



# **THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE MALVINAS QUESTION (1966-1982)**

Secretariat for the Malvinas Islands,  
Antarctica and the South Atlantic



Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
International Trade and Worship  
**Argentina**

COVER PICTURE

Inauguration of airstrip in the Malvinas Island , 15 November 1972.

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# AUTHORITIES

## **Alberto Fernández**

President

## **Cristina Fernández de Kirchner**

Vice-president

## **Agustín Rossi**

Cabinet Chief of Staff

## **Santiago Cafiero**

Minister of Foreign Relations, International Trade  
and Worship

## **Guillermo Carmona**

Secretary of Malvinas, Antartica and the South Atlantic

## **Sandra Rosana Pitta**

National Department of Malvinas  
and Islands of the South Atlantic

## **Facundo Rodríguez**

Coordinator of the Consultative Council  
on matters related to the South Atlantic

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# WORDS FROM THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

As Cicero pointed out: "history is the teacher of life". And it could be added that it is so, as long as we seek to reconstruct the facts as they were.

The book presented here deals with the Malvinas Question by providing a deep and detailed description of the negotiations that took place between Argentina and the United Kingdom between 1966 and 1982, following Resolution 2065 (XX) of the United Nations General Assembly.

History, and this is not a subjective statement, proves us right. After World War II, within the framework of the work led by the United Nations, a process of decolonization began throughout the world.

From the very beginning, also in that multilateral forum, the Argentine diplomacy worked to make a reservation of its sovereignty rights over the Malvinas Islands, South Georgias, South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas. Later on, in the Decolonization Committee, Argentina deployed a diplomatic strategy to present its historical, legal and political arguments on the Malvinas Question. That exposition went down in history as the "Ruda Statement", in honor of José María Ruda, the Argentine representative before that Committee.

Shortly afterwards, in the plenary session of the General Assembly, Argentina secured the adoption of Resolution 2065 (XX), which opened an interesting period of negotiations as explained in this work.

This will allow us to reach an obvious conclusion: there were negotiations between Argentina and the United Kingdom in relation to the Malvinas Question. It is for this reason that Argentina insists on a point that is sometimes a little overlooked, but for the specialists on the subject: Argentina does not seek to initiate negotiations but to resume them.

Our peaceful, dignified and friendly foreign policy has its logic. In that framework, this is a crucial document. Because it reminds us, and reminds the United Kingdom, that for many years those negotiations did actually take place. That the United Kingdom was not only willing to negotiate with Argentina and various proposals for a solution to the dispute were drawn up. Moreover, the United Kingdom was even willing to recognize the sovereignty of our country over the Malvinas Islands.

On 3 January 2022, we launched the "Malvinas 40 years Agenda" in the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the South Atlantic Conflict. We then announced the implementation of a participative, federal and multidimensional action program... By decree of President Alberto Fernandez, that year was declared a year of tribute by the Argentine people to the fallen soldiers in the South Atlantic conflict, as well as their families, and the veterans of the Malvinas War. But this decree was not only an administrative disposition. It came to life in thousands of expressions of the society as a whole -State and civil society ceremonies, courses, exhibitions, initiatives- honoring the motto "Malvinas unites us", which was chosen for the commemoration. It was clear, once again, that Malvinas is an identity cause of a people that in no way chooses an aggressive nationalism or a militaristic stance.

~~The year~~ 2022 also marked the 40th anniversary of Resolution 37/9 of the United Nations General Assembly, adopted on 4 November 1982, a few months after the end of the South Atlantic conflict. This resolution is crucial, since it established that the conflict did not modify the nature of the sovereignty dispute and, recalling resolutions 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII), it requested, once again, the governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom to resume negotiations in order to find a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute as soon as possible. Resolution 37/9 also requested the Secretary General, on the basis of this resolution, to undertake a renewed mission of good offices in order to assist the parties, which is currently in force in spite of the United Kingdom refusal to cooperate.

This book details the various proposals and alternatives that reflect the dialogue that existed between the United Kingdom and the Argentine Republic to put an end to the

sovereignty dispute. Among them, it is worth mentioning the 1968 Memorandum of Understanding, the 1971 Communications Agreement, the 1974 Condominium proposal and the 1980 Leaseback proposal.

Unfortunately, the United Kingdom turns a deaf ear to this experience of dialogue and negotiation, and currently refuses to resume negotiations. In the same way, it ignores the provisions in Resolution 2065 (XX) and other resolutions by the United Nations General Assembly, the Decolonization Committee and many international organizations, such as MERCOSUR, CELAC, OAS, G77 + China and BRICS, among others, which request the United Kingdom to resume negotiations on sovereignty.

Continuing with the coincidence of commemorations, during this year 2023, we are celebrating 40 years of uninterrupted democracy in our country. And this is relevant, since Malvinas is also a cause of the democracy, of dialogue and peace.

The different areas of the national government, the provinces, the municipalities, the Malvinas National Council, the organizations and centers of war veterans and relatives of the fallen, universities, social organizations and society as a whole, work with fervor for a just national cause that is expressed in the popular will.

It is necessary to include the Malvinas Question in the permanent commemorations and activities for the celebration of the 40 years of democracy. Malvinas is, at the same time, a democratic cause, a Latin American, peaceful and anti-colonial cause, present and deep-rooted in the Argentine people and in the peoples who are in solidarity with us all over the world.

The Argentine government and people continue and will continue to work for the recovery of the full exercise of sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands, South Georgias, South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas. They will do so in accordance with the principles of International Law and the National Constitution.



These pages demonstrate that this has been done before, with different instruments and proposals. Our aspiration is to reclaim the study, analysis and discussion of that history. But not only as a historical or legal exercise, but also so that we can transform it into a popular affirmation of defense of our sovereignty.

And when we achieve this, no one will then doubt the accuracy of Cicero's wise phrase, because we will have learned from history.



**Santiago Cafiero**

Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Trade  
and Worship

# WORDS FROM THE SECRETARY

The sovereignty dispute over the Malvinas Islands, South Georgias, South Sandwich Islands and the corresponding maritime and insular areas is the oldest and, undoubtedly, one of the most important matters of our foreign policy. Likewise, it is a special and particular question of colonialism where our country, from the very moment of our territory's usurpation in 1833, never consented to the British plunder.

Since 10 December 2019, President Alberto Fernández has once again placed Malvinas at the top of Argentina's foreign agenda. Since then, the work entrusted by the president was to establish a real state policy for the Malvinas question.

We are a Nation that has historically appealed to peace and peaceful means of controversy settlement to solve its international disputes. We have the right and the unwavering will to live in a region of peace. The United Kingdom maintains an unjustified and massive military presence in the Islands, carrying out regular military maneuvers and exercises that are not only contrary to United Nations Resolution 31/49, but also expressly disregard General Assembly resolution 41/11, which establishes a Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic.

In this regard, this book plays a fundamental role because it fully demonstrates how, after the first resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on the Question of the Malvinas Islands in 1965, i.e. resolution 2065 (XX), the United Kingdom was forced to set aside its historical intransigence and moved forward with a process of substantial negotiations on the central aspect of the question: the settlement of the sovereignty dispute.

