation in the Malvinas Islands.» Before leaving, Comodoro Martínez asked for the reason behind the operation, and he was told it was a «political diversionary measure.»

Immediately, the Operations Department Chief of the 1st Air Brigade and Squadron Commanders were called in. They were required to turn up at the Unit with overnight gear by 1100. The meeting took place at 1400, and in view of the task and in complete secrecy, planning for Operation *Aries* 82 began, with a strict prohibition imposed on external communications. The plan was presented and approved by the Air Operations Command on March 30, setting April 1 as the start date, although due to weather conditions, the execution would be postponed for 24 hours.

On April 1 at 1700, the crews, who were unaware of the purpose of the meeting, were summoned with overnight gear to the Officers' Mess Assembly Hall. Comodoro Martínez

began by saying: «Gentlemen, you will have the opportunity to achieve what you have dreamed of your entire lives –to recapture the beloved Malvinas Islands.» The audience was deeply surprised, and then an intense and overwhelming joy followed. He then explained the reason for the meeting, the *Aries* 82 operation order, the airborne assault, and the details of the task to be carried out by the military air transport. Squadron commanders provided specific aspects, and the meeting concluded with a review and update of sea survival techniques.

The task of the 1st Air Brigade was to organize a *Puesto de Operaciones de Transporte Aéreo* (POTA, Air Transport Operations Post) at the 9th Air Brigade in Comodoro Rivadavia, carry out an airborne assault landing at Stanley Airport, and transport the personnel and equipment urgently needed on the islands, so as to establish a military consolidation of the recapture and to begin managing civilian institutions on the Malvinas as soon as possible. According to the Plan *Aries* 82 flight schedule, the first departure of a C-130H aircraft was set for 2000 on that April 1.

The 1st Air Transport Group would participate with four Hercules C-130H aircraft for transporting special forces, troops, and equipment; five Fokker F-28 aircraft for transporting personnel; one IA-50 G-II aircraft for liaison tasks; and one Fokker F-27 aircraft for search and rescue.

According to the priorities set by the Strategic Air Command, the following boarding priority was established:

- Special Operations Group (GOE)
- Staff of the Malvinas Theatre of Operations Air Component (EMCA- TOM)
- 25th Infantry Regiment (RI 25)
- 9th Combat Engineers Company
- Staff of the 9th Infantry Brigade Command
- Air Surveillance and Control Squadron (VyCA) with a mobile radar
- Air Transport Control Element (ECTA)
- Air Cargo Terminal
- Transfer of a Bell 212 helicopter
- Crates with aluminum plates to widen the parking apron at the Malvinas airport
- Assets for organizing the military airport services in Stanley

The cargo to be transported included supplies and support equipment for the units involved (weapons, ammunition, vehicles, power generators, antennas, radio equipment, firefighting equipment, cargo handling equipment, field accommodation and rations, portable fuel and water tanks, fuels, and lubricants).

No major issues regarding flight procedures were foreseen. The 1st Air Brigade crews had been visiting the Malvinas airport for years. The members of the F-27 and F-28 squadrons, which operated the LADE weekly services, performed frequent flights to the islands. The last scheduled flight to the islands had taken place on March 30⁶².

However, the situation was different for the *Escuadrón I Hercules* (1st Hercules Squadron). Only a few crews had operated on the islands. Among them were the crew that had transported items in February 1981 for the residence of the Special Advisory Commission Argentine Representative in Stanley⁶³; the crew that had delivered supplies to the settlers in September of that same year; and the KC-130 TC-70 crew that, on March 7 1982, carried out a distant exploration task over the Georgias Islands area, as requested by the Argentine Foreign Office and directly ordered by Brigadier Mayor Weber, Chief of the Air Operations Command. The planned route was El Palomar-Río Gallegos-Georgias Islands-Río Gallegos-El Palomar. While flying over the South Atlantic, an emergency occurred due to fuel loss caused by a malfunctioning transfer valve. The aircraft could not reach Río

⁶² RUBÉN OSCAR PALAZZI, *Puente aéreo a Malvinas*, Buenos Aires, Aeroespacio Publishing, 1997, page 17.

⁶³ RUBÉN HORACIO CABANILLAS, *No apagues la luz cuando te vayas*, Buenos Aires, BM Press, 2004, page 82.

Gallegos using the remaining fuel. The only possible alternative was the Malvinas Islands. The aircraft commander, Comodoro José María Pérez, was forced to request assistance through the Red Nacional de Emergencia (National Emergency Network), asking a radio amateur to establish contact with another person in the Malvinas to request the unblocking of the deliberately obstructed runway, as there were concerns about a possible assault operation. Thanks to this communication, permission to land was granted after flying for 11 hours, 40 minutes. After resolving the technical failure, the TC-70 refueled and completed the planned route. The navigation officer was Comodoro Roberto Mela, who was performing his last flight before retiring⁶⁴.

The air transport operations would be carried out in close coordination with the other branches' assets. The Navy group, Task Force 40 (FT-40), which had set sail on Sunday March 28, was made up of a landing unit, a transport group, an escort group, and a special tasks group (tactical divers). On board the flagship, the destroyer ARA *Santísima Trinidad*, were Contraalmirante Walter Allara, Landing Force Commander; General Osvaldo García, Malvinas Theater of Operations Commander; and Vicecomodoro Alberto Alegría, Air Force Liaison Officer.

Tasks of the Special Operations Group (GOE)

By the end of March, the Chief of the Planning Department summoned Vicecomodoro Esteban L. Correa, Chief of the GOE, and described the task to be carried out by his unit: to occupy and secure the Stanley airport in close coordination with the amphibious assault of the 2nd Marine Battalion (BIM 2) and Company C of the 25th Infantry Regiment of the Army. The GOE's landing final details were conditional upon the situation development and the intelligence reports to be sent from Stanley by Vicecomodoro Roberto Gamen, Chief of the LADE Command Group.

Islands' government team foresight

The leaders appointed to take up the Malvinas Islands government were getting organized and analyzing the measures they would apply to win the islanders' goodwill. The Military Junta had appointed General de Brigada Mario B. Menéndez, Chief of the 3rd Operations of the Army General Staff, to be in charge as Military Governor.

General Galtieri assured him that his commission would not extend beyond November or December as they did not expect any complications. Menéndez quickly requested to be assigned assistants, as there were around 1,900 people living in the archipelago: 1,420 natives, 450 British citizens, and approximately 30 foreigners (including Argentinians, Canadians, Uruguayans, Israelis, and Americans).

In response to General Menéndez's requirements, as from April 5, the Cabinet would be set up with the following authorities:

- Government Secretary-General, Comodoro Carlos F. Bloomer Reevee
- Secretary of Education and Public Health, Capitán de Navío Barry M. Hussey
- Secretary of Public Works, Coronel Manuel R. Dorrego
- Secretary of Economy and Finance, Coronel Oscar R. Chinni; assistants, Mayor de Intendencia del Ejército Juan C. Hidalgo and Capitán de Corbeta Rodolfo V. Angelo
- Secretary of Communications, Coronel Francisco E. Machinandarena
- Secretary of Justice, Vicecomodoro Eugenio Miari; assistant, Capitán de Corbeta Leopoldo Vinelli

The Argentine Air Force participation in the government would entail a special responsibility. Of the three services, it was the only one whose personnel had lived among the

⁶⁴ Written statement given by Brigadier VGM (R) Jorge Martínez to the BANIM Commission.

islanders, collaborating in the development of the Malvinas Islands' infrastructure or in matters regarding the well-being of the community (supplies, health care, and education). The effort of the previous ten years of service had allowed them to become familiar with and understand the complex relationship among the islanders, the British Administration, and the Argentine Government. The countless support tasks performed by the Air Force personnel, including humanitarian requests, were professionally carried out with a high spirit of service, improving the islanders' quality of life, putting an end to isolation, and enabling direct communication with Argentina. This closeness, combined with their involvement in most of the projects for the Malvinas Islands, committed the Argentine Air Force to ensure that the administration was as efficient as possible.

Argentine Air Force Representative

Comodoro Carlos F. Bloomer Reeve had been the Argentine representative before the Special Advisory Commission and head of LADE on the Malvinas Islands between 1974 and 1976. Additionally, in his capacity of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Chief of Staff, he had participated in formal and informal rounds of talks between 1979 and March 1981. In 1982, he was performing functions as Air Attaché to the Argentine Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany. He was possibly the cabinet member who best understood the Malvinas Islands' reality.

In the morning of 27 March, in Bonn, Bloomer Reeve received the order to immediately travel to Buenos Aires so as to witness the execution of the contract with Dornier Company for the design of the IA-63 Pampa aircraft. At 0900 in the morning of the 28th, he arrived at Ezeiza Airport, where the Airport Chief was waiting for him to tell him to contact Brigadier General Basilio Lami Dozo. The latter then referred him to Brigadier Mayor Sigfrido M. Plessl. They met the following morning, and Plessl explained the plans for the recapture of the islands and the Junta's planning. He then expressed the Air Force confidence in him due to his experience in the Malvinas Islands and in the Argentine Foreign Office. He ordered him to report to General Menéndez at 1100 at the Army General Staff. He advised him to maintain absolute secrecy, warning him that no other commanders were aware of the plans.

Both officers agreed on the inconsistency of the assessment regarding the British government attitude and their military response capability. However, they expressed hope for an intelligent and mature diplomatic action to prevent an armed confrontation, which outcome was deemed unfavorable. Assigned to the task, Bloomer attended the briefing called by Menéndez. The General explained to the appointees that the islands would be considered a province, that he would be assuming the position of governor, and they would form the cabinet with direct responsibility over the civilian population. They were all surprised when they were informed that the recapture was planned for 1 or 2 April. Only Capitán de Navío Hussey had noticed some unusual movement of ships.

Once the islands had been recaptured and the secrecy lifted, and despite being familiar with the island environment, Bloomer requested the latest updates at the Argentine Foreign Affairs Department. Coronel (R) Luis González Balcarce, advisor to the Malvinas and Antarctica General Directorate since 1970, recognized Bloomer and understood the reason for his consultation. He provided the available documents and the information sent by Gilbert, which warned about the unrest in Stanley.

In subsequent meetings and on the basis of these data, it was decided to organize the government on the existing structure, which the islanders were familiar with. The existing communication networks could be used, and public officials, without many alternatives for employment, would appreciate the opportunity to keep their jobs. Patriotism and the fear of being labeled as collaborators could be overcome with the excuse that they were serving their fellow citizens. Some governance effectiveness was expected.

The cabinet still needed to be completed with officers specialized in justice, accounting, and finance. Law and order would initially be maintained by military police personnel. The governor would lead the administration, assisted by a chief secretary who would oversee the superintendencies of the basic government agencies. The treasury would report directly to the governor, except for certain duties of the chief secretary. In addition, there would be two elective councils: one with legislative functions and the other with executive functions. Both would be chaired by the governor and assisted by the chief secretary and the treasurer.



Part 2

April 1982



Chapter 3

Recapture of the Islands



The previous days

On Thursday, 30 March 1982, Vicecomodoro Héctor Gilobert arrived in Stanley aboard a Fokker F-28, in what would be the last scheduled service of Líneas Aéreas del Estado (LADE) to the Islands. The aircraft was guarded by armed Marines under the pretext of preventing hostile attitudes. However, it was clear that they wanted to prevent the possible descent of Argentine commandos hidden inside. The F-28's arrival, after the riots at the airline commercial offices following Davidoff's incident in South Georgia, immediately aroused the authorities' suspicions as they already knew that a Task Force had set sail for the South Atlantic.⁶⁵

Gilobert explained he had come to assess the situation after the attack against LADE's premises and wished to clear the air. As he entered the town, everything looked as usual. Local residents did not seem to suspect the reasons for his visit and exchanged polite greetings. However, a very different situation was heard on the local radio broadcast. Gilobert requested a meeting with the authorities, which was scheduled for the following day.

A sophisticated communications equipment, which had been transported on that same flight, was installed at Vicecomodoro Gamen's house (LADE House) to send coded messages. The installation was done in front of local residents, as it had been impossible to conceal the bulky packages being transported and the technicians working with the antennas, although some of the work was carried out overnight.

On Wednesday, March 31st, Gilobert went to the Government House accompanied by Gamen, who was completely unaware of the imminent operation. When they entered the governor's office, a cabinet meeting was taking place with the presence of the Government Chief Secretary, Dick Baker, the new commander of the Royal Marines' Naval Party 8901, Major Mike Norman, and other government officials. A map of the peninsula was unfolded on the table.

After the formal greetings, the British listened to Gilobert as he tried to justify his visit. Governor Hunt expressed their deep concern about the escalating conflict and reminded him of the conversation they had had at Gilobert's farewell party, clearly referring to his pessimism about the outcome of the conflict.

As he left, Gamen was surprised by the tone of the conversation, the underlying meaning of which he could not quite understand. According to the information he had received in Buenos Aires at the beginning of March, everything indicated that there were preparations for facing a probable crisis, but not an imminent one. Hence his concern when Gilobert confirmed that the plans were indeed to be executed and Argentine troops were to land soon.

After such a revelation, time seemed to go by as usual. Local residents tried to hide their nerves. The rest of the Argentine population, unaware of the state of affairs, continued with their daily activities while the FIDF⁶⁶ kept them under a discreet surveillance.

Around 1900, on March 31st, Stanley's radio broadcast spread the news on the Islands that the Argentine fleet had been set back twenty-four hours due to a sea storm. This cleared things up. Not only were the British aware of the ongoing situation, but they could also accurately locate naval surface units. Meanwhile, such news and the events in Stanley were coded and rebroadcast to the landing forces command via LADE's stations in Buenos Aires and Comodoro Rivadavia.

⁶⁵ RUBÉN OSCAR MORO, *Historia del Conflicto del Atlántico Sur (La guerra inaudita)*, Buenos Aires: Escuela de Guerra Aérea de la Fuerza Aérea Argentina, Nos. 135/136, 1985), page 59.

⁶⁶ The acronym "FIDF" stands for "Falkland Islands Defence Force."

On the morning of April 1st, Gilobert and Gamen discussed ways to support the air assault to the airport without involving LADE's employees. The less number of personnel involved the more chances of achieving the goal. At the right time, they would approach the runway, each of them separately, on foot, and across the field so as not to be seen.

Although everything continued as usual at Stanley, where stores and public offices were open, the atmosphere was rather tense. At noon, Danny Borland, the airport's meteorologist, invited Gilobert and Gamen to dine at his house. This meant an impossible obstacle for them to overcome: covering the 10 kilometer distance to the runway and arriving with enough time for the air assault. With that trick, the British would retain both men without capturing them. A similar situation would lie ahead for the rest of the Argentine leaders.

Around 1400, on April 1st, Reinaldo Reid, an Anglo-Argentine man who had been living for a long time in Malvinas' capital, informed Gamen that the runway was blocked with vehicles to prevent landings. Only a small portion was available for the Britten Norman Islander, the aircraft owned by Governor Hunt, which was patrolling the area around the adjacent sea. At 1700, the radio announced that the aircraft had confirmed the proximity of the Argentine fleet, and summoned FIDF's volunteers to take up their posts. Based on the ships' distance and speed, the radio broadcaster announced that the invasion would start at 2200.

Meanwhile, at 1810, Vicecomodoro Gilobert informed the command of the runway status, using code words such as "obstacles" and "comfortably accommodated".⁶⁷ Under such circumstances, besides the aftermath of the previous day's storm —the swell had made the helicopter break loose from its moorings rendering it inoperable—, the Argentine Task Force 40 commander was forced to redistribute tasks and to change the sequence of the execution plan.

Before 1900, following British tradition, Gilobert and Gamen were having dinner at Borland's house. The atmosphere was rather tense, with an air of strange courtesy. From the next room, as though coming from far away, orders and information being broadcast on the radio could be heard. Both Argentine men tried to understand the messages spoken in distorted English, maybe a mixture of cockney accent or London slang and Gaelic.

Dinner finished at 2100, and the Argentines left for Gamen's residence. Once there, they found the house guarded by four armed FIDF militiamen. Both men assessed the situation: the guards prevented them from moving, the runway was blocked, and troops were deployed and ready. Since they were convinced that the air assault would not be executed, they did not go to the airport. Meanwhile, policemen and defense forces searched the houses of Argentine residents. All adult men were sent to the Town Hall under armed guards.

On the other hand, a group of foreign journalists and an Argentine graphic reporter had been staying in town for several days to cover the news of Davidoff's trip and the naval efforts to remove the scrap metal workers. That night, the British sent them to different rooms of the Government House.