We will be able to observe how, over the course of 17 years, the United Kingdom negotiated sovereignty and how, during that period, Argentina showed its good faith and ample predisposition to arrive at a definitive solution to the dispute. From the first approaches in 1966 until 1982, our country showed flexibility and willingness to negotiate,

addressing all issues of mutual interest for both parties. During that period, the "1971 Communications Agreement" was adopted within the framework of the negotiation process started by Resolution 2065(XXV). It was a set of practical measures that facilitated contact between the mainland and the islands. It contributed significantly to the prosperity of the islanders, not only by opening up air communications, but also in terms of heating, fuel, health, education and supply of a variety of fresh products. LADE, YPF and Gas del Estado performed remarkable feats for the welfare of the islanders, often in spite of obstacles imposed explicitly or covertly by the British elite on the islands. It fostered the establishment of social, cultural and economic ties that endure in the memory on both sides of the sea.

Likewise, the determination of the national position becomes clear in the face of eventual British attempts to delay the negotiation for sovereignty or to try to move away from the central question, when it did not hesitate to resort again to the General Assembly of the United Nations to strengthen its position and put the negotiation process back on track.

However, the main purpose of this work is to demonstrate that when there is will on both sides, serious progress can be made in complying with the stipulations of the relevant United Nations organs in order to put an end to the special and particular colonial situation -known as the Question of the Malvinas Islands.

We believe that it is time to resume that path. For that very reason, on 2 March, and in the same spirit that guided the negotiating process following Resolution 2065 (XX), we have proposed to the British government to adopt a new bilateral agenda regarding the South Atlantic and establish a formal process of negotiations within the general framework established by UN General Assembly Resolution 2065 (XX), transparent and based on good faith, of a periodic nature, where matters of mutual interest, including sovereignty, will be addressed.

Having entered the fourth international decade for the eradication of colonialism, the United Kingdom must fulfill its international obligations and resume sovereignty

negotiations. We must put an end, once and for all, to the anachronism of colonialism in the 21st century.

We will not rest until we have recovered the effective exercise of sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands, South Georgias, South Sandwich Islands and the corresponding maritime and island areas, respecting the way of life of their inhabitants and in accordance with the principles of international law.

In the over 190 years that the sovereignty dispute has been going on, Argentina has promoted progress through different methods in order to settle it. We will never cease to appeal to dialogue, negotiation and diplomacy in order to fulfill the permanent and inalienable objective that our National Constitution places in the hands of all the Argentine people.

But we will do it with conviction, trusting in the justice of our rights, with international support and in a peaceful way. That is our objective and that is our priority.



**Guillermo Carmona**

Secretary of Malvinas, Antártica and the South Atlantic

*In tribute to the men and women who worked **for a peaceful solution to the dispute.***

1945-1965

## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

Since 3 January 1833, when the act of force by the United Kingdom took place in the Malvinas Islands -carried out in peacetime, without any prior communication or declaration, in violation of the international law of the time and by which the Argentine authorities and part of its population were expelled-, the Argentine Republic has never consented to and has always protested against such action, which violated its territorial integrity. The demand for their restitution and the recovery of the full exercise of sovereignty over those territories and the surrounding maritime areas was a constant policy of all national governments since the moment such act of force was known. The changes that took place in the global political scenario after the end of World War II and the establishment of the United Nations Organization created new conditions to break the British intransigence and seek a definitive and negotiated solution to the controversy since, up to that moment, Great Britain had refused to negotiate with Argentina and had even rejected different arbitration proposals to settle the dispute.

### ***The United Nations and the Decolonization process***

After World War II, several States agreed to create a new international forum with a universal vocation to regulate international relations and prevent the atrocities of the previous years from happening again: the United Nations Organization ("UN"). From its beginnings, the Argentine Republic, as a founding member, declared reservation therein regarding its sovereign rights over the Malvinas Islands and the particular situation of the archipelago, which made the provisions applicable to the other non-self-governing territories under the administration of the colonial powers, inapplicable to the Islands. In the same vein, when the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland submitted, for the first time in 1946, the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories that would be included under its administration and of which it would have to submit information, as provided for in Article 73 of Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations, Argentina again stated its position with respect to the situation of the Malvinas Islands, laying its reservations. With

Juan Domingo Perón as President of the nation, Juan Atilio Bramuglia as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship and the Argentine delegation to the UN General Assembly chaired by Ambassador Lucio M. Moreno Quintana -who was the first Argentine judge at the International Court of Justice- a new declaration was submitted reserving the sovereign rights of the Republic over the archipelagos and southern areas that the United Kingdom claimed as its own.



Ambassador Lucio M. Moreno Quintana



Ambassador Miguel Ángel Cárcano

Argentina's actions would be constantly repeated in the successive sessions of the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (known as the Fourth Committee) and in the plenary of the General Assembly between 1946 and 1960. Besides reiterating their reservation of rights, the national diplomatic delegations pointed out that the information provided by the United Kingdom about the Malvinas Islands did not diminish or affect the Argentine Republic's titles over the Islands, nor did they recognize the acts that any other power might carry out on South Georgias and the South Sandwich Islands, as well as on the other Antarctic islands and continental polar lands within the Argentine Antarctic Sector, since these were an integral part of the national territory.

In this new international context, since the middle of the 20th century a process developed by which the former colonies in Africa and Asia confronted their metropolis in

order to break the yoke of colonialism. The process of decolonization gained full force in the 1950s and 1960s and the new states that emerged joined the UN as full members.

With the presence of these new States in the international organization, decolonization gained renewed vigor and was reflected in 1960 in the draft submitted by 43 countries, including African and Asian States, which, with the approval of the General Assembly, became Resolution 1514 (XV), the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples" -also known as the Magna Carta of Decolonization-. Adopted on 14 December with the affirmative vote of the Argentine Republic and the abstention of the United Kingdom, the resolution recognizes the need to put an end to colonialism in all its forms and manifestations, enshrining two fundamental principles that should guide the decolonization process: that of self-determination of peoples and that of respect for territorial integrity. In this regard, it states that "any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations"<sup>1</sup>.

The following year, by Resolution 1654 (XVI), the United Nations General Assembly established the "Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples"<sup>2</sup>. It originally had 17 members, but in 1962 it was enlarged to 24 members and is therefore known as the Special Committee of 24 or also the Committee on Decolonization. The Committee meets annually to monitor the application of the decolonization mechanisms established by the General Assembly and issues resolutions for the Assembly's consideration.

The Argentine Republic continued with its claims and protests against the presentations made by the United Kingdom of information relating to the Malvinas Islands at the UN, while doing the same in other multilateral and bilateral spheres, obtaining the international support of those States that saw in the South Atlantic the last British imperial remnants.

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<sup>1</sup> Resolution 1514 (XV)

<sup>2</sup> Resolution 1654 (XVI)



Accordingly, in April 1948, Foreign Minister Bramuglia defended the position of the Argentine Republic at the Ninth International Conference of American States in response to the Memorandum on the Malvinas Islands circulated by the Embassy of Great Britain. There he set forth "the historical-political elements of judgment" on which national rights are based and stressed the national commitment on the Question of the Malvinas Islands: "We believe in reason. We have faith in the law, and we think that justice will not be long to come" [...] "The democracies of the West can only be strengthened in truth and with truth. In this problem, the truth is Argentine and is with Argentina"<sup>3</sup>.

### **The "Ruda Statement" and Resolution 2065 (XX)**

On 12 October 1963, Dr. Arturo Umberto Illia assumed the presidency of the Argentine Republic. In his inaugural speech before the Legislative Assembly, he emphasized the peaceful vocation of the country. He committed himself to the integration and sovereign defense of the whole Argentine territory as it had always been done, expressing his wish that "the national geography be effective in the Malvinas Islands and the Argentine Antarctic" concluding that "national sovereignty must be affirmed as an inalienable imperative"<sup>4</sup>.

From that moment onwards and taking advantage of the international context, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship headed by Dr. Miguel Ángel Zavala Ortiz, together with the Permanent Mission of Argentina to the United Nations, gave top priority to the peaceful search for a solution to the dispute over the Question of the Malvinas Islands, demonstrating to the participant nations the justice and reasons for the Argentine position.

1964 would be the year when this policy would begin to bear fruit. In March, the General Secretariat of the United Nations prepared a work document that was submitted to the Special Committee of 24 with information on the territories to which Resolution 1514 (XV) applied. Among them, the Malvinas Islands were mentioned with the information

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<sup>3</sup> Bramuglia, Juan Atilio, "Annex to the Minutes of the Eleventh Session of the Initiatives Committee of the Ninth International American Conference containing the response of the Argentine Republic to the Memorandum on the Malvinas Islands circulated by the Embassy of Great Britain, Bogotá, Colombia, 21 of April 1948". *Acts and Documents*, Vol. II, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia, Bogotá, 1953, p. 279 a 288.

<sup>4</sup> In: <http://www.historydoctrinadelacr.com/2013/02/arturo-illia-discurso-de-asuncion-como.html>

provided by the United Kingdom on their location and population, and other specific data on economic and social conditions. This inclusion, like the previous ones, provoked the usual reaction of response from the Argentine Delegation.

The following month, on 20 April, Argentina sent two letters to the Chairman of the Special Committee of 24 requesting to participate in the discussions on Malvinas. This letters pointed out that, in the work document submitted, the lack of historical and legal information provided by the United Kingdom prevented a full understanding of the reality of the special and particular colonial situation of the Islands and of the rights of the Argentine Republic. Furthermore, they requested it to make the corresponding corrections and expressed Argentina's wish to make the basis of its position known at the next meeting of Subcommittee III in the Committee of 24 dealing with small territories, when the situation of the Malvinas Islands would be examined. The Argentine request was not well received by the British counterpart: its delegate to Subcommittee III of the Committee of 24 considered that the intervention requested by the Argentine Republic "constituted an intervention in the affairs of this territory, in which Argentina had no legitimate interest"<sup>5</sup>.

Despite British opposition, Argentina finally succeeded in participating in the debate. In September 1964, on the 9th, 16th and 18th, Ambassador José María Ruda, then Legal Adviser of the Foreign Ministry, addressed Subcommittee III of the Committee of 24.

His presentation took the form of a statement, in which the Argentine Republic reaffirmed its inalienable and imprescriptible rights to the Malvinas Islands, arguing that the United Kingdom had and has the legal duty to restitute the full exercise of sovereignty to its legitimate sovereign.

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<sup>5</sup> A/AC.109/L.125/Add.3



Ambassador José María Ruda



Ambassador Lucio García del Solar

For this purpose, the Ruda Statement -as it is known- lays out the historical and legal grounds on which the Argentine position is based and criticizes the argumentative fallacies sustained by the British Government. In addition, it explains the peculiar characteristics of the Malvinas Question: its differences with respect to other cases in the process of decolonization (since there was a previous presence of the Argentine people in the islands in accordance with international law); the British act of force in 1833 that expelled the legitimately established Argentine authorities and a part of the population; and the establishment of a colonial administration that, as part of the exercise of its domination, installed a population coming from the metropolis (demonstrating, therefore, that the

principle of self-determination of peoples does not apply to the inhabitants of the archipelago).

In short, the Ruda Statement explains that the position of the Argentine Republic on the Question of the Malvinas Islands is to claim respect for its territorial integrity through a restitution of the full exercise of sovereignty over the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas, that were forcibly occupied by the United Kingdom in violation of the international law of the time.

The Argentine presentation was poorly answered a few days later by the British Representative trying to reject the different historical and legal arguments put forward by Ambassador Ruda. This prompted a new national intervention where it was clarified that, in all its history, Argentina had never annexed any territories, but rather, had developed a negotiating vocation. Argentina's claim was aimed at securing a restitution of the full exercise of sovereignty over a part of its territory that had been taken away from it by use of force by the United Kingdom.

Such was the impact of the Ruda Statement and the strength of the Argentine position that Subcommittee III of the Committee of 24 took note of the existence of a sovereignty dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom relating to the Question of the Malvinas Islands, and recommended that the governments of both countries enter into negotiations with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the question. This recognition and its recommendation were then sent to the Decolonization Committee, where they were fully accepted.

With this momentum, in 1965, Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Zavala Ortiz and the Argentine Representative to the UN, Ambassador Lucio Garcia del Solar, advanced in the exposition of the national position -along the same lines as Ambassador Ruda-. This time, before the plenary session of the General Assembly, they reiterated the historical and legal grounds, the particularity of the Question of the Malvinas Islands and the legal reasons why the principle of self-determination of peoples is not applicable to the inhabitants of the archipelago. In addition, they called on the United Kingdom to initiate bilateral negotiations to settle the sovereignty dispute.

At that moment, the Argentine Republic achieved another diplomatic victory. The United Nations decided to use the double nomenclature to refer to the archipelago; Islas Malvinas (Falkland) in Spanish and Falkland Islands (Malvinas) in English. Additionally, it would be accompanied by an explanatory note to allude to the territory's status as the subject of a sovereignty dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom<sup>6</sup>.

Based on the recognition and the recommendation by the Committee of 24, the Fourth Committee approved a draft resolution submitted by 15 Latin American States. When it was later considered by the plenary of the General Assembly, this document was approved by 94 votes in favor, none against and 14 abstentions, including the United Kingdom, thus becoming Resolution 2065 (XX).

Through this historic Resolution -the first one referring exclusively to the Malvinas Question-, on December 16th, 1965, the General Assembly of the United Nations, the body in charge of the Decolonization process, recognized the existence of a sovereignty dispute between the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom over the Malvinas Islands, South Georgias and the South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas. Furthermore, it invited both governments to continue negotiations without delay in order to find a peaceful solution; within the framework established by the Charter of the United Nations and Resolution 1514 (XV) and taking into account the interests of the population.

The importance of Resolution 2065 (XX) lies in the fact that it establishes the essential elements that defines the Malvinas Question and, consequently, the way in which it should be settled. These elements are:

- a) that the Question of the Malvinas Islands is one of the forms of colonialism that must be put to an end;
- b) b) that this case involves a sovereignty dispute between the Argentine and British Governments and;
- c) c) that the way to put an end to this colonial situation is the solution of the sovereignty dispute through bilateral negotiations between both governments taking into account the interests of the population of the islands.

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<sup>6</sup> Decision of the Fourth Commission of the General Assembly on the 1560<sup>a</sup> session, celebrated on the 18 of November 1965, in which the General Assembly took note in the 1398<sup>a</sup> plenary session, celebrated on the 16 of December 1965. A/6160.

The express mention of the interests of the Islands' inhabitants , as opposed to the word "desires", reflects the correct application by the General Assembly of Resolution 1514 (XV) to this specific case. On the one hand, they take into consideration respect for the territorial integrity of Argentina; and on the other hand, they do not determine that there is a human community entitled to the right of self-determination -a right that was already recognized as such by the UN and which the United Kingdom then considered only a political principle- in the Malvinas Islands.