On April 1 at 2200, Gilobert and Gamen began their radio communications attempts with the Task Force 40, at the scheduled times. They repeated the procedure every two hours, until the early morning of April 2, when they heard gun firing had started.

The air assault begins

At the 9th Air Brigade located in Comodoro Rivadavia, the early hours of 2 April started with some unusual activity. The F-28, registration mark TC-51, landed at 0015 carrying the Comando Aéreo de Transporte (CAT, Argentine Air Transport Command) commander Brigadier Enrique R. Valenzuela. Immediately afterwards, three C-130Hs and two F-28s more arrived. After 0100, a C-130 and a KC-130 landed, as well as the vehicles carrying the Regimiento de Infantería 25 (25th Infantry Regiment) troops which had not traveled

⁶⁷ "Diario de Guerra del Comando Aéreo Estratégico", DEH-FAA Archives, 1 April 1982.



Obstacles scattered across the runway in Malvinas on 2 April- Photo courtesy of: Archivo G1 Comunicaciones Escuela

with the Task Force 40, the Compañía de Ingenieros de Combate 9 (9th Combat Engineers Company), and elements of the Command of the IX Brigada de Infantería (9th Infantry Brigade). Personnel and materiel boarding began at 0400. The Assault phase of the Operations Plan Aries 82 had started.

At 0515, aircraft call sign LITRO 1 (C-130H, registration mark TC-68) took off from Comodoro Rivadavia heading to Malvinas. The men who would consolidate the Islands occupation traveled in the aircraft cargo hold: a total of 108 passengers who would make up the Staff of the Air Component of Teatro de Operaciones Malvinas (TOM, Malvinas Theater of Operations), commandos of the Grupo de Operaciones Especiales (GOE, Special Operations Group), the Elemento Control de Transporte Aéreo (ECTA, Air Transport Control Element), materiel for the Terminal Aérea de Carga (TAC, Air Cargo Terminal), personnel and materiel of the Grupo 1 de Comunicaciones Escuela (G1CE, 1st Communications Group Institute), and Army troops with two Jeeps. Argentine Air Force personnel were responsible for the airport control and the organization of assets to support air transport operations.

At dawn, close to the Islands, the TC-68 made radio contact with the fleet vessels and was ordered not to land. The situation was yet to be defined while the battle continued in the vicinity of the airport, so the aircraft flew a holding pattern for two hours.

At 0700, the airport was finally recaptured. As they found no opposition, a Company C section of the 25th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Teniente Coronel Mohamed Alí Seineldín, and supported by a company of the Batallón de Infantería de Marina 2 (2nd Marine Battalion), removed the obstacles, road machines and the vehicles scattered around preventing air operations. At 0730, the runway was clear.

Landing clearance was issued at 0830, and, as a precaution, aircraft doors were opened during the flight so that GOE commandos could take up their positions with their weapons since they would fly over a thousand meter open field before reaching the airport. The LITRO 1 touched down in Malvinas at 0845. Though there was no armed resistance, according to Argentine Air Force doctrine, that air assault task with landing delivery was the first combat air operation of the Malvinas conflict.

As soon as the aircraft stopped, the 29 GOE commandos, under the orders of Vicecomodoro Esteban Luis Correa, descended forming two rows in a combat crouch position. They

surrounded the aircraft to protect it in case of a possible attack, since it was uncertain whether the airport was indeed clear. After confirming that there was no enemy resistance, GOE's leader authorized the rest of the passengers' descent.

While machine gun fire was heard in the city, commandos thoroughly searched the premises looking for booby traps, weapons and other elements that could entail a risk. As they secured the different areas (TWR, hangars, communications facilities, fuel station, etc.), they handed them over to those in charge of setting up general and special services for airport operation and air traffic control.

GOE troops, divided into patrols, spread throughout the airport raking through the surroundings, and found abandoned ammunition and materiel. When the task was completed, they occupied a hangar and unloaded equipment and provisions, while sentry posts were getting ready to guard the airport.

The GOE would provide the target security and defense until 3 April. Afterwards, it would be relieved by a company of the 9th Air Brigade that would continue with the assigned tasks.

According to Plan Aries 82, after the arrival of the TC-68, three C-130s and four Fokker F-28s (call signs LITRO 2 to LITRO 8) would follow, concluding the Air Assault phase.

Events in the city

The night of 1 April, Vicecomodoros Gamen and Gilobert, confined to the Argentine residence, learned about the course of action over Stanley's radio broadcast. Around 0900, when firefights concentrated on the Government House, Hunt telephoned Gilobert and sharply demanded his intervention to stop the assault. As he was unable to contact Argentine troops, both men decided they would meet at Hunt's office to work on a solution.

Gilobert walked the 300 meters between his residence and the Government House waving a white flag, while Argentine Navy Marines continued the firefight, unaware of the ongoing negotiations. The Islands' defenders seemed relieved as they watched him from their positions, and encouraged him to keep going. When he arrived, the leader of the Marines received him and led him to Hunt and Baker. On his way, he noticed that some documents had been burned and several cryptographers lay destroyed on the ground. Without saying a word, the Governor asked him to contact the Task Force commander and to demand, on behalf of the Crown, the immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of troops. Though Gilobert knew it was just an expression, he could not believe what he had just heard, and reminded him that the disproportion between the forces could make the position untenable for the British. He also informed him of the decision to prevent casualties and the commitment to respect the Islands' military and civilian personnel.

Gilobert's arguments did not convince Hunt. Only the weight of reality persuaded him to accept the capitulation. As the siege of the Government House continued, they decided to meet with the landing forces commander.

Gilobert and Baker went to the radio station to send a message for the Argentine commander, certain that he would have it tuned in just as the Islanders. First of all, Gilobert informed the Argentine authorities' measures to be implemented, and assured Islanders their interests would not be affected. Then he addressed Contraalmirante Carlos A. Büsser, and explained the Governor's decision to make the surrender official. Since his presence was necessary, he invited Büsser to meet at Santa María catholic church to go together to the meeting with Hunt.

Nobody knew for sure if Büsser had received the message. While they waited, news was received that the cargo ships were near Stanley and that another C-130H was landing on the runway. Minutes later, Büsser arrived at the church, unarmed and accompanied by his assistants. On their way to the Government House, Gilobert gave him details of his conversation with Hunt.

Argentine troops kept firing until Contraalmirante Büsser ordered the ceasefire. Once again, the Governor demanded the withdrawal of troops. The Argentine commander advised him to lay down their arms. Hunt did so, and ordered the leader of the Marines to organize the surrender. At that moment, Büsser asked him if he could have the honor of shaking his hand in recognition of the extraordinary courage demonstrated by his men. Hunt, surprised at such a request, agreed and asked Gilobert to aid the wounded. They went to the back of the house, where several Argentine soldiers were lying on the floor. Immediately, Capitán de Corbeta Pedro E. Giachino, the most seriously wounded man, was taken to the hospital, but died soon afterwards, and was the only fatal casualty.

Utter confusion followed the ceasefire. Coming from the four cardinal points, Argentine and British troops converged towards the Government House without a clear understanding of the situation. Exhausted, nervous, they went past one another carrying their loaded weapons. At mid-morning, the helicopter –coming from the destroyer *Santísima Trinidad*– arrived bringing General de División Osvaldo García, Contraalmirante Walter Allara and members of the Argentine Staff.

The air assault continues

The remaining aircraft followed the arrival of the TC-68. The LITRO 2 (C-130H, registration mark TC-63) landed at 0920 carrying twenty-five men from the Army and a similar number from the Company of Soldiers of the 9th Air Brigade Battalion, who were to support the GOE in Security and Cargo Terminal functions. The LITRO 3 (C-130H, registration mark TC-64) landed at 0945 carrying Army men, a jeep, and the rest of the soldiers from the 9th Air Brigade Company, transporting a total of one hundred passengers. The LITRO 4 could not depart from Comodoro Rivadavia at the scheduled time due to technical problems; thus, it would depart in the afternoon. The LITRO 5, LITRO 6, LITRO 7 and LITRO 8 (all F-28s, registration marks TC-51, TC-54, TC-52 and TC-55 respectively) landed in Malvinas at 0955, 1050, 1105 and 1110, respectively, carrying fifty-four passengers each. The LITRO 4 (C-130H, registration mark TC-65) arrived at 2005 transporting the AN/TPS-43 radar of the 2nd VyCA Group, and a vehicle.

Flights conducted during the Air Assault phase:

LITRO 1. Type: C-130H. Registration mark: TC-68. Crew: Comodoro Carlos J. Beltramone, Vicecomodoro Alfredo A. Cano, Comodoro Roberto F. Mela, Suboficial Ayudante Juan Rydzik, Cabo Principal Mario E. Cemino, Suboficial Ayudante Manuel R. Carabajal, Suboficial Ayudante Ramón A. Pajón, and Suboficial Auxiliar Carlos A. Salzano. The aircraft took off from Comodoro Rivadavia at 0515 and arrived in Malvinas at 0845. It took off again at 0920 and landed in Comodoro Rivadavia at 1130.

LITRO 2. Type: C-130H. Registration mark: TC-63. Crew: Vicecomodoro Alberto Vianna, Capitán Andrés F. Valle, Capitán Roberto M. Cerruti, Suboficial Principal Pedro E. Razzini, Suboficial Auxiliar Oscar A. Ardizzoni, Suboficial Auxiliar Carlos D. Nazzari, Suboficial Ayudante Juan E. Marnoni, and Cabo Principal Ricardo O. Figueroa. The aircraft took off from Comodoro Rivadavia at 0620 and arrived in Malvinas at 0920. It took off again at 0950 and landed in Comodoro Rivadavia at 1150.

LITRO 3. Type: C-130H. Registration mark: TC-64. Crew: Mayor Rubén O. Palazzi, Vicecomodoro Julio C. Sanchotena, Vicecomodoro Adrián J. Speranza, Suboficial Auxiliar Juan C. Romero, Cabo Principal José L. Torres, Suboficial Principal Américo A. Arévalo, Suboficial Principal Carlos A. Sánchez, and Cabo Principal Juan B. Reynoso. The aircraft took off from Comodoro Rivadavia at 0655 and landed in Malvinas at 0945. It took off again at 1000 and landed in Comodoro Rivadavia at 1200.

LITRO 5. Type: F-28. Registration mark: TC-51. Crew: Brigadier Enrique R. Valenzuela, Capitán Agustín A. Míguez, Capitán Antonio F. Fazio Carreras, Suboficial Principal Julián Rodríguez, Cabo Primero Gerardo F. Roldán, and Suboficial Ayudante

Carlos A. Martínez. The aircraft took off from Comodoro Rivadavia at 0815 and landed in Malvinas at 0955. It took off again at 1045 and landed in Comodoro Rivadavia at 1215.

LITRO 6. Type: F-28. Registration mark: TC-53. Crew: Vicecomodoro Oscar J. Bahamondes, Mayor Carlos H. González, Suboficial Ayudante Héctor A. García, Cabo Primero Osvaldo Puñet, and Suboficial Ayudante Enrique R. Prince. The aircraft took off from Comodoro Rivadavia at 0915 and landed in Malvinas at 1050. It took off again at 1110 and landed in Comodoro Rivadavia at 1240.

LITRO 7. Type: F-28. Registration mark: TC-52. Crew: Mayor Raúl E. Echenique, Mayor Héctor M. Pupek, Cabo Principal Juan R. Medina, Suboficial Auxiliar Carlos N. Verasay, and Cabo Primero Ramón O. Avendaño. The aircraft took off from Comodoro Rivadavia at 0930 and landed in Malvinas at 1105. It took off again at 1130 and landed in Comodoro Rivadavia at 1250.

LITRO 8. Type: F-28. Registration mark: TC-55. Crew: Vicecomodoro Eduardo J. Amores, Capitán Ricardo L. Altamirano, Suboficial Principal Roberto Verdú, Cabo Principal Jorge L. Gamba, and Suboficial Auxiliar Hugo J. Ochoa. The aircraft took off from Comodoro Rivadavia at 0945 and landed in Malvinas at 1110. It took off again at 1945 and landed in Comodoro Rivadavia at 2115.

LITRO 4. Type: C-130H. Registration mark: TC-65. Crew: Mayor Julio A. Domínguez, Vicecomodoro Rubén O. Moro, Mayor Jorge A. Valdecantos, Suboficial Auxiliar Ranulfo M. Lozano, Suboficial Auxiliar Juan C. Hümöller, Suboficial Auxiliar Roberto M. Ovejero, Suboficial Principal Domingo G. Farías, and Cabo Principal Horacio R. González. The aircraft took off from Comodoro Rivadavia at 1755 and landed in Malvinas at 2005. It took off again at 2050 and landed in Comodoro Rivadavia at 2245.

This last flight completed the Air Assault phase of the Plan Aries 82 conducted by the CAT. Before noon, most of the flights' crew (except for the LITRO 4 crew) had crossed to the Islands: the Staff of the 9th Infantry Brigade, members of the 25th Infantry Regiment, and the 9th Combat Engineers Company. The fifty soldiers of the 9th Air Brigade were the first contingent of Air Force troops to set foot on Malvinas.

During the first hours of the air assault, a serious disagreement came up between the Navy leaders, who were already in Malvinas, and the Air Force leaders who had just arrived to be responsible for the airport operation and control. The misunderstanding arose because each armed force had received different instructions on how to manage the airport, runway and facilities.

The COA planning had not included the involvement of the Navy transport aircraft. Hence, the Air Force took part accordingly. When nobody expected it, however, the Navy F-28, registration mark 5-T-20, carrying Naval Aviation commander Contraalmirante Carlos García Boll, requested landing clearance, to take control of the airfield and set up a naval air base. It was not authorized until an hour later, after the intervention of Contraalmirante Carlos Büsser and Contraalmirante Walter Allara. They both came to an agreement with Brigadier Luis Castellano, the Air Component commander, and the decision was reconsidered.⁶⁸

Furthermore, the hasty planning before the occupation posed other problems which failed to be solved by verbal agreements as the above mentioned, and which would affect the operations development. Initially, Air Force and Navy landings and take-offs were not

⁶⁸ Account given by Brigadier Luis Guillermo Castellano, DEH-FAA Archives. On its return flight, this aircraft carried the remains of Capitán de Corbeta Pedro E. Giachino.



British Royal Marines boarding a C-130 bound for the mainland - Photo courtesy of: BANIM DEH-FAA

coordinated, thus it was impossible to organize efficiently the reduced parking area available at the Malvinas Airport.⁶⁹

The surrender of Port Stanley

Brigadier Castellano left the airport at 1045 and went to town to appear before the Argentine authorities. In such circumstances, he learned that an official ceremony was being prepared to hoist the flag in front of the Government House. As there was no time to gather a more formal audience, he ordered the personnel available to go to the flagpole area.⁷⁰

A few minutes later, Vicecomodoro Gilobert accompanied Hunt and Baker up to the Town Hall. There, they made the surrender official before General García, with the presence of the commanders of the Armed Forces involved and journalists. When he found out he would be evacuated that afternoon, Hunt expressed his wish to leave the Islands with dignity, wearing his governor's uniform, and driving his official car, the classic Austin.

When they arrived, General García greeted him, extending his hand cordially. Hunt, with his hands clasped behind his back, refused to return his greeting. He said he was sorry but he could not do so under the circumstances. He was informed he would be deported to Montevideo, together with the troops, and that his request was accepted. Baker would stay temporarily in Stanley to facilitate the transfer of power to the incoming administration.

Gilobert was appointed to escort Hunt and his family until their departure. The former Governor asked him to explain to General García –who had felt snubbed– that, under those circumstances, it was not appropriate to show fraternity publicly. And, though he had refused to greet him back, it had not been for personal reasons. Moreover, he earnestly requested Gilobert to keep an eye on his private aircraft, the Islander. He had just bought it and kept it inside a hangar at the airport, waiting for the regular supply ship to take it to the UK. The commitment was diligently fulfilled in collaboration with the Air Force personnel.⁷¹

⁶⁹ On 3 April at noon, two Navy S2E Tracker aircraft landed at the BAM Malvinas. The aircraft occupied a portion of the airport apron making it difficult to unload the successive C-130s and F-28s flights coming from the mainland without interruption. Consequently, part of the assets had to be unloaded on the taxiway and on the runway thresholds. That event resulted in a direct request from Brigadier Castellano to the FAS commander. On 11 April, both aircraft returned to Espora without having performed a single exploration flight that would justify their deployment to Malvinas.

⁷⁰ Account given by Brigadier Luis Guillermo Castellano, DEH-FAA Archives.