At the end of 1965, the Argentine Republic had succeeded in getting the international community to recognize the existence of a sovereignty dispute relating to the Question of the Malvinas Islands and urge the United Kingdom to negotiate in order to put an end to the special and particular colonial situation of the archipelago. Faced with the initial act of force in 1833, and despite the differences of power in the international arena, Argentina, after 132 years of maintaining its position, of its non-consent to the British usurpation, of offering different ways of settling the dispute and of the unrestricted defense of its sovereign rights, had managed to break the historical intransigence of the United Kingdom.

This was an unparalleled victory in the long history of the dispute. In this process, the Ruda Statement was a fundamental milestone in that our country was able to explain clearly and with the democratic will to seek a peaceful solution, its position and the rights on which it is based. The recognition given at the United Nations, through Resolution 2065 (XX), confirmed that the solution to the sovereignty dispute will have to come through frank and good faith negotiation between the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

**2065 (XX). Question of the Falkland Islands  
(Malvinas)**

*The General Assembly,*

*Having examined the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),*

*Taking into account the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),<sup>15</sup> and in particular the conclusions and recommendations adopted by the Committee with reference to that Territory,*

*Considering that its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 was prompted by the cherished aim of bringing to an end everywhere colonialism in all its forms, one of which covers the case of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),*

*Noting the existence of a dispute between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the said Islands,*

1. *Invites the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to proceed without delay with the negotiations recommended by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the problem, bearing in mind the provisions and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas);*

2. *Requests the two Governments to report to the Special Committee and to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session on the results of the negotiations.*

*1398th plenary meeting,  
16 December 1965.*

1966-1971

## **THE FIRST STEPS**

Since the creation of the United Nations, the Argentine Republic had decided to bring the treatment of the sovereignty dispute to the multilateral arena due to British intransigence. With the opportunity presented by the Decolonization process, Argentina decided to develop a strategy to promote a broader understanding of the Question of the Malvinas Islands, while giving greater visibility to its sovereign rights before the international community. This policy, which had the framework of the United Nations as its central axis, succeeded then, thanks to the Ruda Statement, in making the historical and legal grounds on which the Argentine position is based better known at a global level and, with the adoption of Resolution 2065 (XX) by the General Assembly, the existence of a sovereignty dispute was acknowledged and the parties were invited to enter into bilateral negotiations for its solution as a mechanism to put an end to the special and particular colonial situation of the Islands. Thereafter, Argentina moved forward in full compliance with UN stipulations.

### ***The Stewart-Zavala Ortiz communiqué***

At the end of 1965, the Argentine Government made a formal invitation to the British authorities to begin the diplomatic negotiations as indicated by Resolution 2065 (XX). In response, the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, Michael Stewart, visited Buenos Aires between the 11th and 14th of January 1966. Thus, the first ministerial contact was established which, among other matters, dealt with the Question of the Malvinas Islands. After several meetings, Foreign Minister Zavala Ortiz and Secretary Stewart agreed on a joint communiqué expressing their mutual willingness to continue with the recommendations of Resolution 2065 (XX). The agreed text stated that both States intended to proceed without delay, through diplomatic channels or other means that could be jointly established, with negotiations leading to a peaceful settlement of the dispute. This decision was also to be communicated to the UN Secretary General and therefore, on February 9th, the Permanent Representative of the Argentine Republic to the United Nations complied



with the agreement and transferred the text of the Joint Communiqué to the Secretary General:

"The Ministers discussed the differences between the Government of the United Kingdom and that of the Argentine Republic on the Malvinas. In accordance with the spirit of conciliation which inspired the resolution of the twentieth General Assembly of the United Nations approved on 16 December 1965, they have engaged in a valuable and frank exchange of views, in the course of which both Ministers restated the positions of their respective Governments. Finally, as a result of this exchange, both Ministers have agreed that discussions recommended by this resolution should be pursued without delay through diplomatic channels, or such other means as may be decided with the purpose of finding a peaceful solution to the problem and preventing this question from affecting the excellent relations that exist between Argentina and the United Kingdom. The Ministers decided to convey this decision to the Secretary-General of the United Nations"<sup>7</sup>.



The Stewart - Zavala Ortiz communiqué became the starting point of the rounds of bilateral negotiations on the Question of the Malvinas Islands and both States, within the framework established by Resolution 2065 (XX), committed themselves to energize talks in order to reach a peaceful solution of the dispute.

<sup>7</sup> A/6261. Also as A/AC.109/145.

## ***The first rounds of negotiations***

The rounds of negotiations began only 6 months after the meeting between the Foreign Ministers of Argentina and the United Kingdom. According to the joint communiqué signed by Stewart and Zavala Ortiz, the first round of negotiations took place in London in July 1966, putting an end to 133 years of British refusal to deal with the sovereignty question.

That first series of meetings was regarded by the Argentine Foreign Ministry as very positive given that the British delegation had left no room for doubt about the United Kingdom's willingness to negotiate, without imposing preconditions, and it was mindful of the political and economic benefits that would derive from the solution of the dispute. At the conclusion of that round, a joint communiqué was issued on 20 July reporting on the meetings held, in compliance with the provisions of Resolution 2065 (XX), to continue with talks to find a solution to the Question of the Malvinas Islands in accordance with "the traditional ties of friendship existing" between the two nations. It also added that the meetings had been held in a cordial atmosphere and that it had been agreed to continue them in October. A few days later, the Permanent Representatives of both States to the UN submitted this text to the Secretary General<sup>8</sup>.

The second round of negotiations began in London at the end of November. Throughout several meetings, which lasted until December, the British delegation proposed to advance towards the improvement of communications between the islands and the Argentine mainland as a way of making the islanders aware of the benefits offered by the Argentine Republic, with a view to a future sovereignty agreement.

For the first time the United Kingdom expressed its willingness to negotiate on the sovereignty question, if a formula acceptable to the inhabitants of the islands could be found

The delegations finally agreed on a joint communiqué which was issued on 15 December and where, in agreement with the previous ones, they reported on the meetings held and informed that "some ways of reaching an agreement" had been considered, that

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<sup>8</sup> A/6261/add.1

the negotiations would continue and they would submit "a more detailed report on the outcome of the negotiations" to the Committee of 24 and the plenary of the General Assembly. This text was sent to the UN Secretary General by the Permanent Representatives of the two States<sup>9</sup>.

In the meantime, the Argentine representatives to the United Nations, Mario Cámpora and Raúl Quijano -who went on in their task of promoting and making visible an international understanding of Argentine rights in the Question of the Malvinas Islands-, in reporting on the development of the rounds of negotiations, stressed Argentina's "firm intention" to comply "scrupulously with the recommendations" of the organization and to continue with the negotiations "with a view to finding a peaceful solution"<sup>10</sup>. As a consequence, on 20 December 1966, the General Assembly approved a Consensus draft - arising from the Fourth Committee which would be the first of four - urging Argentina and the United Kingdom to continue with "negotiations so as to find a peaceful solution" to the dispute, keeping the Special Committee of 24 and the General Assembly informed<sup>11</sup>. On February 3 of the following year, Amb. Ruda -who was the Permanent Representative of the Argentine Republic to the United Nations- sent a letter to the Secretary General in compliance with his instructions to acknowledge receipt of the communication referring to that First Consensus and express the desire of the national authorities to reaffirm the "willingness" to comply with it<sup>12</sup>. The Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Caradon, acted in the same fashion<sup>13</sup>.

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<sup>9</sup> A/C.4/682

<sup>10</sup> A/C.4/SR.1679

<sup>11</sup> A/PV.1500

<sup>12</sup> A/6661

<sup>13</sup> A/6662

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**SERAN INHUMADOS HOY EN MOSCU LOS RESTOS DE LOS TRES COSMONAUTAS DE LA SOYUZ II**

At the beginning of 1967, the bilateral negotiations were in full progress and had reached the first common ground between the parties. Throughout 1966, intense diplomatic activity had consolidated the bilateral approach as a mechanism to consolidate talks leading to a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute. Consequently, both Argentina and the United Kingdom had moved closer together and were beginning to work out future alternatives. The multilateral aspect, without losing relevance, had remained as a scenario that covered the actions of the States interested in resolving the dispute.

**Agreements and first differences: the Memorandum of Understanding**

The impetus that the negotiations had gained did not lead to the establishment of a mechanism of more permanent informal conversations in order to keep a rhythm that was not limited to formal negotiation rounds, nor did it involve the meeting of special delegations. From then on, meetings between embassy officials and local authorities would become more frequent and proposals would be made to try to reach a solution to the dispute.

The first meetings held in 1967 dealt with the sovereignty and communications aspects. In these meetings the British proposal to move towards a greater fluidity of relations between the Malvinas Islands and the Argentine mainland began to be negotiated with a

view to a future sovereignty agreement. In this regard, the United Kingdom raised the possibility of agreeing on a transition period in the political situation of the archipelagos where the Argentine Government would facilitate communications with the mainland and, at the end of this period, the United Kingdom would consult the islanders on their opinion regarding sovereignty. The proposal was unacceptable to Argentine officials as the islanders were not a party to the dispute and therefore could not decide on sovereignty. While the United Kingdom stated that the wishes of the inhabitants of the islands could not be ignored, the Argentine Republic has maintained, in accordance with the mandate of the United Nations under which negotiations were being conducted as expressed in Resolution 2065 (XX), that it was their interests that should be taken into account.

The Question of the Malvinas Islands as recognized by the assembly of States that integrate the UN, is a special case of Decolonization: in this case the same mechanisms are not applied as in other cases since it is not a typical case of colonialism where a people is subjugated by the colonial power, but, on the contrary, the inhabitants of the Malvinas Islands are the result of an act of force by the colonial power against the territorial integrity of a recently independent young State.

These differences, which had arisen between the two States in the course of these initial negotiations, made it necessary to hold a high-level meeting to find a solution. In September 1967, taking advantage of the presence of both foreign ministers in New York to participate in the annual opening session of the General Assembly, a meeting was arranged. This practice was to be repeated in subsequent years.

The conversations held between Nicanor Costa Méndez and George Brown succeeded in unblocking the negotiation process. Then, different meetings were held again between officials of both governments, which made it possible to identify the agreements reached and the divergences that continued to exist, on which they had to work in order to reach a definitive solution to the controversy.

At the end of that year, the Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations, Amb. Ruda addressed a letter to the Secretary General to inform him about the status of the negotiations. There he stated that they had continued and that, as a result, "progress was made towards narrowing the area of divergence between the two

Governments"<sup>14</sup>. A few days later, on December 16, the Argentine delegate to the Fourth Committee stressed the "atmosphere of mutual understanding" that had existed in the negotiations<sup>15</sup>. This intervention was made during the debate on the new draft Consensus proposed by the Representative of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay. Approved by the General Assembly on 19 December, this Second Consensus once again urged both States to continue negotiations with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the dispute as soon as possible<sup>16</sup>.

In the meantime, the meetings between Argentine and British representatives made progress in the drafting of a common document which sought to reflect both the agreements reached and the existing divergences in the negotiation process over the Question of the Malvinas Islands. At the proposal of the United Kingdom, the document took the form of a memorandum of understanding. The text was agreed by both negotiating teams in August 1968 and submitted for final approval by the respective governments.

The Memorandum of Understanding stated, among its main points that "the common objective is to settle permanently and amicably the dispute over sovereignty" and for that purpose "the interests of the population of the Islands" should be taken into account.

To that end, both governments proposed to advance in "practical measures" that would promote "freedom of communication and movement between the mainland and the Islands". In addition, with respect to the sovereignty question, it was stated that, as part of the definitive solution, the United Kingdom would recognize "Argentina's sovereignty over the Islands" when the conditions that ensure the satisfaction of the interests of the islanders were met by "the safeguards and guarantees" offered by the Argentine Government.

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<sup>14</sup> A/C.4/703.

<sup>15</sup> A/C.4/SR.1755.

<sup>16</sup> A/PV.1641.

"4. The Government of the United Kingdom as part of such a final settlement will recognize Argentina's sovereignty over the Islands from a date to be agreed. This date will be agreed as soon as possible after (i) the two governments have resolved the present divergence between them as to the criteria according to which the United Kingdom Government shall consider whether the interests of the Islanders would be secured by the safeguards and guarantees to be offered by the Argentine Government, and (ii) the Government of the United Kingdom are then satisfied that those interests are so secured".

The Argentine government approved the text that was agreed at the negotiating table and then informed its British counterpart that it was ready for signing and therefore awaiting its decision to proceed with the signature.

Meanwhile, in the United Kingdom, within the cabinet of Prime Minister Harold Wilson, Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart and Commonwealth Secretary George Thomson - the main figures behind the issue- were pushing for the signing of the memorandum, although they did so on condition that it was accompanied by a unilateral declaration to be published together with the memorandum, stating that the recognition of sovereignty would take place if the settlers considered the agreement to be satisfactory to their interests.

However, since the beginning of 1968, opposition had been growing within the British Parliament to a possible agreement with Argentina. The leaks of the diplomatic negotiations that appeared in the press and the pressure exerted by a group that claimed to represent the islanders - linked to the economic sectors with presence and interests in the archipelago- contributed decisively to the delay in dealing with the memorandum. The British Government sent the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lord Chalfont, over to the Malvinas Islands to explain to the inhabitants the scope of the negotiations and thus break the opposition to a change in the status of the archipelago. However, the most active sectors of the population, while recognizing the good faith of the UK authorities, managed to impose their rejection by mobilizing against the visit and generating a movement against any agreement with Argentina regarding sovereignty that was echoed in Parliament and in the press. Faced with this political climate, the United Kingdom unilaterally decided to abandon the memorandum proposal at the end of 1968.

Despite this, the Argentine Republic continued to insist on diplomatic negotiation to settle the sovereignty dispute as proposed by the UN. On 19 December, Amb. Ruda sent a letter to the Secretary General regarding the status of the negotiations. In that text he

pointed out that the negotiations had continued and remarked that "progress was made towards narrowing the area of divergence between the two Governments"<sup>17</sup>.

### ***A new approach: the Communications Agreement***

The Memorandum of Understanding had been the closest point towards a solution to the dispute. However, since the British side did not sign it, it seemed necessary to re-launch the negotiating will that still existed in both governments. The United Kingdom maintained that it could not advance toward a solution to the sovereignty question, invoking a commitment with the wishes of the islanders as a precondition. Faced with this situation, Argentina continued to insist on the need to negotiate sovereignty as a central matter but agreed to seek a new approach in the negotiations with sovereignty as the ultimate goal: to reach an understanding on practical measures related to the communication of the Islands with the Argentine mainland, while making a reciprocal reservation on the respective positions on sovereignty. Throughout 1969, meetings were again held between embassy officials and local Argentine and British authorities to boost the negotiation process.