⁷¹ The aircraft was kept in perfect condition until the early morning of 1 May, when a British bomb damaged it beyond repair.

Around 1600, wearing his flamboyant uniform, Hunt got into the old car together with his wife and son. Gilbert observed that intimate moment and bid them farewell before the vehicle started. Hunt thanked Gilbert deeply touched, while his wife comforted him saying: “Don’t worry, Héctor. This is the third time we are dismissed from an assignment.” Along their way to the airport, the Islanders waved them goodbye.

British troops, taken prisoners during the recapture of the Islands, arrived at the airport together with the former Governor and his family. Unnoticed by the Argentine authorities, Tony Hunt —Rex Hunt’s son— was hiding inside his shoe a news dispatch by Simon Winchester, the Sunday Times’ journalist who was in Malvinas to cover the news on Davidoff’s incident.

Their custody during the flight to the mainland and then to Carrasco airport (Uruguay) was exclusively assigned to the GOE.

At the airport, the Navy Intelligence personnel searched through the Hunts’ personal belongings, looking for the Royal Navy cryptographic codes. The former Governor never forgot the humiliation. From that moment on, he became a bitter enemy of Argentina, and started leading the most radical groups. Hunt, who had always been impartial, would twist facts so as to diminish our country’s image. Hunt and his family were transported to Comodoro Rivadavia aboard an F-28 escorted by a guard led by Alférez Guillermo Sorensen.

British troops boarded the C-130 Hercules, registration mark TC-68. In this case, security was in charge of Teniente Hugo Dante Amaya, Cabo Primero Roberto Agüero and Cabo Manuel Darío Córdoba. It was an uneventful flight.

The aircraft took off about 2030 from Puerto Argentino heading to Comodoro Rivadavia. Once all prisoners arrived, they were taken on two buses up to the runway threshold, where they boarded an Argentine Air Force Boeing 707. The aircraft commander, Vicecomodoro Horacio Genolet, welcomed them aboard in perfect English and informed them they would be taken to Uruguay.

They were under GOE’s custody at all times. About 0300 in the morning, they arrived at Carrasco airport, where prisoners were handed over to the British ambassador in the neighboring country, Patricia Hutchinson. Neither the crew nor the custody members got off the aircraft.

Once the mission was accomplished, the aircraft returned uneventfully to the 1st Air Brigade in El Palomar, and the four GOE members were taken to their home base, the 7th Air Brigade in Morón. The rest of the GOE members stayed in Malvinas.

Escuadrón Pucará deployment

On that 2 April at 0430, a flight of four IA-58 Pucarás landed at the BAM Río Gallegos coming from the 3rd Air Brigade in Reconquista, Santa Fe province.⁷² Crew members included Capitán Roberto Vila (A-556), Teniente Héctor Furios (A-529), Teniente Miguel Giménez (A-552), and Teniente Roberto Címbaro (A-523). Each of them was accompanied by the following mechanics Cabo Principal Jorge Piaggi, Cabo Primero Luis Toloza, Cabo Antonio Ramos, and Cabo Primero Rubén Carreras, respectively.

At 0730, four additional Pucará pilots arrived at the same BAM aboard a Boeing 707: Capitán Jorge Benítez, Primer Teniente Francisco Navarro, Teniente Daniel Jukic and Teniente Hernán Calderón.

Fragmentary Orders (Frag-Os) were issued immediately for deployment to Malvinas:

Frag-O w/o no. Aircraft: four IA-58 Pucará. Call sign: TIGRE. Weapons: 20 mm cannons and 7.62 machine guns. Mission: deployment to Malvinas. Crew: Capitán Jorge Benítez

⁷² They had taken off from their home base the day before at 1230, and had a stopover in Tandil at 1535. From there, they took off again at 2300 headed for the BAM Río Gallegos



The Pucará Flight in formation with the supporting TC-70 arriving in Malvinas on 2 April

Photo courtesy of: Comodoro VGM (R) Aranda Durañona

and Cabo Principal Jorge Piaggi (A-529); Capitán Roberto Vila and Teniente Miguel Giménez (A-556); Teniente Daniel Jukic and Cabo Primero Luis Toloza (A-523); and Teniente Hernán Calderón and Cabo Antonio Ramos (A-552). The aircraft were configured with two 318-liter wing tanks and one 1,000-liter center tank (ECO version).

Frag-O w/o no. Aircraft: KC-130. Registration mark: TC-70. Mission: Pucará deployment support. Crew: Vicecomodoro Luis Litrenta Carracedo, Vicecomodoro Eduardo Pessana and Vicecomodoro Roberto Tribiani; Suboficial Mayor (R) Giliberto Salvador and Suboficial Mayor (R) Guillermo Aguirre; Suboficial Ayudante Sergio A. Tulián, and Suboficial Ayudante Luis F. Sarmiento; Suboficial Auxiliar Roberto G. Puig; Suboficial Principal Roberto Caravaca; and Cabo Principal Jorge L. Contigiani.

The four Pucarás and the KC-130 took off at 1400 from the BAM Río Gallegos. The Hercules provided navigation support. The aircraft arrived in Malvinas at 1600, though the KC-130 did not land, but rather returned to Río Gallegos where it landed at 1800.

This Pucará formation had the distinction of being the first attack flight to touch down on Malvinas soil, and the first to be part of the air unit of the Malvinas Air Component. On 3 April aboard the C-130, registration mark TC-68, the rest of the crew arrived together with the technicians and brought deployment materiel. The Pucará flight, then, got ready for its first operational tasks.



The Pucará Squadron operating in Malvinas since 3 April - Photo courtesy of: Comodoro VGM (R) Aranda Durañona

British response and Argentine reaction

Since the end of March, Argentina had been requesting a Security Council meeting to discuss the crisis over South Georgia, but the US and the UK avoided setting a date and discussing the problem.

On 31 March, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had already decided to retake the Islands by force if Argentine troops landed in Malvinas. Sir Henry Leach, the First Sea Lord of the Royal Navy, had encouraged her to do so, assuring her that they could organize a powerful naval force, preceded by aircraft carriers HMS *Hermes* and HMS *Invincible*, and set sail in just forty-eight hours.⁷³

The Prime Minister, encouraged by Leach, had ordered her collaborators to go to war without previous discussion. Despite the many known reservations that Sir Michael Beetham (Air Force) and Sir Edwin Bramall (Army) may have expressed, they were never included in the cabinet's agenda. Their duties consisted in executing orders to get the task force moving. Only at a later stage, once the stimulus became constant, their opinion would be taken into account.⁷⁴

On 1 April, the British government decided to send the task force to the South Atlantic. On 2 April, after Argentina recaptured the Islands, the UK undertook a firm diplomatic action and succeeded in summoning a meeting of the UN Security Council. On 3 April, Security Council Resolution 502 was adopted, demanding the immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces. On that same day, the British fleet sailed from the port of Portsmouth to operate 8,000 miles (14,800 km) away from its usual naval stations, led by aircraft carriers which were soon to be scrapped or sold. A surprising speed on such short notice.⁷⁵

⁷³ JOHN WOODWARD AND PATRICK ROBINSON, *One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander*, with a "Foreword" by Margaret Thatcher, Glasgow, HarperCollins Publishers, 1992, pages 11-12.

⁷⁴ MAX HASTINGS AND SIMON JENKINS, *La batalla por las Malvinas*, Buenos Aires, Emecé Editores, 1984, page 127.

⁷⁵ RUBÉN OSCAR MORO, *La guerra inaudita, Historia del conflicto del Atlántico Sur*, Buenos Aires, Edivérn, 2000, page 89.

The main Argentine assumption had vanished; British military assets were already being mobilized to remove the Argentine forces. The Royal Air Force (RAF) also made its initial movements on 3 April. A VC 10 aircraft from the 10th Air Transport Squadron took off from Brize Norton base (England) headed for Montevideo, in order to transport Governor Hunt and his family back home. At the same time, eight C-130s flew to Wideawake Airfield on Ascension Island.⁷⁶ The aircraft transported essential elements to reinforce the air station: a Martello long-range (400 km) air surveillance radar system to prevent possible air attacks, 30th Communications Regiment assets, and the mobile weather unit of the 38th Group.

Meanwhile, on that same day, the Argentine Air Force Secretary, Brigadier Mayor Rodolfo A. Guerra and Brigadier Mayor Sigfrido Plessl summoned Comodoro Bloomer Reeve so that he could report on the Malvinas military government organization carried out by General Menéndez organization of the military government in Malvinas. They also told him that they were staying in Stanley with no definite return date. In turn, Comodoro Bloomer Reeve asserted that events would negatively unfold. He highlighted the UK's position in NATO and the traditional distrust of Argentina since World War II. He also reminded them that the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment⁷⁷ was still in effect despite the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR). And he added that European opinion regarding Argentina's diplomacy of that time was unfavorable.

On 4 April, faced with the British forces deployment, the Argentine government suspended the planned return and ordered the reinforcement of defenses. DEMIL 1/82 had assigned a level 3 probability to the UK's reaction, that is, deployment of forces seemed very unlikely to happen. Such an inaccurate hypothesis revealed that no real contingency plan had ever been considered: neither on 23 March when the COMIL decided to occupy the Islands, nor on 26 March when such decision was actually implemented; even less so on 2 April when the Islands were reincorporated into the national wealth. The only measure actually taken for such a scenario was the inactivation of the Malvinas Theater of Operations and the activation of the Teatro de Operaciones Atlántico Sur (TOAS, South Atlantic Theater of Operations).

Due to such lack of anticipation, the Outline Plan of the South Atlantic Theater of Operations would be issued on 12 April 1982, ten days after the Islands' occupation. This means that the UK launched the recapture operation before Argentina had even conceived a defense plan.⁷⁸

So as to understand the seriousness of having assumed that the UK would attempt to recapture the Islands only through claims before international organizations, it is only necessary to mention that the return of assets of the Task Force 40 included in the original plan was completed on the same 4 April. In fact, that same day the Argentine Navy corvette *Granville* set sail from Port Stanley to the mainland carrying on board a large number of troops and heavy materiel which would prove tactically significant during the battles fought as from 1 May.

The Argentine Air Force, taking into account the British reluctance to negotiate, had drafted four different plans: two of them were already being implemented, CAE's Azul y Blanco, and CAT's Aries 82; while CAE's Mantenimiento de la Soberanía and CAD's Caburé Azul y Blanco needed a few minor adjustments before the commanders' approval and signature and the Military Junta's authorization, which would not be given until 7 April 1982. Still, on 5 April the Air Force had created the Argentine Air Force Southern Command and kept deploying assets to airfields in Patagonia.

⁷⁶ Ascension Island belonged to the UK but its airfield was administered by and leased to the US.

⁷⁷ In 1978, the U.S. Congress passed the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act prohibiting military sales, aid and loans to Argentina or U.S. training of its troops.

⁷⁸ COMISIÓN DE ANÁLISIS... (*Rattenbach Report*), paragraph 167, subparagraph C.

The cabinet arrives in Malvinas

During the last cabinet meeting held before traveling to Malvinas, General Menéndez insisted on protecting and respecting Islanders' organization and customs, increasing their living standards, recognizing their private property rights and encouraging their gradual integration with Argentine citizens.

On the morning of 4 April, an Argentine Air Force Fokker F-28 took off from Jorge Newbery Airport carrying cabinet members and civilian personnel assigned the task of liaison and assistance to public officials. The aircraft landed in Malvinas at 1500, after a stopover in Comodoro Rivadavia.

Once they arrived, public officials received the news that Stanley would be renamed Gaucho Rivero. Looking rather alarmed, they informed General Menéndez that history did not justify the new name, at least for the Islands' most important city and seat of government. Immediately afterwards, the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs was consulted and the project was canceled. Other possible names were considered, such as Vernet or Mestiver, but the Argentine Ministry chose Puerto Argentino, with neither significant meaning nor socio-political connotations.

At noon, they met at Moody Brook —Marines' former lodgings— with the leader of the 25th Infantry Regiment, Teniente Coronel Mohamed A. Seineldín. There, they learned that most Navy troops had withdrawn and that the 2nd Marine Battalion (BIM 2) would be replaced by BIM 5, commanded by Capitán de Fragata Carlos H. Robacio. At dusk, Comodoro Bloomer Reeve stayed at the Upland Goose hotel, and General Menéndez and his assistants stayed at the Governor's residence.

First government measures

On 7 April, an Argentine Air Force F-28 arrived at Puerto Argentino carrying national authorities and military leaders, political personalities, and members of workers' unions and cultural organizations. All of them were to attend the inauguration of the military government. The austere ceremony was held at the Town Hall hotel. Within half an hour the National Anthem was sung and the usual oath was taken. Afterwards, attendants stayed at the hotel where a cocktail party was organized. Desmond King, the hotel's owner and manager, was a former World War II veteran sergeant.

Together with the entourage, journalists and film crews from TV news programs arrived. Some of them would achieve fame, such as Nicolás Kasanzew, Eduardo Rotondo, and others who would stay on the Islands risking their lives to record the events. The journalists' presence was yet another issue for the government to deal with. The Secretary General was responsible for the security and appointed Army Capitán Fernando O. Rodríguez Mayo to coordinate activities and, particularly, to prevent them from running risks.

During the subsequent days, they worked on lasting projects: the asphalt road to Darwin and water and fuel tanks were built, and filters were repaired. To that end, specialists from the Argentine National Highway Administration and other state-owned and private companies were summoned.⁷⁹

Another issue was to restrict the large number of the Islanders crowding the secretariats. Without discouraging them, but with the intention of delaying their arrival and, thus, gain time to get things going, Mrs. Nanette Pitaluga King, the hotel owner's wife, and a member of the Legislative Council, was asked to intervene. It was partly due to her intervention that the Islanders' anxiety was reduced.

Government measures were issued by executive orders. Coordinations were made every other day at cabinet meetings, where the Governor received the latest updates, orders were

⁷⁹ "Instituciones civiles en MLV...", *La Gaceta Malvinense*, No. 59, Year XV, Buenos Aires, March 2016, page 32.

signed, tasks were set up and public officials were briefed on the political and operative situation.

British blockade

On 7 April, the UK publicly announced its military response: it would send a Task Force and establish a 200-nautical-mile (370 km) “maritime exclusion zone” around Malvinas effective as from 12 April at 0000 (GMT). That date would coincide with the arrival of the first nuclear submarine in the area. On 10 April, to avoid a confrontation with the fleet and to allow the U.S. Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, to hold a new round of talks, the Argentine ambassador to the Organization of American States (OAS) announced that the Argentine Navy would not break the blockade. With such a decision, the Military Committee abandoned the idea of using sea transportation to reinforce the island territory and bore the cost of undertaking the deployment operation only with aircraft.

The UK’s threat became effective on 12 April, i. e., any Argentine military or auxiliary ship found within the exclusion zone would be considered hostile and could be sunk. The Naval Command for Sea Traffic designated some logistic ships of Empresa Líneas Marítimas Argentinas (ELMA, Argentine Sea Shipping Company) and of private companies which, though running a high risk, transported cargo between different ports of the Islands in support operations.

Despite the risk of being sunk, the Argentine Coast Guard patrol ships GC 82 *Islas Malvinas* and GC 83 *Río Iguazú* arrived at Puerto Argentino on 13 April, towing one another due to fuel shortage. The British siege would also be evaded by transport ships ELMA *Formosa* on 20 April; ELMA *Río Carcarañá* on 26 April; and tug ship *Yehuín*, coming from Ushuaia, on 1 May at 1920 after the war had started.

Planning the Islands’ defense

After the recapture of 2 April and the forced withdrawal announced by the UK had taken place, Brigadier Mayor Hellmuth Weber ordered the Argentine Air Force to allocate all its resources, to immediately occupy convenient locations on the mainland, and conduct operations together with the Army and the Navy.

On 3 April, the COMIL summoned Naval Operations Commander, Vicealmirante Juan José Lombardo. He was informed he had been appointed Commander of the Teatro de Operaciones del Atlántico Sur (COATLANSUR, South Atlantic Theater of Operations), which would replace the TOM effective as of 7 April. DEMIL 1/82 was handed to him and the following governing ideas were established:

- Argentina would refrain from the use of force in the future, as per the provisions of UN SC Resolution 502. A defensive strategic position would be adopted. Opening fire would not be allowed even in the presence of the enemy, except when responding to a specific aggression.
- The Argentine Navy Fleet would have to return immediately to Puerto Belgrano, as per the provisions of Operation Azul plan (or Rosario, as it was also called). After its resupply, it would have to set sail and stay anchored in the protected waters of Rincón de Bahía Blanca.
- The theater’s territorial jurisdiction was a maritime zone beyond 12 miles and the archipelagos within it. The mainland would be excluded.
- The TOAS Commander would be assigned the same forces as the Naval Operations Command’s, together with all assets deployed in Malvinas, whether they belonged to the Army, the Navy or the Air Force. He would not command Army or Air Force’s troops or assets stationed on the mainland. He was not assigned reserves.

- He would coordinate with the CAE (activated on the basis of the Air Operations Command under orders of Brigadier Mayor Helmuth Conrado Weber) all aspects related to the Air Force actions in the theater, including exploration and reconnaissance, attacks to naval targets and direct and indirect fire support to ground forces on the Islands.⁸⁰

On that same 3 April, when the British armed reaction and blockade became a real threat, Vicealmirante Lombardo summoned the Islands' military governor and CAE's leader for a meeting at Edificio Libertad. They began with an update of the current situation and a discussion on the enemy's retained capabilities. Then, they set out the guidelines to coordinate air assets operations. The Air Force was formally requested the following:

- Maintaining the airlift to Malvinas, even after the blockade had been imposed.
- Performing long-range exploration and reconnaissance over the sea with KC-130s in coordination with the Navy's SP-2H Neptunes.
- Strategic air operations (interdiction) to enemy ships.
- Carrying out tactical air operations (close fire support, exploration and reconnaissance, search and rescue, direct and indirect air defense) on the Islands and airfields assigned to the FAS.
- Under the orders of commands to be set up, as appropriate, conducting defense and transport strategic air operations within the theaters as ordered by high-ranking officers.

Hence, as established by the COMIL, the Air Force was requested to intervene in the TOM (later called the TOAS), conducting air operations which were the Navy's primary responsibility. The Air Force had neither the time nor the resources to develop detection and navigation systems; neither did it have the appropriate weapons for such targets nor the assets to defend against the dangerous missiles on board. Moreover, the guidelines to immediately carry out the South Atlantic air exploration were set out.

In order to meet such requirements, the Air Operations Commander, Brigadier Mayor Hellmuth C. Weber, ordered the adjustment of the Operations Plan 2/82 - Mantenimiento de la Soberanía which, in practice, was already written in full. Said document included activating the CAE and maintaining its headquarters at the Edificio Cóndor and, as of 5 April, defining the mission of the FAS. The previously mentioned higher tactical command would report to the CAE and, stationed at the 9th Air Brigade in Comodoro Rivadavia, it would be responsible for conducting strategic, tactical, defense and transport air operations in the TOAS.

As initially planned, the FAS would coexist and operate together with the commands of the Air Defense Zone created by the Defense Command⁸¹ –reactivated as of 7 April– and also with the CAT, which was responsible for maintaining the airlift between the mainland and Malvinas, and complying with the operational and regular transport requirements of the Armed Forces.

The CAE's self-imposed mission stated in the Operations Plan 2/82 - Mantenimiento de la Soberanía included the following operations:

- Exploration and reconnaissance –together with the South Atlantic Theater of Operations Command based at Puerto Belgrano– in the areas adjacent to Malvinas (a 900-km radius around the Islands).
- Strategic interdiction against the British Task Force, when ordered to do so.
- Tactical air operations on the Malvinas Islands.
- Air defense of FAS's deployment airfields.
- Diversionary air operations.

⁸⁰ JUAN JOSÉ LOMBARDO, op. cit., page 113.

⁸¹ Air Defense Zones are defined in the military strategic planning.

Brigadier Ernesto Horacio Crespo was appointed FAS Commander. The CAT was already under the orders of Brigadier Enrique R. Valenzuela. And the mainland air defense was assigned to the CAD, led by Brigadier Mayor Augusto J. Hughes since peacetime.

One of the most significant changes introduced to DEMIL 1/82 was that as of 7 April the TOM was inactivated and taken over by the TOAS⁸² based at Puerto Belgrano. Within its jurisdiction remained Soledad and Gran Malvina Islands, and the adjacent islets; San Pedro Island (South Georgia); and the air and maritime zones necessary to guarantee the integral defense of Argentina's Atlantic continental coast. As to its geographical reference, it extended from Punta Rasa —at the end of Samborombón Bay— southwards.

Under the authority of the COATLANSUR Commander, Vicealmirante Juan José Lombardo, was the Joint Command of the Malvinas Garrison in charge of the Malvinas Governor, General de Brigada Mario B. Menéndez, together with the commanders of the land component (General de Brigada Américo Daher⁸³), naval component (Contraalmirante Edgardo Otero), and air component (Brigadier Luis G. Castellano). Through their authority, Lombardo would lead the forces detached in Malvinas.

As regards the conduct of the conflict, the COMIL maintained the level of joint leadership with its advisory body, the Argentine Joint Staff.⁸⁴ Under the authority of the COMIL, the TOAS, the Comando Aéreo Estratégico (CAE, Strategic Air Command) and the Reserva Estratégica Militar (REM, Military Strategic Reserve) were assigned the same organizational level.

The FAS Commander and the Malvinas Air Component Commander would coordinate the reception of all kinds of supplies by air transport operations and, mainly, the provision of intelligence information and, thus, plan combat sorties against naval and ground targets.

As stated in the Outline Plan 1/82, the TOAS Commander was assigned the mission to deter and/or interdict possible British military reactions. Therefore, and complementing the Argentine Navy Fleet, the COMIL assigned him the elements of the three armed forces already in Malvinas since the recapture operation. The COMIL was requested the 8th Infantry Regiment as Reserva Estratégica Operacional (REO, Strategic Operational Reserve) in Comodoro Rivadavia, and Air Force assets on the mainland by the COATLANSUR.

On the other hand, since the hypothesis of an imminent conflict with Chile could not be dismissed, the activation of the TOS was considered for an eventual defense of the Argentine mainland, based on the provisions of DEMIL 1/81 and its amendments (Malvinas) introduced at the end of March by DEMIL 1/82.

As regards military aviation assets, in case the Argentine Air Force were to meet the requirements of both the TOS and TOAS theaters, through the CAE, at the operational strategic level, it would act on all fronts up to the flight range of its aircraft, under orders of the FAS Commander. Within that context, the FAS, at the higher tactical level, could simultaneously operate in both Chile's and Malvinas' theaters, maintaining the same permanent bases and coordinating assets allocation according to the urgency of the situation in either theater.

General Osvaldo García was removed from his position as TOM Commander, but kept his position as head of the Army 5th Corps in Bahía Blanca and all units of the Argentine Army in Patagonia.

As regards the Air Force's air assets, DEMIL 1/82 stated that the CAE reported directly to the COMIL; hence, except for exploration and reconnaissance tasks which had to be

⁸² Executive Order "S" No. 700 issued by the Argentine National Executive Power.

⁸³ As of 15 April, he will be succeeded by General de Brigada Oscar Luis Jofre.

⁸⁴ National Strategic Directive (DENAC) no. 2/82, page 17: "The COMIL shall exercise joint military leadership."

expressly coordinated with the COATLANSUR, the CAE had its own powers to interdict naval targets of the British Task Force and execute tactical air operations in support of the Islands.

However, the COATLANSUR plan stated that the conduct of Air Force operations to attack naval targets, after being requested by the COMIL, remained under the control of the Naval Operations Command together with the Argentine navy fleet and all land-based aviation.

To sum up, DEMIL did not assign the CAE or the TOAS Command (both at the operational strategic level) a defined mission and tasks for conducting air operations in the South Atlantic; it only gave them authority to coordinate tasks between them.

The organizational structure introduced by DEMIL 1/82 would not be the last one to be adopted during the conflict. After the landing in San Carlos on 22 May, the COMIL made the late decision to create the Centro de Operaciones Conjuntas (CEOPECON, Joint Operations Center) based in Comodoro Rivadavia. This body was composed of General Osvaldo García, Commander of the Army 5th Corps; Brigadier Mayor Hellmuth Weber, Air Operations and CAE Commander; and Vicealmirante Juan José Lombardo, Naval Operations Commander. The CEOPECON would act in an executive capacity over all the forces of the theater, including the Reserva Estratégica del Ejército (REE, Army Strategic Reserve). It would be conducted with the agreement of the parties; should disagreement arise, the decision-making power would rest with the highest-ranking officer (General García, in this case).

Planning characteristics

The lack of a joint doctrine

In case a conflict escalated into war, the defense doctrine in force in 1982 established that the highest leading authority for conflict resolution was the Argentine National Executive Power (PEN). This body was to decide on the national strategy and define the geographic area for military actions. According to the physical dimensions of the territory involved, one or more theaters would be established and military operations leaders or operational commanders would be appointed.

The next level of leadership referred to the military sectoral strategy which, coordinated by the Argentine Joint Staff, would draft a directive outlining the goals to be achieved by each theater operational commander.

The Staff of the TOAS focused on the Campaign Plan for the defense of the Malvinas Islands with only one reference document (DEMIL 1/82) and without previous planning:

There was no joint publication save for the Basic Doctrine. We had neither operational terms dictionaries, nor any joint planning manual. There were no codes, keys or operation manuals compatible among the three armed forces. Even administrative tasks were managed differently in each service.⁸⁵

On the other hand, DEMIL 1/82 was no longer in force as it had been drafted based on DENAC 1. The latter did not include the TOAS nor did it convey the enemy's real capabilities, so they had to be redefined.

Probably due to the fact it had been swiftly drafted and the Argentine Joint Staff's characteristics, DEMIL 1 turns out to be very confusing as it mixes already adopted decisions with future possibilities.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ JUAN JOSÉ LOMBARDO, op. cit., page 122.

⁸⁶ Ibid., page 109.

[...] it is interesting to highlight that after reading DEMIL 1, the Argentine Joint Staff and, consequently, the COMIL –that passed said document– believed that England’s military reaction was very unlikely to happen (enemy capability 2), and even if it did react, it would only employ one or two submarines (enemy capability 4).⁸⁷

The first records of the Argentine Joint Staff doctrine date back to 1986, when Regulation RC-20-01 “Joint Military Action Planning - Strategic Operational and Tactical Levels” was issued. On the other hand, the operational level and joint military action in the 1980s were not included in the curricula of the Armed Forces War Colleges. Hence, in 1982, commanding and high-ranking officers belonging to the different Staffs, including the TOAS’, had no training on the matter whatsoever.

There were practically no smooth relations among the Armed Forces. Joint military action was based on the efforts and willingness of those who were obliged to work with the other forces, and the documents issued lacked support as they were not part of any doctrine publication.

The TOAS Staff had to elaborate a campaign plan integrating the action of the three armed forces without any support doctrine for the planning of tasks and without any experience in joint military action.

Jurisdiction of operations

The delimitation of the South Atlantic theaters of operations also resulted from the lack of a duly consolidated joint doctrine. In fact, an area of operations in that region of our country was mentioned for the first time in DENAC 1/82, issued by the Argentine Joint Staff, which set up the creation of a TOM around the archipelago during the Islands’ recapture operations.

Likewise, the abovementioned directive included designating a Strategic Military Reserve in Patagonia for defense in case of aggression by Chilean forces in the soon-to-be-created Teatro de Operaciones Sur (TOS, Southern Theater of Operations). Thus, jurisdiction was determined and, in case of conflict, it would include part of the legally recognized Argentine territory.

In that regard, the UN Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, held in 1973, focused on determining the extent of the territorial waters and contiguous zones to allow coastal States to gain economic advantages, as well as the delimitation of the continental shelf. For such purposes, the baseline from which the breadth of the maritime zones would be measured was determined. As a general rule, the baseline was the low-water line along the coast. Waters from that line landwards were considered inland waters and belonged to the coastal State. Outward and up to 12 nautical miles from the baseline, the adjacent maritime zone or territorial waters extended which, legally, was also part of the coastal State and the latter had full sovereignty over it.

On the other hand, coordinating instructions included in DENAC 2/82 mentioned the inactivation of the Theater of Operations once the subsequent negotiations had started. The latter never happened since upon the issuance of Resolution 502, on that same 2 April –demanding the immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Malvinas Islands– the Military Junta put up resistance as a way of urging for the compliance with the appeal to negotiate, which was also included in said resolution.

To that end, the TOAS was created in 1982 by Executive Order “S” No. 700, although its jurisdiction was determined on 8 April by the Military Junta’s Joint Statement No. 19. The latter established 200 nautical miles from the limit of the mainland (12 miles offshore from the baseline) and around Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands. On

⁸⁷ JUAN JOSÉ LOMBARDO, *Ibid.*, page 110.

12 April 1982, the COMIL issued Outline Plan 1/82, which in Annex “A” included the inactivation of the TOM and the transfer of obligations to the TOAS, and in Annex “D” added a map showing the jurisdiction of the new theater.

It is worth mentioning that the TOS, seat of the Strategic Reserve, was not created by means of an executive order, since there was no conflict with Chile at the time. In addition to that, the capricious delimitation of the TOAS starting from the 12 nautical miles legally recognized as Argentine territory by international law, though without operative support, resulted in the Air Force and Naval Aviation air bases located in different places along the Atlantic coast falling outside the warfighting theater.

As per Resolution 1/69, the Air Force was restricted to conducting operations beyond 12 nautical miles from the coast. Thus conditioning the possibilities, during peacetime, of performing missions and training over the continental sea.

Under those circumstances, pilots would have to improvise new attack techniques, not only because they were carrying out operations over the sea, but also because they did not have the appropriate weapons to attack ships.

Guarnición Militar Malvinas

The Islands military governor, General de Brigada Mario B. Menéndez, was also in charge of the Malvinas Garrison Joint Command, which reported directly to the COATLANSUR Commander. Though originally conceived as a subordinate unit, this Joint Command would actually operate as an independent theater due to the tactical situation and British naval and air blockade would prevent providing support to deployed forces. Only air transportation would, once and again, evade the siege and carry weapons and essential elements and, most importantly, evacuate the most seriously wounded to the mainland.

The Joint Command was organized based on the land, naval, and air components, each of them commanded by General de Brigada Américo Daher,⁸⁸ Contraalmirante Edgardo A. Otero and Brigadier Luis G. Castellano, respectively.

Assets were organized according to the initial deployment, but no formal operations plan complementing the COATLANSUR 1/82 Campaign Outline Plan was drafted “though it can be deduced that there is a complementing plan, informally discussed, from meetings and verbal instructions given by the Malvinas Military Commander.”⁸⁹

The initial deployment consisted of approximately 2,500 troops of the 25th and 8th Infantry Regiments (RI) belonging to the 9th Infantry Brigade and commanded by General de Brigada Américo Daher. As of 4 April, the COMIL started the reinforcement of land forces by sending the 10th Mechanized Infantry Brigade with RI 3, RI 6 and RI 7, and a Cavalry Exploration Squadron, the Commando Company and the Engineers Company, with neither their corresponding armored vehicles nor the organic artillery group, commanded by General de Brigada Oscar Jofre.⁹⁰ The 5th Marine Battalion (BIM 5) was ordered to deploy that day as well, though actual deployment began on the sixth day.⁹¹

On 22 April, during his visit to Malvinas, General Galtieri met with Menéndez and Jofre to discuss the deployment performed. They agreed that they had not enough resources available, only two infantry companies and some helicopters and armored vehicles. Galtieri suggested sending an infantry regiment but the Commanders were doubtful since that could worsen the supply problems they already had. When Galtieri returned to Buenos Aires, however, he immediately ordered the dispatch of another brigade. Apart from the problems that originated

⁸⁸ As of 15 April, he would be succeeded by General de Brigada Oscar Luis Jofre.

⁸⁹ COMISIÓN DE ANÁLISIS... (*Rattenbach Report*), op. cit.

⁹⁰ RUBÉN OSCAR MORO, *Historia del Conflicto...*, ESGA, 1985, op. cit., page 154.

⁹¹ JUAN JOSÉ LOMBARDO, op. cit., page 106.



The Hercules C-130 unloading on the BAM Malvinas platform

Photo courtesy of: Comodoro VGM (R) Pavlovic

from the defense of Puerto Argentino, he was concerned about not having enough troops to occupy the entire area since that could weaken his negotiating position once battles began. Another brigade could take over the area.