In that spirit, on 21 November, Amb. Ruda addressed a letter to the UN Secretary General to inform him that Argentina and the United Kingdom had continued diplomatic negotiations "with the common objective of settling as soon as possible the dispute concerning sovereignty" over the Malvinas Islands "taking duly into account the interests of the inhabitants of the Islands". While acknowledging that a "divergence remains between the two Governments regarding the circumstances that should exist for a definitive solution", he also explained that they had agreed to hold new talks in 1970 to "agree on practical measures for the implementation and promotion of free communications and movement in both directions between the mainland and the Islands"<sup>18</sup>. In the same vein as his colleague, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the UN wrote to the Secretary General<sup>19</sup>. As a corollary, the General Assembly adopted a new Consensus on 16

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<sup>17</sup> A/7467

<sup>18</sup> A/7785

<sup>19</sup> A/7786



December 1969. This Third Consensus noted the Organization's satisfaction with the progress achieved in the negotiations and urged the parties "to continue their efforts" to reach a solution to "this colonial situation, the elimination of which is of interest to the United Nations" within the context established by Resolution 1514 (XV)<sup>20</sup>.

With the framework of this new negotiating approach the first round of the so-called Special Talks on Communications took place in London between the 14th and 23rd of July 1970. These meetings were reported to the UN Secretary General by the Permanent Representatives of the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom to the organization. In his letter of 11 December, Amb. Carlos Ortiz de Rozas identified these meetings "on communications and movement in both directions between the Argentine mainland and the Malvinas Islands" as part of the negotiations "for a settlement of the dispute over the said Islands". The practical measures that were sought could contribute, according to the text, "to the process of a definitive solution" in accordance with Resolution 2065 (XX) and the consensuses of 1966, 1967 and 1969. It also informed that both States had studied several proposals and suggestions to establish "sea and air communications, movement of persons in both directions, and economic, commercial and cultural links" between the Islands and the Argentine mainland. The letter also stated that these special talks would continue in Buenos Aires in the hope of obtaining "positive measures" that would enable "free communications and movement" and, although there were still differences of opinion regarding the sovereignty dispute, Argentina continued with "its efforts toward an amicable settlement"<sup>21</sup>.

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<sup>20</sup> A/PV1835

<sup>21</sup> A/8234



Between the 21st and 30th of June 1971, another round of the special talks was held in Buenos Aires. At the end of these meetings, on 1 July, the Joint Statement on communications between the Malvinas Islands and the Argentine mainland was signed.

In its text, the Joint Statement was placed as a negotiation process between the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom within the framework of Resolution 2065 (XX) and in accordance with the letters that the Permanent Representatives of both States had sent to the UN Secretary General on 21 November 1969 and 11 December 1970. The document, which was "subject to the approval" of both Governments, established a series of measures that would contribute "to an amicable and definitive solution of the sovereignty dispute ". The text which was finally agreed upon by exchange of reversal notes, preserved, through a sovereignty safeguard formula, the legal positions of each of the parties<sup>22</sup>. The Joint Statement was approved by both governments who informed each other on 5 August

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<sup>22</sup> Letter from 5 August 1971 annex to A/8368

and exchanged reversal notes stipulating that no act carried out by virtue of this statement could be interpreted as a modification of the status of the dispute.<sup>23</sup>



A few days later, on 12 August, the Permanent Representatives of Argentina and the United Kingdom sent notes to the Secretary General referring to the special talks held in Buenos Aires which had concluded with the signing of the Joint Statement. The participation of islanders in the British delegation was noted. In recounting the practical measures adopted, it was pointed out that they would facilitate "the movement of persons and goods" between the Malvinas Islands and the Argentine mainland and would promote "the establishment of cultural, social and economic links". The letters highlighted that what had been agreed was with full consideration of "the interests of the population of the Malvinas

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<sup>23</sup> <http://www.saij.gob.ar/19529-nacional-aprobacion-declaracion-conjunta-referente-apertura-comunicaciones-entre-islas-malvinas-territorio-continental-argentino-Int0000749-1972-03-20/123456789-0abc-defg-g94-70000tcanyel?q=%28numero-norma%3A19529%20%29&o=0&f=Total%7CTipo%20de%20Documento/Legislaci%F3n/Ley%7CFecha%7COrganismo%7CPublicaci%F3n%7CTema%7CEstado%20de%20Vigencia%7CAutor%7CJurisdic%i%F3n&t=2>

Islands" and was designed to contribute to the efforts of both States for "an amicable and definitive solution of the sovereignty dispute on which divergence persists".<sup>24</sup> Also attached were the notes exchanged by both Governments on 5 August and a copy of the Joint Declaration

As a result of the agreement reached on communications, the General Assembly adopted the Fourth Consensus on 20 December 1971, on the recommendation of the Fourth Committee. This document reflected the General Assembly's satisfaction for noting the "progress achieved in the special talks on communications". It also reiterated the General Assembly's call for continued efforts to reach a solution to "this colonial situation, the elimination of which is of interest to the United Nations" within the framework established by Resolution 1514 (XV)<sup>25</sup>.

The year 1971 seemed to have closed a stage in the diplomatic negotiations between the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom on the Question of the Malvinas Islands. With advances and setbacks, but without Argentina ceasing to seek a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute, and within the framework established by the United Nations, the first steps had been taken to reconnect the Islands with the Argentine mainland. The reestablishment of communications sought to create a new economic, social and cultural environment as a basis for reaching a definitive solution to the sovereignty dispute over the southern archipelagos.

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<sup>24</sup> A/8368

<sup>25</sup> A/PV.2028

1972-1982

## **MOVING FORWARD AND BACKWARDS**

From 1972 onwards, the dynamics of diplomatic negotiations entered a new stage. The agreement reached in 1971 with the signing of the Joint Statement lay de foundations of a set of practical measures, which from that moment on, both governments began to implement in order to facilitate the movement of persons and goods between the Argentine mainland and the Malvinas Islands, in both directions, and promote the establishment of cultural, social and economic links. The consequences were quickly visible and introduced radical improvements in the daily life of the islanders. Thereafter, Argentina sought to move towards the long-awaited definitive and friendly solution to the sovereignty dispute.

### ***The first concrete measures: the airfield***

Following the signing of the Joint Statement, the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom tried to move forward with the implementation of the agreed measures. To that end, they held regular consultations through a Special Consultative Commission set up for that purpose in Buenos Aires.

In the meantime, the Argentine Republic had begun to implement the concrete measures that would put the 1971 agreement into effect. The virtual isolation of the population in the Islands meant that one of the first actions to be taken was the construction of a provisional airfield. This would allow the establishment of a regular air service with larger aircraft than the amphibious ones used until then by the Argentine Navy. Through reversal notes exchanged on 2 May 1972, both Governments agreed that the construction and operation of the airfield would be carried out by Argentina. The personnel to be hired, although mainly from the mainland, would also include islanders. The UK Government would provide the site, a building for accommodation of personnel from the mainland, and water and electricity services. The Argentine Government would be responsible for all other costs and maintenance expenses. At the Special Advisory Commission, furthermore, and with the beginning of the aerodrome works, progress was made towards new agreements: the

United Kingdom's commitment to build a permanent airport on the islands -which would help to link them with Buenos Aires, using planes with greater flight autonomy- and the establishment of a regular weekly air service of LADE (Líneas Aéreas del Estado) from Comodoro Rivadavia<sup>26</sup>.