Without prior consultation with other members of the Junta or the COMIL, Galtieri decided to send the 3rd Infantry Brigade from Corrientes province, commanded by General Omar Parada, with the 4th, 5th, and 12th Infantry Regiments, the 4th Artillery Group, and the 3rd Engineers Company. They were transported to Malvinas between 24 and 29 April.⁹²

Besides the above mentioned, the Army added a strength of 9,804 men including the following assets: the 601st Aviation Battalion, battalions and logistics centers, command and services companies, Air Defense Artillery groups and companies, Military Police companies, Intelligence sections, the Field Surgical Hospital and the 601^{st/2nd} Commando companies.⁹³

Afterwards, assets from the Gendarmería Nacional (GN, Argentine National Border Patrol) and from the Prefectura Naval Argentina (PNA, Argentine Coast Guard) were added as well, under the operational control of the corresponding component commands.

The Malvinas Naval Component, which took on the management of the port and its premises, was composed of the Forrest ship of the British government, seized by the Argentine 5th Marine Battalion; the *Monsunen* and the *Penelope* owned by the Falkland Island Company (FIC); and the tug ship *Yehuín*, transferred by the Navy from Ushuaia and used as a barge in Puerto Argentino. It counted on two Argentine Coast Guard patrol boats as well, the GC-82 *Islas Malvinas* and the GC-83 *Río Iguazú*; and three vessels owned by Transportes Navales, the ARA *Islas de los Estados* and the ARA *Bahía Buen Suceso*, and the ELMA *Río Carcarañá*.

The garrison Military Health Services was composed of health specialist officers belonging to the three armed forces, under orders of the Army physician Mayor Mariano Ceballos.

⁹² LAWRENCE FREEDMAN AND VIRGINIA GAMBA. *Señales de guerra - El conflicto de las islas Malvinas de 1982*, Ediciones Vergara, 1992, page 170. CARLOS AUGUSTO LANDABURU, *La Guerra de las Malvinas*, Buenos Aires. Círculo Militar, Biblioteca del Oficial, Vol. 739, 1988, page 134.

⁹³ JUAN JOSÉ LOMBARDO, op. cit., page 106.

Componente Aéreo Malvinas

Faced with the British reaction –that aimed at forcing the withdrawal of the Argentine troops deployed in Malvinas– the COMIL decided that the Air Force’s main efforts to defend the Islands’ sovereignty would lie with the Argentine Air Force Southern Command and the fighter aircraft stationed in the bases along the Patagonian coast. Meanwhile, the Malvinas Garrison Joint Command was assigned an Air Component under orders of Brigadier Luis G. Castellano, as already mentioned.

After meeting with the CAE Commander on 26 March, Brigadier Castellano met with Comodoro Knud E. Andreasen, head of the Planning Department, and Comodoro Alberto A. Ferraris, head of the Personnel Department. Castellano expressed his concern that the operation could lead to a serious conflict. Both Comodoros repeated what the Commander had already anticipated –that everything had been arranged.

Nevertheless, the Brigadier required a list of senior officers to organize his command’s Staff. He selected personnel with experience in operations, and others with specific knowledge in certain specialties. They were supposed to be in Comodoro Rivadavia to plan the operation by Sunday, 28 March at the latest.

During that meeting, Staff members were appointed as follows:

- A-1 Personnel. Chief Officer: Vicecomodoro Juan J. García de Diego. Assistant Officer: Mayor Jorge O. Fernández.
- A-2 Intelligence. Chief Officer: Comodoro Guillermo V. Mendiberri. Assistant Officer: Mayor Alcides J. Cerutti.
- A-3 Operations. Chief Officer: Vicecomodoro Alberto Alegría. Assistant Officers: Vicecomodoro Héctor R. Gilobert, Mayor Gilberto E. Oliva, and Mayor Alberto A. Catalá.
- Information and Control Center (CIC). Chief Officer: Vicecomodoro Oscar L. Aranda Durañona. Assistant Officers: Mayor Alberto Kajihara and Mayor Héctor M. Pergolini.
- A-4 Materiel. Chief Officer: Vicecomodoro (Engineer) Eduardo J. Giannattasio. Assistant Officer: Mayor Raúl Maiorano.
- A-5 Communications. Chief Officer: Mayor Antonio F. González Iturbe. Assistant Officer: Mayor Mario M. Módica.

After recapturing the Islands and facing an imminent confrontation, Brigadier Castellano gave the order to set up another Military Air Base (BAM) in the Darwin area, called Prado del Ganso (Goose Green), later renamed BAM Cóndor. The aim was to preserve the Pucará air materiel and avoid traffic congestion on the platform of the BAM Malvinas, the main airfield. The location was chosen because it was close to Puerto Argentino and, at the same time, it was far away from the coast, which would reduce naval bombardments effectiveness.

The ultimate Order of Battle of the Malvinas Air Component included two Military Air Bases, a command and control system, two air units (IA-58 and helicopters), one VyCA unit (TPS-43 radar), an antiaircraft artillery unit (one 35 mm Oerlikon battery and two 20 mm Rheinmetall batteries), and one GOE unit. All assets were based in two zones 80 km away from each other. The BAM Malvinas remained at the Puerto Argentino airfield with no air assets save for the Norman British Islander BN-2, registration mark FIGAS, seized from former governor Rex Hunt. The Staff and the Tactical Air Control System were placed in different houses around town.

BAM Malvinas creation and composition

The first Operations Plan Azul y Blanco of the Air Operations Command included setting up a military airfield, to be named Alfil, at the Stanley civilian airport. Its mission was to provide security and support services to Argentine aircraft. As the recapture operation



Military personnel placing a sign at Malvinas Airport on 2 April

Photo courtesy of: Comodoro VGM (R) Aranda Durañona

began earlier than expected, the initial idea was disregarded and, from the beginning, it was organized as a Military Air Base.

On 2 April, the Islas Malvinas Military Air Base was created, and Comodoro Héctor Luis Destri was appointed in command. That same day, the Argentine national flag was hoisted and a yellow sign bearing the inscription “Fuerza Aérea Argentina - Aeródromo Malvinas” (Argentine Air Force - Malvinas Airport) was placed in the front of the building. The unit was immediately organized with all its assigned and lodged squadrons. On 6 April, a short ceremony took place whereby Brigadier Luis Guillermo Castellano officially appointed to office Comodoro Héctor Luis Destri as Chief of the Malvinas Military Air Base. On another side of the building, a second sign was placed bearing the name of the Argentine Air Force new unit.

After the strategic situation changed on 4 April, the Malvinas Air Component undertook and imposed itself the mission of the BAM Malvinas, which would be fulfilled during the entire conflict:

“Maintain the Malvinas archipelago authorized airport fully operative and acting as the main point of air deployment from and withdrawal to the mainland, providing at all times the required services for aircraft operations which involve the deployment of troops and assets of the three Armed Forces, the conduct of tactical air sorties, the provision of all kinds of supplies or the evacuation of the wounded, in order to defend and consolidate the possession of and sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands and adjacent islets.”



Military formation of the VyCA Malvinas Squadron at the first radar emplacement

Photo courtesy of: VyCA Malvinas Squadron Archives

Functions:

- Providing communications and flight support services, as well as other services related to the operation of the airfield: marking and lighting, infrastructure, fire protection and prevention, medical services, etc.
- Conducting ground defense of the BAM premises with the assigned company of soldiers, including passive air defense (fortification, masking, explosive ordnance disposal, rubble and debris removal, and any other task which may arise during operations).
- Coordinating and supporting Army and Navy units' actions defending the BAM outer limits.
- Coordinating warnings transmission and weapons readiness with the three Forces' artillery units stationed at the BAM Malvinas.
- Supporting maintenance tasks and tactical air interdiction tasks, close fire support and search and rescue as ordered by the Tactical Air Component Command.

Once more personnel and supplies arrived, the parking apron was widened using the aluminum plates that had been transported aboard the C-130 Hercules to enable the operation of three aircraft at the same time. An air cargo terminal was also established.

At first, the BAM Malvinas was set up as follows:

- Base Commander: Comodoro Héctor L. Destri.
- Operations Department: Vicecomodoro Alberto J. Zeoli and Mayor Alberto L. Iannariello.
- A company of Comodoro Rivadavia 9th Air Brigade Battalion with a 50 soldier-strength who arrived on 2 April under orders of Teniente Eduardo A. Luppo and Alférez Domingo E. Aguerre.
- Air Cargo Terminal: Capitán Mario Stocco.
- Communications Center: Primer Teniente Eduardo R. Zanardi.
- Supply Squadron, General and Special Services: Mayor Héctor M. Rusticcini. Assistant: Mayor Rodolfo L. Guerrero.



A 35 mm cannon of the Argentine Air Force 3rd Battery during an adjustment fire test

Photo courtesy of: Comodoro VGM (R) Rusticcini

- Technical Squadron: Mayor Carlos H. Argente.
- Combat Control Team (ECCO): Primer Teniente Rodolfo Yuse.
- Health Services: Capitán Luis M. Barusso.
- Religious Support Services: Monsignor Roque Puyelli. Later replaced by Presbyter Gonzalo E. Pacheco, who remained at his post voluntarily until the end of the conflict.

Within the BAM Malvinas facilities, the following lodged units were established:

- Pucará Squadron: Mayor Miguel M. Navarro (later redeployed to the BAM Cóndor).
- Helicopter Squadron with two Chinook and two Bell 212: Mayor Oscar J. Pose Ortiz de Rozas (later redeployed to the BAM Cóndor).
- Antiaircraft Artillery Squadron: Mayor Hugo Maiorano.
- Special Operations Group (GOE): Vicecomodoro Esteban Correa.
- Constructions Squadron: Mayor Raúl O. Maiorano.
- Airspace Surveillance and Control Squadron (VyCA): Mayor Miguel A. Silva.
- In one of the airport's sheds, the Argentine Navy set up the Estación Aeronaval Malvinas (Malvinas Naval Air Station) which was established as a lodged unit not reporting to the BAM Commander. It was equipped with a flight of four MB-339 Aermacchi (two aircraft would arrive on 24 Abril and the other two on 15 May)⁹⁴ and a Grumman S2E Tracker section for maritime exploration (which remained at the station between 3-11 April). The operation of these aircraft went on smoothly, but they occupied a portion of the reduced platform and hindered airlift aircraft operation.

During one of the first coordination meetings held with the three Components Operations Chiefs, they all agreed that neutralizing the runway would be one of the enemy's primary objectives, and that it was of vital importance for the Military Air Base to remain fully operative. Hence, in addition to the aeronautical contingent, the Argentine Army's following units were assigned for defense:

⁹⁴ On 26 May, the Argentine Navy would make a third deployment of three MB-339s. Two of them returned to Río Grande on 5 June.



A CH-47 Chinook helicopter at the BAM Malvinas - Photo courtesy of: Comodoro VGM (R) Pavlovic

- The Batallón de Infantería 25 (25th Infantry Battalion) (four companies): Teniente Coronel Mohamed A. Seineldín.
- Two 35 mm Oerlikon Antiaircraft Batteries with Skyguard fire-control system of the Army 601st GADA. One Battery was to be installed at the airport and the other one on the way to Puerto Argentino (operationally reporting to the BAM Malvinas Commander).
- Antiaircraft Battery with two optically-guided S-A Tigercat missile launchers installed at the airport.
- Roland Missile Battery near Puerto Argentino.

As regards the Argentine Navy's contribution to the antiaircraft defense system, an optically-guided S-A Tigercat missile launcher of Río Grande's Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion was installed on the outskirts of Puerto Argentino, and communication networks were established in the BAM Malvinas.

All posts were filled by Argentine Air Force high- and low-ranking officers. Deployed troops belonged to El Palomar 1st Air Brigade, Morón 7th Air Brigade, Comodoro Rivadavia 9th Air Brigade, and the Escuela de Aviación Militar (EAM, Military Aviation School) and the Escuela de Suboficiales (Noncommissioned-Officer School), both located in Córdoba.

Chapter 4

Argentine Air Force Southern Command



Responsibility of the Argentine Air Force

Getting ready for action

Using the available aircraft, suitable for other purposes, in flying testing was performed to determine the best procedure to penetrate the warships' defenses with a reasonable probability of survival. Depending on the approach, the most suitable weapons available were chosen.

Considering that the Argentine Air Force would only achieve the expected effect after dropping weapons on the target and attaining the desired level of damage, it was essential to determine which factors would influence the tasks: availability of aircraft and weapons, pilot training, conditions on the route and in the target area (weather, distance, flight profiles, navigation aids, defended areas), and target characteristics. Also, approach and attack techniques, go around procedures, return air navigation and, if necessary, in-flight refueling.

Everything was considered and verified in the effort calculation. The feasible percentages of failures, shoot downs, impacts on target and the probability of being detected were assessed.

The same happened with the radar systems that made up the air surveillance and control system in the Patagonian coast and in Malvinas. Although some flights were specifically made to determine the coverage of the AN/TPS-43 and AN/TPS-44 Cardion radars, most of the radar coverage charts were drafted using the numerous unscheduled flights that were performed during April between the different mainland bases and the air lift to and from the islands.

Due to the remoteness, the operation over Malvinas had serious limitations. Lack of autonomous navigation equipment, excessive fuel consumption, limited time to locate, identify, and engage the target, adverse weather conditions in one or several route segments, and especially at the target; fatigue from the journey combined with stress; and a greater possibility of human errors. Furthermore, the distance factor would significantly affect the chances of achieving the desired damage in the attacks, thus the number of required missions for doing so would increase.

Air superiority is measured in terms of the degree of freedom to conduct operations in an airspace given sector, the time each party uses to execute effective actions, and the cost in losses demanded by its use. During the Argentine Strategic Air Command planning, it became clear that the distance between the bases and the targets would prevent the permanence of combat aircraft over the islands, thus the Malvinas' bases defense would be limited to anti-aircraft artillery.

The Mirage III EA used as an interceptor-fighter aircraft could fly over the area for five to ten minutes, as long as it remained at a high altitude. If it engaged in combat and descended, it would not have enough fuel to return. Moreover, the runway was too short for any high-performance fighter aircraft, and the Pucará, which is not suitable for interception, lacked the appropriate equipment for air-to-air actions: sight, radar, and missiles.

In order to reduce the problems caused by excessive flight duration, civilian aircraft were procured, suitable for guiding fighter squadrons equipped with outdated navigation instruments, and meteorological stations were reinforced with more forecasters. In-flight refueling of A-4B/C with KC-130 was also planned. The approach routes were optimized, and the time on target was reduced. Additionally, the training of naval aviation pilots for Super Étendard and A-4Q aircraft in-flight refueling was coordinated.

As regards the risks that attacking British ships entailed, in mid-April, an agreement was reached with the Argentine Navy to conduct exercises with the Type 42 destroyers, *Santísima Trinidad* and *Hércules*, which shared similar characteristics. On that occasion, the detection capabilities of the Sea Dart anti-aircraft missile system were tested, which probability of shoot down was 90%, according to the manufacturer's technical specification. The testing was entrusted to Grupo 6 de Caza de Tandil (Tandil's 6th Fighter Group), which, at the Comandante Espora Naval Air Base, practiced different procedures to reduce shoot-down probability. None of them reduced the 50% loss rate.

Once the simulated attacks were completed, the M-5 flight commander flew over the ships at a very low altitude. Vicecomodoro Juan C. Sapolski, M-5 Squadron Commander, who was supervising from command booth, noticed that this low-level passage was undetected by the radar. The discovery and subsequent practice provided the tactic employed by the Argentine aviators to survive, even against the most pessimistic odds: to approach skimming the water surface was the only method to penetrate the defenses, attack and go around with some probability of success.

The bomb fuses had to be calibrated with the minimum delay allowed, and the attacking aircraft had to move away skimming the waves to avoid being hit by shrapnel. Nevertheless, it was known that the naval targets operated together, combining weapons of various ranges: Sea Wolf anti-aircraft systems (short-range anti-missile) and Sea Cat (optically guided missile), in addition to various anti-aircraft artillery weapons. Considering this situation, the calculated risk of being shot down increased by 25%, while the possibility of hitting the target was as high as 55% per aircraft that reached the launching point.

To their advantage, the Argentine Air Force counted on units well-trained in shooting and bombing. Low-altitude droppings were preferred by the pilots due to the higher accuracy. At the deployment bases, practices of navigation over the sea started, which ended in exercise bomb droppings against simulated maritime targets or, in the case of A-4B aircraft, against a ship grounded on the Patagonian coast. Considering there were no weapons available for long-distance droppings, bombs unsuitable for naval target attacks were used, since they required flying over the ship under attack. Most of the available bombs presented limitations in their fuse arming and delay-action for very low-level droppings, as their design was intended for high-altitude bombing.

The 250 kg parachute-braked Alaveses-type bombs (BRP 250), were tested in April only to find out they did not explode in the water. A direct hit — with properly armed fuses — on the ship's structure would be needed to cause damage.

As an alternative, the British MK-17 bomb, originally intended for the BMK-62 Canberra, was adopted in some weapon systems. This bomb weighed 1000 pounds (454 kg) and showed poor results in very low-altitude droppings due to the fuse arming time. In addition, it only allowed a single bomb per aircraft, reducing the probability of success compared to a multiple dropping. This would be confirmed during operations: in many cases, due to very low droppings, the bombs pierced the ship structure, and as the fuses failed to activate, they did not explode. Furthermore, to prevent the shock wave from the explosion of a smooth-tailed bomb from affecting the launching aircraft, it was necessary to count on delays not available in the fuses that would enable a safe escape.

On the other hand, to attack ships from low altitudes, the Argentine Navy counted on 250 kilogram American MK-82 Snakeye, mechanical delay-action bombs, but even with these bombs, the minimum dropping altitude had to be around 50/60 meters. The fact is that there was no fuse available in any arsenal around the world that would allow attacks on warships from altitudes lower than 50/60 meters above sea level. It was clear that this mode of attack had never been considered due to the low survival probability.

In summary, although the Argentine Air Force did not count on suitable weapons to attack naval targets, its personnel would show that despite all the limitations they were faced with, they would seriously affect the enemy fleet.

In order to attack naval targets, it is essential to know their location, number of elements, their course, and speed. Based on this information, it is possible to identify the meeting point and determine the necessary offensive force. Since the development of specific means to combat ships was not authorized by joint directives, the Air Force did not count on aircraft equipped for efficient maritime reconnaissance. Under these conditions, they accepted the risk of using C-130H Hercules and Boeing B-707 for distant exploration tasks, with their limited weather radars, without radar warning systems (RWS⁹⁵) or countermeasures, nor electronic intelligence (ELINT) or communications intelligence (COMINT) equipment.

Since they operated from Comodoro Rivadavia, Río Gallegos, Río Grande, San Julián, Santa Cruz, and Trelew, it was taken into account that due to the low seawater temperatures, flight crews would have to wear anti-exposure suits. Flying over the sea with a single-engine aircraft already involved risks. Considering that missions over the South Atlantic would take long hours, the most unexpected thermal protection suits were urgently sought and obtained to help crews survive in case of ejection⁹⁶.

After assessing these factors, the Argentine Air Force took on a high rate of losses.

A challenge for the Argentine Air Force

The probable theater of operations was essentially an air-naval one, thus neither the weapon systems nor the Air Force crews' training were the most appropriate. In addition to operations taking place in a maritime environment, the objective to be defended was an oceanic archipelago located at the limit of the operating range of aircraft based on the mainland. In order to set up an air defense system for such a target, with any chance of success, it was necessary to have an early warning system, whether airborne or ship-borne, in the potential avenues of approach. On the islands, beyond the range of naval artillery, it was necessary to count on at least one runway with a minimum extension of 2,300 meters to operate with fighters as well as shelters for aircraft.

Immediately after April 2, the Argentine Air Force, among many other requirements, considered the possibility of extending the runway for the operation of fighter aircraft, or for an alternative/emergency use.

Thus, one of the first requirements made to the Joint Staff on April 2 was the maritime transportation of the equipment necessary to extend the runway at Stanley. When analyzing the possibilities, the fact the runway was very close to the sea and, therefore, exposed to naval bombing represented a challenge.

During April, competent personnel from the National Highway Administration were summoned to estimate the magnitude of the task and, especially, the time required. However, due to the soil type, the work involved removing rocks and moving a considerable amount of earth that would take months, even counting on the necessary heavy machinery. The only possibility was to place aluminum plates on the rest of the already leveled ground.

There were some inconveniences in coordinating the departure of the shipping vessels in Buenos Aires, which delayed the shipment of 80 crates with 231 aluminum plates to extend the runway, a front-end loader, a bulldozer, a motor grader, two dump trucks, and a mobile workshop truck. It was only around April 7 that the equipment was finally loaded onto the ELMA Ciudad de Córdoba along with the 3rd Infantry Brigade heavy weapons.

During the voyage, the blockade was imposed, so instead of going to the Malvinas Islands, the ship headed for Puerto Deseado, and arrived on April 11. For unspecified reasons, the

⁹⁵ RWS, Radar Warning System.

⁹⁶ Luis Ponzi, a Tandil-based enthusiast close to the 6th Fighter Squadron, provided frogman suits adapted for the M-5 Dagger Squadron pilots. The Cressi Sub factory in Puerto Madryn supplied adapted neoprene wet suits for the crews of Mirage/Dagger, A-4B/C, and Canberra aircraft.



Installation of aluminum plates at BAM Malvinas - Photo courtesy of: Com. VGM (R) Grünert

transport vessel collided with the quay while berthing, causing a two-meter breach in the bulbous bow. C-130 Hercules aircraft carried the personnel and lighter equipment to the Malvinas, while the rest of the equipment was transported by land to the 9th Air Brigade, to wait for available cargo hold space. Because of the incident, the runway could not be extended in due time and manner, thus the possibility of using it as a recovery base was reduced. The only aluminum plates for field runways arrived in Malvinas on the *ELMA Formosa* transport vessel on April 20, under the responsibility of Cabo Oscar W. Doria, from the Quilmes Materiel Area. In the end, the plates were used both for enlarging the air base terminal platform maneuvering surface as well as for subflooring some Pucará shelters at BAM Malvinas, and reinforcing the port quay, which was in poor condition.

An attempt was made to extend the runway with eight aluminum plates at the threshold 08 (on the west end), and it was possible to build a 50 meter long floor with the same runway width. In order to do so, the Aerolíneas Argentinas B-737s participating in the air lift were ordered to take off from runway threshold 26 (on the runway east end) so that jet engines did not lift the plates. However, on 24 and 25 April, due to a strong tail wind, they were forced to take off from runway threshold 08 and ended up lifting the plates completely; therefore, the work done by the Base personnel to place them came to nothing.

In addition to the challenge of operating in a maritime geographical environment with no runway nearby for emergency landings, the 740 kilometer distance between the islands and the nearest mainland airfields posed another severe difficulty, especially for the Mirage aircraft. Considering the lack of in-flight refueling systems, the M-5 Dagger aircraft could stay in the target area for only two or three minutes due to their limited endurance, while the Mirage M-III EA interceptors could reach the vertical of the Malvinas and maintain altitude without descending.

As far as the A-4B/C and naval Q aircraft were concerned, which counted on endurance and equipment to reach the target, attack it, and return, in-flight refueling would be required to conceal their approach route, flying at low altitudes. On the other hand, this possibility was restricted since there were only two KC-130 tankers available. Moreover, any problem during refueling meant the pilots would have to abort the mission and return to their home base, and in the worst-case scenario, should they experience any serious or unexpected technical failure, they would have to eject over the sea.

As regards the Navy's Super Étendard - Exocet duo, when the United Nations requested Argentina to withdraw its forces, France imposed an embargo on the equipment to be delivered retaining 60% in the port of Marseille. Of the twelve aircraft acquired a year earlier, the first five, together with a similar number of uncalibrated missiles, had arrived on November 18, 1981.

Most of the Argentine aircraft would take off from bases on the mainland, while the British aircraft would advantageously take off close to the area of operations. In addition to this, the movement of their aircraft carriers would allow them to adjust their location and get even closer. Parked between 170 and 220 km away from the Malvinas, the Harriers could carry out several sorties on the same target and stay over it for longer periods (between ten and twenty minutes).

The probability of neutralizing a target is determined by the amount of weapons dropped on it and the number of firing passes made against it. These parameters depend on the air superiority available in the area as well as on four factors: aircraft quantity, flight endurance, daily sortie rate per aircraft, and payload capacity.

As the attacker, the Argentine Air Force Southern Command would count on the advantage of choosing the most suitable procedure, location, and time. According to information revealed after the conflict, the RAF addressed this Task Force disadvantage by sending Nimrod patrol aircraft from Ascension Island with two refuelings on the outbound and return flights, as well as from San Felix Island in the Pacific Ocean, counting on Chile's active and secret cooperation. They also lessened their limited exploration capability by using carrier based aircraft, radar picket ships, or submarines on the surface. Moreover, they counted on satellite information provided by the USA⁹⁷, which was clearly late and inaccurate, according to the results observed after the conflict. The latter is evidenced by the fact that they were never able to determine the Puerto Argentino runway's actual condition.

On the other hand, the tension with Chile remained in 1982. Only four years had gone by since both countries had been on the verge of war due to the Beagle Channel dispute. The Trans-Andean country was expected to support the United Kingdom. According to what the then Chilean Air Force Commander, General Fernando Matthei Aubel, later declared in 2003, he had agreed with the British liaison officer, RAF Gp. Capt. Sidney Edwards, on early warning support by means of the Punta Arenas radar:

[Edwards] counted on equipment that provided direct satellite communication with the British flagship, under the command of Admiral Sandy Woodward, Task Force Commander. For example, it was reported that four planes had taken off from a certain base heading for a particular direction, and that due to their speed, they appeared to be Mirage aircraft. The British were already informed of their arrival one hour before they reached destination⁹⁸.

Years later, Sidney Edwards would write his own account confirming the detailed support Chile provided to the United Kingdom during the conflict⁹⁹.

Considering the strengths and weaknesses known at that time, the Argentine pilots knew they were facing the most difficult choice in the Air Force history. Some pilots presumed that only two missions could be executed. Half the aircraft would be lost during the first mission while the rest would be lost in the second one, and no aircraft would remain. However, if a ship was sunk on either sortie, the effort would be justified.

⁹⁷ SIRO DE MARTINI, "Notas y comentarios a la conferencia del Almirante Train", *Boletín del Centro Naval* N.º748, Buenos Aires, 1987. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *Yearbook 1982*, page 89. "Malvinas: la CIA enviaba informes a Gran Bretaña", *El Cronista Comercial*, October 7, 1987. "CIA: le grand déballeage", *L'Express*, October 16, 1987, page 13.

⁹⁸ PATRICIA ARANCIBIA CLAVEL e ISABEL DE LA MAZA CAVE, *Matthei. Mi testimonio*, Santiago de Chile, Editorial Random House Mondadori, August 2003, page 354.

⁹⁹ SIDNEY EDWARDS, *My Secret Falklands War*, United Kingdom, 2014.

It was not an exaggeration. Never before had there been an air-naval confrontation like the one being considered. Most of the fighter aircraft fleet —the Skyhawks, designed in the 1950s, purchased by our country in 1966, and equipped with unreliable and obsolete avionics— would face a fleet whose oldest unit was more modern than the most recent national aircraft (save for the Argentine Navy's Super Étendard) and was built with the latest missile and electronic warfare technological breakthroughs.

Order of Battle of the Argentine Air Force

The Air Order of Battle, or the operational organization structured with the Argentine Air Force units and their corresponding command and control centers, as well as the occupied geographical distribution to confront the British fleet, was the result of the planning done in three different moments:

In the first one, the tasks ordered by the Strategic Air Command "Azul" and "Blanco" plans and the Air Transport Command "Aries" plan for the recapture of the Malvinas Islands.

In the second moment, the movements ordered over the phone by the Strategic Air Command and the Air Defense Command to the unit commanders for their assets to be at the deployment airfields as from April 4. The aim of these deployments was to dissuade the United Kingdom from using force and make them negotiate. Once the Military Committee made the decision to engage in battle, the deployments were officially set out in the respective Operations Plans: CAE's 2/82 "Sovereignty Maintenance" (Mantenimiento de la Soberanía) Operations Plan, distributed on April 7; and CAD's "Caburé Azul y Blanco", distributed on April 19.

In the third moment, the modifications ordered by the Argentine Air Force Southern Command (FAS, Fuerza Aérea Sur) when it took on the leadership of the elements under its command and control. After carrying out an analysis, it relocated some weapon systems so as to improve their relative position according to their endurance and range. Exclusive of the redeployments carried out during the actions, the Air Order of Battle that would engage in combat against the Task Force on May 1, 1982, is included in the Argentine Air Force Southern Command Schematic Plan issued on April 16.

Air Commands

During the conflict, the operational strategic leadership of the Argentine Air Force was exercised by the Strategic Air Command, which initially kept its headquarters at the Air Operations Command located at the Condor Building. As a consequence of the authority it had been delegated, the Argentine Air Force Southern Command (FAS), located in Comodoro Rivadavia, was the higher tactical authority that planned and conducted the air operations in support of the Argentine troops deployed on the islands and interdicted British naval units in the South Atlantic Theater of Operations and adjacent areas.

The Strategic Air Command retained control of distant reconnaissance and exploration tasks with the Boeing 707 and KC-130 aircraft (the latter would be deassigned on April 29 and deployed to the 9th Air Brigade) operating from El Palomar (Buenos Aires) or Comandante Espora (Bahía Blanca) to fulfill the South Atlantic Theater of Operations (TOAS) Command exploration requirements. A Joint Exploration Center was established at the Comandante Espora Naval Air Base on April 7 to that end, and coordinated flights began on April 10.

Meanwhile, the Air Defense Command exercised its leadership through two air defense zones: CODAZ Centro (Comando de Defensa Aérea Zona Centro, Air Defense Command of the Central Zone), which was the only one activated outside the South Atlantic Theater of Operations, and CODAZ Sur (Comando de Defensa Aérea Zona Sur, Air Defense Command of the Southern Zone).



5th Squadron's Boeing 707, 1st Air Brigade - BANIM DEH-FAA

Integrated into the FAS, air defense operations leadership was executed by the Southern Air Defense Command (CODASUR) over a single Air Defense Zone (CODAZ Sur)¹⁰⁰.

The Air Transport Command (CAT) carried out the air refueling operations from the 1st Air Brigade. In practice, the Argentine Air Force Southern Command, which initially had coordination authority, managed transportation flights to and from the islands through the POTA (Air Transport Operations Post) set up at the 9th Air Brigade. This organization, which became the Sección Operativa de Transporte Aéreo (Air Transport Operational Section, SOTA in Spanish) upon the establishment of the FAS Staff, was in charge of the 9th Air Brigade Cargo Terminal and of coordinating with the Army's 9th Infantry Brigade and the 1st Technical Group's aircraft maintenance echelon.

The transport, air defense, exploration and reconnaissance, search and rescue and offensive air operations carried out by the Argentine Air Force units settled on the Malvinas Islands were conducted by the Air Component lower tactical Command based in Puerto Argentino. In turn, it depended on the Malvinas Garrison Joint Command, which reported to the COATLANSUR. Similarly to what happened on the mainland, there was no centralized command of air assets on the islands; each branch of the military conducted its own.

Argentine Air Force Southern Command

Around midnight on April 1, Brigadier Ernesto H. Crespo, Chief of the 4th Air Brigade in El Plumerillo, Mendoza, was urgently summoned to the Air Operations Command headquarters. According to the capabilities plan for that year, and completely unaware of the ongoing action planning, he had to take up his appointment as Air Commander of the Southern Theater of Operations (CATOS); in the form of a tactical air force, this air component was called Argentine Air Force Southern Command (FAS).

Accompanied by the Grupo 4 de Caza (4th Fighter Group) Chief, Comodoro José A. Juliá, Brigadier Crespo flew a MS-760 Paris to Jorge Newbery Airport. At 0400 on April 2, he appeared before his commander, Brigadier Mayor Hellmuth C. Weber, who informed him about the operation that was being carried out to recapture the Malvinas Islands.

Comodoro Knud E. Andreasen, Chief of the Air Operations Command's Planning and Programs Department, briefed him on the events and tasks that were going on in the South Atlantic. The meeting was attended by the Air Force Commander, Brigadier General

¹⁰⁰ CODASUR is the organic command structure. CODAZ Sur is the territorial or maritime area where air defense is executed.

Basilio A. Lami Dozo; the Chief of the General Staff, Brigadier Mayor Juan García; the Chief of the Air Operations Command Staff, Brigadier Héctor Roy; the Chief of the 2nd Intelligence Division (Jefatura II - Inteligencia), Brigadier Gustavo A. Revol; and other Institution leaders.

It was also pointed out that, in case of a potential conflict with Chile, the FAS should support the mission of the Southern Theater of Operations (not yet established), control and secure the western border to prevent Argentine military power from weakening if offensive actions were carried out on national territory.

Brigadier Crespo asked if there were plans for Air Force fighter aircraft to be used in operations over the sea. The response was categorical: that possibility was not considered. The Argentine Navy, with jurisdiction to exercise control over maritime areas of interest and primarily responsible for air-maritime operations, had assumed said responsibility and undertaken to keep the UK naval assets' movements at least 330 kilometers northeast away from the Malvinas.