In order to facilitate the movement of people between the archipelago and the Argentine mainland, it was agreed to issue a Provisional Certificate -colloquially known as Tarjeta Blanca (White Card) - which would serve as a travel document and did not contain any reference to nationality and did not have to be stamped by any local authority. The inauguration of the airfield built by the Argentine Air Force in November served as a kick-off for a new round of negotiations.

Between the 21st and 24th special talks on communications were held on the islands. The evident improvement that the new airfield meant for the islanders' life allowed the negotiations to include issues related to the daily life of the population. Among the issues discussed was granting scholarships to children and young people to study on the Argentine mainland, the establishment of postal, telegraphic and telephone communications, tourism, medical care and cultural exchange, as well as an increase of commercial and financial ties<sup>27</sup>.

The Argentine Republic supported these proposals, which had a direct impact on the population because they meant an improvement in their living conditions. However, by focusing on the establishment of communications, the government did not neglect its main objective in the negotiations, that is, the recovery of the full exercise of sovereignty over the southern archipelagos. This had been stated and reiterated in the course of the special talks, in the face of the British evasive attitude to discuss these fundamental negotiations. The special talks were concluded in a friendly atmosphere. While the Special Advisory Commission would continue to meet and maintain informal meetings between officials of the two States, a new round was scheduled for October 1972 in London in 1973.

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<sup>26</sup> A/8723/Rev. 1

<sup>27</sup> Idem

- 1) El presente certificado provisorio deberá ser exhibido a las autoridades cada vez que se lo requiera.
- 2) El status del titular de este certificado está contemplado en la Declaración Conjunta de Buenos Aires de 1° de Julio de 1971.
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REPUBLICA ARGENTINA

**CERTIFICADO PROVISORIO**  
EMITIDO DE ACUERDO A LA  
DECLARACIÓN CONJUNTA DE  
BUENOS AIRES DE 1971

**TEMPORARY CARD**  
ISSUED IN ACCORDANCE WITH  
THE JOINT STATEMENT OF  
BUENOS AIRES OF 1971



### ***The deadlock in negotiations and Resolution 3160 (XXVIII)***

Despite progress in the practical articulation of the communications agreement, diplomatic negotiations began to stall in 1973. The central question, i.e. sovereignty, was clearly evaded by the United Kingdom despite the successive instructions by the UN since 1965 for both States to negotiate a peaceful and definitive solution to the Question of the Malvinas Islands.

In December 1972, a few days after the end of the special talks in the Malvinas Islands, the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs reported to the British Parliament. In front of the House of Commons, Julian Amery stated that the negotiations had been conducted in a friendly and constructive atmosphere and his own delegation had "included participants from the Territory". He also clarified that, while the practical arrangements "would open up new opportunities for the Islanders", the question of the sovereignty of the Islands had not been discussed. Finally he stressed that the policy of the United Kingdom "remained that 'there can be no transfer of sovereignty against the wishes of the Islanders'"<sup>28</sup>.

In March 1973, during a session of the Security Council held in Panama City, the Argentine Delegate, Amb. Carlos Ortiz de Rozas expressed the support that Argentina had always given to the Decolonization process. He also pointed out that colonialism "it is a present-day reality" because "there still remains on our territory a vestige of that imperialist phenomenon". In the search for a definitive solution as expressed by the General Assembly through Resolution 2065 (XX), he noted the impossibility of agreeing on a common text between Argentina and the United Kingdom regarding the last round of talks because the British Government "position would have distorted the essence of those meetings in so far as these negotiations are intended to find a peaceful solution to the dispute over sovereignty"<sup>29</sup>.

Finally, on the 26 and 27 of April, the Government Representatives of Argentina and the United Kingdom met again. The talks took place in London and were described by

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<sup>28</sup> A/9023/Rev. 1

<sup>29</sup> S/1697



the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as "part of a series of regular exchanges of views, which reflected the gradual improvement in relations between both countries". Despite the confidentiality of the talks, the British Government stressed that "there had been no change of view" regarding the future of the Islands: according to them it was "up to the Islanders themselves to decide on this matter"<sup>30</sup>.

Faced with the growing and relentless British intransigence, Argentina, through its Representative to the United Nations, expressed its position on the matter to the Secretary General. Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas addressed a note on 17 August 1973, in which he pointed out that the negotiation process was "virtually paralyzed as a result of the attitude adopted by the Government of the United Kingdom". It was noted that, for the counterpart, the round of meetings to be held "could not be called 'negotiations' since, in its opinion, they involved only 'talks' or 'discussions'". This was an attempt to downgrade the process and also to "change its true nature", in open contradiction with what had been previously accepted and which was in accordance with Resolution 2065 (XX). For Argentina, the definitive solution to the dispute was being postponed and therefore in breach of UN mandates. This justified the concern raised by the letter<sup>31</sup>.

A few days later, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom sent a note to the Secretary General in response to the one submitted by Amb. Ortiz de Rozas. There he stated that his Government took note of Argentina's express desire expressed for an early solution to the problem and reiterated its willingness to resume talks bearing in mind that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and Resolution 1514 (XV), "it is essential that any solution should recognize the right of the inhabitants of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands to self-determination and should provide for them to express their wishes in this connexion"<sup>32</sup>. This was a misrepresentation and misapplication of Resolution 1514 (XV) by the United Kingdom, a situation that would be constantly repeated.

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<sup>30</sup> A/9023/Rev.1

<sup>31</sup> A/9121

<sup>32</sup> A/9124

On October 3, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship Alberto Vignes again referred to the matter before the General Assembly of the United Nations. In his speech he alluded to the "state of stagnation in which, as a consequence of the attitude adopted by the British Government, the negotiations" that had been entrusted by the UN through Resolution 2065 (XX) were at a standstill, and remarked the full willingness of the Argentine Republic to resume them, taking into account "the special nature of the problem and its singular characteristics". He identified the Question of the Malvinas Islands as "a remnant of the power politics of the 19th century" whose impact had been the dismemberment of Argentina's territorial integrity by an act of pure aggression, "while the usurpation has at no time been consented to by the State to which the territory belongs". He also emphasized that in this concept "of typical imperialist design", the population played a fundamental role in that it was "a method of alleged consolidation of the colonial aggression" since the original inhabitants were displaced and replaced by others imposed "by the imperialist Power".

Minister Vignes then pointed out that the attitude of the United Kingdom was paradoxical since, after "having maintained a critical attitude towards Resolution 1514 (XV)", it now wanted to invoke it in a fragmentary and intentional way "to validate one of the many episodes of colonial expansion carried out by that country". Although he emphasized Argentina's deep conviction in favor of negotiation, he did not fail to warn, along the same lines as Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas had done in August, "that this procedure cannot be prolonged indefinitely, serving as a means to maintain the current situation". Faced with the negative attitude of the United Kingdom, which "leads to a dead end," the Argentine Republic, Foreign Minister Vignes declared, would be obliged "to re-examine in depth the policy followed up to date, based on good faith and the observance of the principles of the Charter and the resolutions of our Organization". It would then be the responsibility of the UN to determine "to what extent the purposes of Resolution 2065 (XX) have been undermined by a lack of a real negotiating spirit on the part of one of the parties"<sup>33</sup>.