Brigadier Crespo was also informed that the distant air reconnaissance and exploration task would be carried out using Strategic Air Command's assets, without being assigned to or controlled by the Argentine Air Force Southern Command.

On that same day, April 2, Brigadier Ernesto Crespo flew the same MS-760 (registration mark E-234) to Comodoro Rivadavia so as to organize the Argentine Air Force Southern Command. Brigadier Crespo made up his Staff and ordered the establishment of airfields for deploying the air units that would be under his command. Simultaneously, although the means of transport were not under its jurisdiction, the Argentine Air Force Southern Command coordinated through the Air Transport Operational Section (SOTA), all Air Transport Command's aircraft movements already operating from the 9th Air Brigade to the islands.

Staff of the Argentine Air Force Southern Command

As a widely experienced professional, and aware of personnel's skills and air assets, Brigadier Crespo chose the men with whom he would share leadership. On 5 April, the Argentine Air Force Southern Command was officially established¹⁰¹ –it directly depended on the Chief of the Strategic Air Command– and an important deployment of assets to operate in the Teatro de Operaciones Malvinas (TOM, Malvinas Theater of Operations) started.

On 7 April, the TOM was no longer in effect and was replaced by the Teatro de Operaciones del Atlántico Sur (COATLANSUR, South Atlantic Theater of Operations) led by the Vicealmirante Juan J. Lombardo based in Puerto Belgrano. For that purpose, the FAS staff developed the Operations Plan 2/82 – Sovereignty maintenance Complementing Planning. Approved on 16 April, this new Argentine Air Force higher tactical level Staff would have the mission of «repulsing possible actions from the British Task Force by performing air and ground operations, and preventing any unexpected action from the Chilean Air Force».

FAS Staff departments were made up of the personnel already been designated by the CAE, plus the personnel required by Brigadier Crespo and those who had arrived from the 9th Air Brigade to organize the CODASUR. Though the simultaneous action of both operational organizations (FAS and CODASUR) within the same geographical area had been planned for, their commanders' common sense led them to merge the structures under a single leadership. Both commanders' proposal was submitted to their respective operational strategic commanders (Strategic and Defense commanders) who immediately accepted it. Brigadier Roberto Camblor, in charge of the CODASUR, was appointed Second-in-

¹⁰¹ Formatted as date-time group April 4 at 21:35, the Strategic Air Commander issued message No. 3137 by means of which the Argentine Air Force Southern Command was created.

Command and Chief of the FAS Staff, the Comodoro José Juliá as A-3 Operations of the Argentine Air Force Southern Command, and Comodoro Tomás Rodríguez as A-3 Defense Area of Comodoro Rivadavia and Chief of the Interdiction and Air Superiority Operational Section (Sección Operativa Superioridad Aérea e Interceptación - SOSAI).

The FAS Staff was made up of the following departments:

- A-1 Personnel, Comodoro Manuel R. Rivero
- A-2 Intelligence, Comodoro Jorge A. Espina
- A-3 Operations, Comodoro José A. Juliá
- A-4 Materiel, Comodoro José D. Marcantoni
- A-5 Communications, Vicecomodoro Antonio Á. Maldonado

Thanks to the sustained effort and flexibility of these men and their assistants, who promptly found solutions to every problem, in less than thirty days, the personnel were fully deployed, and the Command's organizational chart was adjusted to the needs of the impending conflict.

During that initial period, Brigadier Crespo divided the tasks, assigning responsibility for the deployed units' training to Brigadier Cambor, while retaining the organization of both the FAS and its Staff.

In the early weeks of April, the crews arriving from Buenos Aires provided information that suggested the conflict would be solved peacefully. While at the highest levels of military leadership the conflict was still considered a crisis that would be resolved diplomatically, both brigadiers understood that it was clearly a state of war, where the FAS would fight since the United Kingdom was assembling an overwhelming Task Force, presumably to punish what they understood as an aggression against their imperial policy.

Among the changes introduced to the organizational chart of the Staff, the position of General Coordinator, responsible for overseeing the ordered air operations, was established and taken up by Comodoro Juan M. Correa Cuenca. With previous experience in Staff work, Correa Cuenca allocated the tasks among Departments and Operational Sections. Likewise, Comodoro Héctor Valeri acted similarly as coordinator between the FAS Staff and the subordinate units, supervising the ordered offensive tasks and advising the commander on their fulfillment.

Furthermore, an immediate planning team was assembled. Located in the Operations Department, it was made up of the Deputy Commander, the General Coordinator, the Chief of the A-3 Operations Department, and the Chief of the Interdiction and Air Superiority Operational Section. It was tasked with analyzing the suitability and feasibility of prearranged or immediate missions, according to information provided by various sources from Malvinas, reports following combat missions, or the limited information gathered by their own intelligence.

By May 1, the Argentine Air Force Southern Command was fully working with its entire staff and, more significantly, with almost all crews trained and familiarized with the theater of operations.

FAS Staff Organization

A-1 Personnel Department

A unique personnel department was created and men were designated to carry out duties within the Southern Air Defense and Argentine Air Force Southern Commands. Five reinforced sections were established:

- **Records and Information**, in order to keep troop strength updated both in deployment bases and in Malvinas. Located at the 9th Air Brigade premises, it kept the record

of personnel traveling to and from the islands. It would keep the list of casualties and troops deployed in Malvinas updated.

- **Health Service**, at the deployment units in an organic way, in addition to other planning which included the Portable Hospital deployment at the 9th Air Brigade and the support of the Joint Military Hospital in Malvinas.
- **Postal Service**, set up by means of the normal services of the Empresa Nacional de Correos y Telégrafos (Encotel, Argentine Mail Company) and a mail plane flying between the deployed units and the home bases. This section would also handle Malvinas mail, of both the Air Force and the Army, and part of the Navy. The office, located in the 9th Air Brigade, would act as reception and dispatch desk.
- **Discipline, law and order**, section in charge of managing disciplinary issues and, when necessary, constituting courts-martial.
- **Donations**, section responsible for receiving the donations the population made to the operative forces. They rarely had a predetermined use. Due to their amount and diversity, those supplies would be a valuable contribution; specifically, the warm clothing and personal items aimed at raising the troop's morale: letters aimed at soldiers, cigarettes, chocolates, and personal care products, which were transported to the islands on the aircraft performing the air bridge.

A-2 Intelligence Department

The commander who counts on the latest and most complete information wins the battle. In the case of the South Atlantic, something unusual happened: due to the strict secrecy with which the Outline Plan was developed, the 2nd Intelligence Division had not been asked to take part. It was not until March 20 that the Joint Staff of the Argentine Armed Forces started the intelligence process; when the SIDE (Argentine Secretariat of State Intelligence) was ordered to gather information on Malvinas, they recorded in writing that they would compile the essential elements of information (EEI) by June. So, without a proper analysis from the higher level, both the Navy and the Air Force carried out the initial planning stage with their respective commands. On April 4, 1982, upon deciding to engage troops in combat and thanks to the measures taken by the Strategic Air Command (CAE), basic and quite general information on the United Kingdom war capacity was gathered. On April 16 of 1982, when the Argentine Air Force Southern Command finished the 1/82 Complementing Outline Plan, it was unaware of vital British strengths¹⁰².

In some way, this can be explained by the fact that military intelligence is an ongoing process directly linked to a country's hypothetical conflict scenarios, which leads to monitoring the capabilities and vulnerabilities of potential aggressors. That factor was not considered in the case of the United Kingdom.

A-3 Operations Department

It executed the Staff actions. In short, its importance lay in the effectiveness of planned air operations.

The following Operational Sections reported directly to the A-3 Operations Department:

- Operations Analysis and Assessment (SOAEO). Chief: Vicecomodoro César A. Torres
- Interdiction and Air Superiority (SOSAI). Chief: Comodoro Tomás A. Rodríguez

¹⁰² *In the Rattenbach Report*, drawn up to assess the commanders' performance in the conflict, it is stated that the intelligence was "at an appropriate level of detail and timeliness, which allowed for the smooth planning of its subordinate command..." That was not the case of the Argentine Air Force, which had to engage its own assets – which, in some cases, were not suitable – in order to gain information about the enemy, with a high cost as regards life and materiel losses during the campaign. ("Argentine Air Force Southern Command Final Report" submitted to the Strategic Air Commander). DEH-FAA Archives.

- Reconnaissance and Exploration (SOER). Chief: Comodoro Ronaldo E. Ferri
- Special Operations (SOOE). Chief: Comodoro Ronaldo E. Ferri
- Search and rescue (SOBYS). Chief: Mayor Norberto H. Barozza
- Air Surveillance and Control (SOVYCA). Chief: Comodoro Enrique Saavedra
- Air Transport (SOTA). Chief: Mayor Horacio A. Oréface
- Security and Services (SOSS). Chief: Mayor Alfredo C. Aguirre
- Meteorology. Chief: Primer Teniente Eduardo A. Viotti

This structure and planning and operation mode were designed based on the experience of numerous previously carried out operational exercises, in which both orders to the deployed units and a Staff working in operations ensured a response to foreseeable needs. Its implementation would be highly suitable since, from the very beginning, it was integrated with all operational elements, which facilitated a unified command and the maximum economy of resources. Despite some technical flaws, the implemented C3 I2 system¹⁰³ allowed to widen control and delegate authority whenever it was necessary, without weakening leadership cohesion.

On a daily basis, the Commander used to meet with the Chiefs of the Staff Departments to get informed about the situation. The person in charge of each area presented the news in the presence of the general coordinator. After analyzing the state of affairs, the Commander gave the orders and the incumbent Chiefs relayed them to their units. This procedure emphasized that whenever orders were given, instructions were not unnecessarily repeated, and the personnel reporting them were well informed.

A direct liaison between the Departments Chiefs and the personnel responsible for military air bases specific areas was established.

The Staff actions were centralized at the headquarters mounted by the Operations Department, so that the Commander was informed about what was happening by only one spokesperson.

The personnel established a relationship with a strong sense of fellowship and professionalism that allowed them to work coherently and efficiently while conveying that feeling to the units reporting to them. The adopted organization arose from the operations dynamics. Practice always had priority over theory and planning ran smoothly. Only the necessary topics were put down on paper. Reaction time would reach acceptable levels since decisions would be orally transmitted to units so as to expedite assets readiness.

Setting up the Operations Analysis and Assessment Section (SOAEO), also reporting to A-3 and in close contact with the Interdiction and Air Superiority Operational Section (SOSAI), would be highly valuable since it would enable the personnel at the planning level to devote themselves only to receiving the conclusions without performing other activities.

The procedure improved in time. In general, for offensive air operations a consistent analysis pattern and order design would be followed. According to the targets to be beaten, every night the units would be informed beforehand the aircraft and configurations corresponding to the first mission, so that they would be ready at the break of day.

Target selection would be performed during the meeting of the Interdiction and Air Superiority Operational Section, in the presence of the Deputy Commander, the Chief of the Operations Department (A-3) and specialized analysts. The following would be determined:

- Meteorological situation.
- Analysis of the capabilities, feasibility and acceptability of the target area.
- Number and type of offensive and defensive aircraft and weapons to be employed.
- Malvinas radar information.

¹⁰³ C³ I²: command, control and communications, intelligence and interoperability system.

- In case diversion flights were required, the SOER/SOOE Chief would also participate in the meeting.
- Alerting search and rescue assets, with the involvement of the SOBYS Chief.
- Need to work with the Forward/Tactical Air Control Officer (OCAA)/(OCAT).
- Use of KC-130 tankers and rendezvous points determination, with the involvement of the SOTA Chief.
- Upon finishing the analysis, planning would be briefed to the commander.
- Drafting and handing on fragmentary orders by the corresponding section (that process used to take between 20 and 90 minutes, according to the topic complexity).
- A SOSAI senior officer would receive action development and update A-3 Department on the situation.
- Initial result analysis on the basis of briefings sent in advance by in-flight crews.
- Specialized intelligence personnel would question the crews after landing. Whenever possible and according to the attacked target importance, crews would be previously questioned by the SOSAI.
- Once the individual reports had been gathered, the ordered operation was analyzed in detail.
- Conclusions were recorded and considered by the SOAEO.
- Late at night, the day events were gathered, conclusions were analyzed and the next day missions were planned.

This process was not only applied to offensive and defensive air operations, but also to other actions: diversion, air transportation, search and rescue, reconnaissance and exploration. In those cases, the SOSAI established the guiding approach which was then conveyed to the corresponding section so that it could thoroughly understand the task. The operation was proposed to the A-3 Department, the latter submitted it to the commander and, if approved, it was immediately executed.

Reconnaissance and Exploration (SOER and SOOE)

Reconnaissance and Exploration tasks were divided into zones and focal areas covering the complete Patagonian coastal maritime area; said tasks were executed in order of frequency and according to patterns which had been pre-established with the assigned assets¹⁰⁴.

The respective deployment units chiefs which had exploration assets were responsible for performing sorties at the coastal exploration areas within their jurisdictions, and reported flight occurrences to the Air Force Southern Command on a daily basis.

The two sections (SOER and SOOE) under the responsibility of Comodoro Ronaldo Ferri submitted the information gathered to A-3 Operations. Likewise, they planned with Learjet-type assigned assets, diversion missions simulating fighter aircraft work-out profile against the fleet so as to weaken the British crews by attrition and force them to take off with the interceptors.

Search and Rescue (SOBYS)

It was assembled on April 5. On the 8, the Argentine Air Force Southern Command (FAS) issued a directive for its units to organize the search, assistance, and rescue sections for the personnel in danger¹⁰⁵. As from April 16, the directive became part of the FAS Plan. Search and Rescue operations in Malvinas were under the responsibility of the FAS sub-center.

¹⁰⁴ Reconnaissance and exploration assets deployment and organization is developed in the next chapter.

¹⁰⁵ Directiva 01/82 – Comando de la Fuerza Aérea Sur – Sistema de Búsqueda y Salvamento.



Learjet Learjet 35 A, registration marks T-23 and T-24, 2nd Air Brigade Air Photographic Group - DEH-FAA Archives

The SOBYs was made up of the headquarters and the situation room led by a senior officer together with an assistant junior officer. In order to assist with the search and rescue tasks at sea along the approach routes to target areas and back to base, the use of two vessels on which the Air Force had installed a radio beacon and a multichannel VHF radio system was coordinated with the Navy though, for various reasons, they were not used. The assigned vessels were the dispatch boats ARA *Alférez Sobral* on the Comodoro Rivadavia - Malvinas line and the ARA *Comodoro Somellera* between Río Grande and the islands.

Due to its favorable location considering its infrastructure and the distance to the islands, a coordinating search and rescue sub-center was established in Puerto Deseado on May 10. Two Sikorsky S-61 helicopters, with maritime search and rescue capability, and three Mitsubishi MU-2/60 search aircraft were assigned to it. Search and rescue operations in Malvinas were the responsibility of the Air Component Staff A-3 Department with the assigned helicopters.

Air Surveillance and Control (SOVYCA)

This operational section served mainly to centralize the deployed radars requirements in order to keep them in operational service. Air surveillance was carried out using the 2nd Air Surveillance and Control Group's assets (G2 VyCA) based in Merlo. The available Westinghouse AN/TPS-43 mobile radars made it possible to organize air defense sectors in Comodoro Rivadavia, Río Gallegos, Río Grande, and Malvinas. Of the two remaining TPS-43 radars, one was used as spare parts warehouse in Comodoro Rivadavia for the four deployed radars, and the last one remained at G2 VyCA as a test bench and laboratory for repairing out-of-order components sent from the deployment sites.

Subsequently, four TPS-44 Cardion "Alert" radars belonging to the Army were made available to and operated by the Southern Air Force Command, and installed in Puerto Argentino, San Julián, Santa Cruz, and the 9th Air Brigade as a Malvinas radar backup and spare parts warehouse.

Thanks to this distribution it was possible to control air traffic along the entire coast and in the mainland responsibility area, and to support crossings to and from the islands. At medium and low altitude, these radars served to keep the TOAS air situation updated, as well as the situation of interest for each base, within their corresponding ranges.

The radars were used for detection, identification, interception, and to support air traffic control and combat missions. The Malvinas radar was also used for tactical guidance tasks,

support in air-to-air combat, and for an unusual function: long-and-short-distance enemy ships' location, making it possible to provide night naval bombardment warnings.

Air Transport (SOTA)

After recapturing the islands, two C-130H, two F-28, one IA-50 G-II, and one SA-226 AT Merlin medical aircraft were assigned to the Argentine Air Force Southern Command, between April 4 and 17. Starting from April 7, the four largest aircraft joined those performing the airlift to Malvinas. In order to speed up the task, they reported directly to the A-3, through the Air Transport Operational Section (SOTA). In turn, SOTA controlled take-off times of all aircraft flying from the mainland to the Malvinas, coordinating unloading tasks with the island's Air Terminal so as to avoid aircraft congestion on a small-sized platform. SOTA coordinated, on a daily basis, with the Transport Command in El Palomar, the Army, and the Navy to decide transfers together with the 9th Air Brigade's Air Cargo Terminal. A maintenance echelon at the Comodoro Rivadavia 1st Technical Group ensured aircraft serviceability to guarantee round-the-clock continuous operation while the airlift was being executed.

Originally, crew members were housed at the 9th Air Brigade. Due to the fact that air transport did not stop, night and day, and that accommodations were close to the runway and platforms, rest was inadequate. Therefore, accommodations were arranged at Comodoro Rivadavia City.

Moreover, once the United Kingdom imposed the Maritime Exclusion Zone, naval transports ceased to cross to the islands, and all loaded supplies had to be reconfigured for air transport. The quantity of materials accumulating at the 9th Air Brigade was increasingly occupying more space at the air terminal. Although up to 120 tons were dispatched to the islands on a daily basis, the incoming amount exceeded the one outgoing one. On April 13, there were 600 tons, and two days later, that quantity amounted to 900 tons. Therefore, reinforcements were requested from the Air Transport Command.

From that moment onwards, the Air Transport Orders (Órdenes de Transporte Aéreo, OTA) were issued, and transport was coordinated with the 9th Infantry Brigade's Joint Operations Center, and then reported to the Argentine Air Force Southern Command through SOTA. SOTA updated the Air Traffic Information Desk (MITA) at Comodoro Rivadavia in order to control the schedule of flights departing from the mainland to Malvinas, avoiding traffic congestion and ensuring orderly unloading at the Malvinas Air Terminal.

The task was carried out between April 18 and 29; afterward, the means assigned for that purpose returned to El Palomar.

The KC-130s arrived at the 9th Air Brigade on April 30. They reported directly to the Commander of the Argentine Air Force Southern Command and received orders through the operations departments of the units they were to support.

Security and Services (SOSS)

Land defense, including anti-aircraft artillery, was directly dependent on unit commanders; in some cases, with their own assets and in other cases, with lodged units, exercising operational control over those assets. Through the Security and Services Operational Section, requirements and information requested from the FAS Staff were coordinated; thus, the situation and corresponding states of alert were permanently known.

Southern Air Defense

The Air Defense Command, led by Brigadier Mayor Hughes, organized the defense into two large zones through the Plan Caburé Azul y Blanco: CODAZ Centro and CODAZ Sur, the latter divided into Defense Sectors with their corresponding Information and Control



Mirage III EA of the 8th Air Brigade - DEH-FAA Archives

Centers and early warning mobile radars at Viedma (which reported to the CIC Buenos Aires at Merlo together with the Mar del Plata radar), Comodoro Rivadavia, San Julián, Santa Cruz, Río Gallegos, Río Grande, and the Malvinas Islands. After the integration of the CODAZ Sur with the Argentine Air Force Southern Command through the SOSAI, the organizational chart planned for the coastal bases to face air attacks made up a single command and control system.

On the mainland, the Active Air Defense was carried out with the assigned anti-aircraft batteries and at least one section of M-5 Dagger or Mirage III EA interceptors configured with Matra 530/Magic 550 or Shafrir missiles, respectively. Furthermore, since the enemy's retained capabilities included special forces attacks, Passive Air Defense measures were taken (blackout, asset dispersal, among others) to mitigate the effects.

A-4 Materiel Department

Since there was no logistic planning suitable for the aeromarine environment, the Air Command of the Southern Theater of Operations' Campaign Plan 1/81 (CATOS 81) planning was used, in which only attacks on land targets were considered. For the Malvinas scenario, the operational airfields at San Julián, Santa Cruz, Río Gallegos, Comodoro Rivadavia, and Trelew were similar to those in CATOS 81, save for Río Grande. But, conversely, both weapons and survival equipment had to be adjusted to the aeromarine environment. These differences forced the introduction of modifications without the standard-required testing.

Most of the supply for the mainland air bases as well as the Malvinas Military Garrison was carried out using transport aircraft assigned to the Argentine Air Force Southern Command. It was an ever-changing situation, imposing endless unforeseen requirements which were attempted to be met by any means necessary, sparing no expense, though not always with the necessary quality.

A-5 Communications Department

The command and administration network was installed with the elements outlined in the Strategic Air Command Campaign Plan, save for the Malvinas Military Air Base. Materials

for the remaining liaisons were distributed according to users' requirements, and neither security nor reliability would be compromised by the enemy during the conflict.

Last-minute needs were met using equipment from the Argentine Air Force Western Command, Strategic Air Command Communications Department's provisions, and the services of the National Telecommunications Company (Entel).

* * *

In summary

On April 2, 1982, the Argentine Air Force Southern Command began operating as an organic unit with just five officers; it counted on no plans or communication support and was unaware of the conflict. They started from scratch.

On the same day, a few staff officers were appointed and transferred to Malvinas so as to enable the initial deployment; later on, reinforcements would be sent in response to the strategic situation change after the British Task Force set sail.

The Argentine Air Force Southern Command appointed the appropriate personnel and completed an organizational structure that was adjusted to the emerging needs of the conflict. Of course, they benefited from the time it took the British fleet to reach the South Atlantic, a period that would not have been possible in other circumstances.

While the air transport means were almost entirely committed to the deployment on the islands, the air units that needed to be relocated to favorable relative positions in the Patagonian bases and airports because of endurance reasons, counted on limited transport resources for their implementation. Nevertheless, by May 1 —the day of their baptism of fire— the Argentine Air Force Southern Command Staff was fully operational, their operational units were deployed, and they counted on an acceptable understanding of the theater of operations. This effort meant maximizing flexibility and versatility to their fullest extent. Despite all difficulties, the Air Force Southern Command was at its maximum operational capacity when it entered the conflict.

Glossary of terms and acronyms

Spanish	English	Acronym
Análisis y Evaluación de las Operaciones	Operations Analysis and Assessment	SOAEO
Armada de la República Argentina	Argentine Navy	ARA
Artillería Antiaérea	Antiaircraft Artillery	AAa
Base Aérea Militar	Military Air Base	BAM
Base Aeronaval	Naval Air Base	BAN
Batallón de Aviación 601	601 st Aviation Battalion	
Batallón de Infantería de Marina	Marine Battalion	
Batallón de Infantería de Marina 5	5 th Marine Battalion	BIM 5
Brigada Aérea	Air Brigade	
Central de Operaciones Antiaéreas Conjunta	Joint Central Antiaircraft Operations Center	COAaCj
Centro de Información y Control	Information and Control Center	CIC
Centro de Información y Control Baires	Buenos Aires Information and Control Center	CIC Baires
Centro de Operaciones Conjuntas	Joint Operations Center	CEOPECON
Círculo de Aeronáutica	Aeronautical Association	
Comandante de Operaciones Aéreas	Commander of Air Operations	COA
Comandante de Operaciones Navales	Naval Operations Commander	
Comando Aéreo de Defensa	Argentine Air Defense Command	CAD
Comando Aéreo de Transporte	Argentine Air Transport Command	CAT
Comando Aéreo Estratégico	Argentine Strategic Air Command	CAE
Comando de Defensa Aérea Sur	Southern Air Defense Command	CODASUR
Comando de Defensa Aérea Zona Centro	Central Zone Air Defense Command	CODAZ Centro
Comando de Defensa Aérea Zona Sur	Southern Zone Air Defense Command	CODAZ Sur
Comando de Operaciones Aéreas	Air Operations Command	COA
Comando de Operaciones Navales	Naval Operations Command	CON
Comando Naval de Tránsito Marítimo	Naval Command for Sea Traffic	
Comisión Batalla Aérea por Nuestras Islas Malvinas	Air Warfare Commission for Our Malvinas Islands	BANIM
Comité Militar	Military Committee	COMIL
Compañía de Ingenieros de Combate 9	9 th Combat Engineers Company	
Compañía de Soldados del Escuadrón de Tropas de la IX Brigada Aérea	Company of Soldiers of the 9th Air Brigade Battalion	
compañías de infantería	infantry companies	
Componente Aéreo del Teatro de Operaciones Sur	Air Component of the Southern Theater of Operations	CATOS
Dirección de Estudios Históricos	Directorate for Historical Studies	DEH
Dirección de Infraestructura	Infrastructure Directorate	
Dirección General de Antártida y Malvinas de la Cancillería	Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs Antarctica and Malvinas General Directorate	

The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War

Directiva de Estrategia Militar	Military Strategic Directive	DEMIL
Directiva de Estrategia Nacional	National Strategic Directive	DENAC
Director General de Antártida y Malvinas	General Director of Antarctica and Malvinas	
Ejército Argentino	Argentine Army	EA
Elemento Control de Transporte Aéreo	Air Transport Control Element	ECTA
elementos esenciales de información	essential elements of information	EEI
Empresa Líneas Marítimas Argentinas	Argentine Sea Shipping Company	ELMA
Empresa Nacional de Correos y Telégrafos	Argentine Mail Company	ENCOTEL
Equipamiento de inteligencia de comunicaciones	Communications Intelligence Equipment	COMINT
Equipamiento de inteligencia electrónica	Electronic Intelligence Equipment	ELINT
Equipo de Control de Combate	Combat Control Team	ECCO
Escuadrón de Exploración de Caballería	Cavalry Exploration Squadron	
Escuadrón Vigilancia y Control Aéreo	Airspace Surveillance and Control Squadron	VyCA
Escuela de Aviación Militar	Military Aviation School	EAM
Estado Mayor Conjunto	Joint Staff of the Argentine Armed Forces	EMC
Exploración y Reconocimiento Lejano	Long-Range Exploration and Reconnaissance	ERL
Exposición Rural	Argentine Rural Exhibition	
Fuerza Aérea Argentina	Argentine Air Force	FAA
Fuerza Aérea Oeste	Argentine Air Force Western Command	FAO
Fuerza Aérea Sur	Argentine Air Force Southern Command	FAS
Gas del Estado	Argentina's state-owned gas company	
Gendarmería Nacional	National Border Patrol	GN
Grupo 1 de Comunicaciones Escuela	1 st Communications Group Institute	G1CE
Grupo 1 de Transporte Aéreo	1 st Air Transport Group	
Grupo 2 Vigilancia y Control Aéreo	2 nd Airspace Surveillance and Control Group	2 nd VyCA Group
Grupo 4 de Caza	4 th Fighter Group	
Grupo 5 de Caza	5 th Fighter Group	
Grupo 6 de Caza de Tandil	Tandil's 6 th Fighter Group	
Grupo Artillería de Defensa Antiaérea	Antiaircraft Defense Artillery Group	GADA
Grupo de Artillería 4	4 th Artillery Group	
grupo de artillería orgánico	organic artillery group	
Grupo de Exploración y Reconocimiento Aéreo	Air Reconnaissance and Exploration Group	GERA
Grupo de Operaciones Especiales	Special Operations Group	GOE
Grupo I de Construcciones	1 st Constructions Group	
Grupo I Mantenimiento	1 st Maintenance Group	
Guarnición Militar Malvinas	Malvinas Military Garrison	
Instituto Nacional de Aviación Civil	Civil Aviation National Institute	INAC
IX Brigada de Infantería	9 th Infantry Brigade	
Jefatura II - Inteligencia	2 nd Intelligence Division	

Jefatura III Planificación	3 rd Planning Division	
Líneas Aéreas del Estado	Argentine state-owned airline	LADE
Mesa de Información de Tránsito Aéreo	Air Traffic Information Desk	MITA
Nivel Estratégico Operacional	Operational Strategic Level	NEO
Nivel Táctico Superior	Higher Tactical Level	NTS
Oficial de Control Aéreo Adelantado	Forward Air Control Officer	OCAA
Oficial de Control Aéreo Táctico	Tactical Air Control Officer	OCAT
Órdenes de Transporte Aéreo	Air Transport Orders	OTA
Organización de los Estados Americanos	Organization of American States	OAS
Poder Ejecutivo Nacional	National Executive Power	PEN
Prefectura Naval Argentina	Argentine Coast Guard	PNA
Puesto de Comando de Artillería Antiaérea	Antiaircraft Artillery Command Post	PCAAa
Puesto de Observación Aérea	Air Observation Post	POA
Puesto de Operaciones de Transporte Aéreo	Air Transport Operations Post	POTA
Puesto de Socorro	Aid Station	PUSO
Red de Observadores del Aire	Air Observers Network	ROA
Regimiento de Infantería	Infantry Regiment	RI
Reserva Estratégica del Ejército	Army Strategic Reserve	REE
Reserva Estratégica Militar	Military Strategic Reserve	REM
Reserva Estratégica Operacional	Operational Strategic Reserve	REO
Sección Operativa de Búsqueda y Salvamento	Search and Rescue (Operational Section)	SOBYS
Sección Operativa de Exploración y Reconocimiento	Reconnaissance and Exploration Operational Section	SOER
Sección Operativa de Operaciones Especiales	Special Ops Operational Section	S00E
Sección Operativa de Seguridad y Servicios	Security and Services (Operational Section)	SOSS
Sección Operativa de Transporte Aéreo	Air Transport Operational Section	SOTA
Sección Operativa de Vigilancia y Control Aéreo	Air Surveillance and Control (Operational Section)	SOVYCA
Sección Operativa Superioridad Aérea e Interdicción	Interdiction and Air Superiority Operational Section	SOSAI
Secretaría de Correos y Telecomunicaciones	Mail and Telecommunications Office	
Secretaría de Inteligencia del Estado	Secretariat of State Intelligence	SIDE
Sistema de Control Aerotáctico	Tactical Air Control System	
Sistema de Control Aerotáctico	Tactical Air Control System	
Sociedad Científica Argentina	Argentine Scientific Association	
Subprefecto	Prefecture Deputy Official	
Teatro de Operaciones Atlántico Sur	South Atlantic Theater of Operations	TOAS
Teatro de Operaciones del Atlántico Sur	South Atlantic Theater of Operations	COATLANSUR
Teatro de Operaciones Malvinas	Malvinas Theater of Operations	TOM
Teatro de Operaciones Sur	Southern Theater of Operations	TOS

Terminal Aérea de Carga	Air Cargo Terminal	TAC
Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca	Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance	TIAR
Veterano de Guerra de Malvinas	Malvinas War Veteran	VGM
Vialidad Nacional	National Highway Administration	
Vialidad Nacional	National Highway Administration	
X Brigada de Infantería Mecanizada	10 th Mechanized Infantry Brigade	



Comparison of military ranks

Argentine Air Force (FAA)	Royal Air Force (RAF)	US Air Force (USAF)
Brigadier General	Air Chief Marshal	General (Gen/O-10)
Brigadier Mayor	Air Marshal	Lieutenant General (Lt Ge/O-9)
Brigadier	Air Vice Marshal	Major General (Maj Gen/O-8)
Comodoro Mayor	Air Commodore	Brigadier General (Brig Gen/O-7)
Comodoro	Group Captain	Colonel (Col/O-6)
Vicecomodoro	Wing Commander	Lieutenant Colonel (Lt Col/O-5)
Mayor	Squadron Leader	Major (Maj/O-4)
Capitán	Flight Lieutenant	Captain (Capt/O-3)
1er Teniente	Flying Officer	First Lieutenant (1st Lt/O-2)
Teniente (Alférez and Teniente are included here since both last about 6 six years as the Second Lieutenant rank))	Pilot Officer	Second Lieutenant (2d LT/O-1)
	Warrant Officer	
Suboficial Mayor	N/A	Chief Master Sergeant (E-9)
Suboficial Principal	Flight Sergeant	Senior Master Sergeant (SMSgt/E-8)
Suboficial Ayudante	Sergeant	Master Sergeant (E-7)
Suboficial Auxiliar	Corporal	Technical Sergeant (E-6)
Cabo Principal	Senior Aircraftman	Staff Sergeant (E-5)
Cabo Primero	Aircraftman	Senior Airman (E-4)
Cabo	Aircraftman	Airman 1st Class (E-3)
Voluntario Segundo		Airman (E-2)
Voluntario Primero		Airman Basic (E-1)

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