For its part, the United Kingdom sent a note to the Secretary General about the stalemate in the negotiations. Dated 19 October 1973, the British letter stated that "if this was the case, it has not come about on the United Kingdom Government's own volition". It

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<sup>33</sup> A/PV.2139

reiterated its willingness "to renew discussions at an early date and continue to explore [...] in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 2065 (XX), all possible means of finding a solution to the problem defined in that resolution". He also mentioned the considerable progress that had been made with the opening of communications between the archipelago and the Argentine mainland but stressed that he had no doubts about its sovereignty over the Islands. Finally, he pointed out that the British Government was reluctant to believe that its Argentine counterpart would desire a solution contrary to the wishes expressed by the inhabitants and that it hoped that future talks would continue in the constructive spirit that had led to the 1971 exchanges<sup>34</sup>.

These expressions were refuted in a letter from Amb. Ortiz de Rozas to the UN Secretary General. The Argentine Permanent Representative addressed him on November 5 in compliance with the instructions of the Buenos Aires Government. He noted that the United Kingdom, now invoking the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and Resolution 1514 (XV), was trying to render "an early solution" of the Malvinas question conditional upon recognition of an alleged right of the inhabitants 'to self-determination' and permitting them to express their wishes". However, he added, Resolution 2065 (XX) had "categorically precluded any erroneous interpretation" by laying the basis for "a logical solution of a problem which has special features and cannot be linked to other colonial questions". He reiterated the Argentine position on the territorial integrity and the origin of the island population, although he remarked that the "Argentine Government has already given valid proof" of its position, in view to its interests, facilitating "communications and contributing to the well-being of the settlers in the Islands". He criticized the paralysis of the sovereignty negotiations that had occurred due to the "substantial change in the United Kingdom's position concerning the nature" of the negotiations and remarked Argentina's willingness to resume them in accordance with the provisions of Resolution 2065 (XX)<sup>35</sup>.

In the meantime, the Latin American countries had sponsored draft resolution A/C.4/L.1052 in the Fourth Committee, which was finally approved on 5 December and thus submitted to the General Assembly. The Latin American support, together with that of other

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<sup>34</sup> A/9124 Note of 19/10/1973, referenced in the Special Committee Report (A/9623/Add.6).

<sup>35</sup> A/9287

Asian and African States, was the result of intense Argentine diplomatic efforts. Given the evident stalemate in negotiations on the Question of the Malvinas Islands, the Argentine Republic once again sought to return to the multilateral arena of the General Assembly in order to make its position visible in the international community. Together with the Argentine Republic, several States concluded on the need to reiterate, through a new resolution, the need to make effective progress towards the end of colonialism. On 14 December 1973, the General Assembly voted and approved Resolution 3160 (XXVIII) by 116 votes in favor, none against and only 14 abstentions, including the United Kingdom. This constitutes the second UN resolution on the Question of the Malvinas Islands.

Resolution 3160 (XXVIII) continues the line drawn by the previous resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2065 (XX). It also states how "gravely concerned" the General Assembly was "at the fact that eight years have elapsed since the adoption of resolution 2065 (XX) without any substantial progress having been made in negotiations" and its appreciation for "the continuous efforts made by the Government of Argentina, in accordance with the relevant decisions of the General Assembly, to facilitate the process of decolonization and to promote the well-being of the Islands' population ". Accordingly, it declares "the need to accelerate the negotiations (...) that are called for in General Assembly Resolution 2065 (XX)" between Argentina and the United Kingdom to reach "a peaceful solution of the conflict of sovereignty between them over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)" urging that both Governments "proceed without delay with the negotiations (...) in order to put an end to the colonial situation"<sup>36</sup>.

In short, the main points of Resolution 3160 (XXVIII) are as follows:

- a) The concern of the international community for the lack of progress in the negotiations recommended by Resolution 2065 (XX) to put an end to the dispute.
- b) The recognition of the continuous efforts being made by the Argentine Republic.
- c) The need to accelerate the process of negotiations that was established in Resolution 2065 (XX).

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<sup>36</sup> Resolution 3160 (XXVIII)

Upon approval of the new resolution, the Argentine Republic expressed its satisfaction, appreciating the support it received. Furthermore, it expressed its confidence that the United Kingdom would participate in the same spirit and that, in the same sense, "will accordingly co-operate in ensuring that these negotiations resume as soon as possible and come to a successful conclusion"<sup>37</sup>.

***Regaining the negotiating dynamics:  
condominium and leaseback projects***

The firmness shown by the Argentine Republic to prevent negotiations from stagnating and its permanent call to find, within the framework that was set by the UN, a peaceful and definitive solution to the dispute over the Question of the Malvinas Islands had found an echo in the international community. Resolution 3160 (XXVIII) reflected that sentiment shared by most States, noting the concern over the lack of substantial progress and the need to accelerate diplomatic negotiations on the sovereignty dispute over the southern archipelagos and the surrounding maritime areas. In this new context, the United Kingdom tried, from 1974 onwards, some proposals and alternatives that could put the process back on track. However, those proposals failed to progress due to the pressure of the group that claimed to represent the islanders -which had economic interests in the archipelago-, the lack of conviction to support them and the inability to try to bring these proposals closer to the position held by Argentina, which was based on what was established by the UN General Assembly.

Despite the stalemate in the negotiations, throughout 1973, the ties between the Malvinas Islands and their population and the Argentine mainland had deepened thanks to the good faith and efforts by the Argentine Government. The communications agreement, far from paralyzing, was moving forward with concrete measures on the part of the Argentine Republic that had a direct impact on the social and economic life of the archipelago. The situation of virtual isolation in which the inhabitants had found themselves for decades was beginning to disappear. In addition to the new airfield, the weekly flights operated by LADE allowed groups of children and young islanders to travel to the mainland and study in

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<sup>37</sup> A/PV.2202

schools thanks to the scholarships that were made available. Likewise, those settlers that required so were treated in the hospitals of the Argentine mainland. It was also decided to send Argentine teachers over to the archipelago to teach Spanish to the islanders. All these measures were economically supported by the Argentine State.

At the beginning of 1974, there were in the United Kingdom expressions in favor of bringing back the negotiating dynamics on sovereignty but keeping the same limitations that had led to the stalemate of the previous negotiations. On 4 January, the Island's self-called Legislative Council of the Territory passed a motion expressing its strong opposition to any "negotiations or talks held with the Argentine Government" on the question of sovereignty without "the prior and full knowledge of the people of the islands" and against "the wishes of the inhabitants of the islands". A few days later, the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Julian Amery responded in the same sense before the UK House of Commons. He stated that "there would be no change in the sovereignty" of the Malvinas Islands "without the full consent of the islanders."<sup>38</sup>



Islander students in a Argentine school

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<sup>38</sup> A/9623/add.6



Some of the Argentine teachers that travelled to the Malvinas Islands to teach islanders.

Finally, halfway through that year, the British Government submitted a proposal to its Argentine counterpart: the establishment of an Anglo-Argentine condominium system in the Malvinas Islands as a preliminary step to a definitive solution to the sovereignty dispute. The proposal was received with interest by Foreign Minister Vignes and President Perón. A counter-proposal was immediately presented in order to discuss them and seek a negotiated solution between them. The Argentine Government offered the alternative of a joint administration instead of shared sovereignty, and for that purpose, it took the main subjects of the formulation proposed by the United Kingdom (two flags, passports, administration, legal system, etc.) and complemented them with other subjects that had not been contemplated (nationality, currency, languages, etc.).

Although the British authorities considered that both proposals were close enough for an open negotiation, the persistent refusal by an island group complicated any possibility in that direction. On 26 June 1974, while diplomatic contacts between Argentina and the United Kingdom were in progress regarding a possible condominium or joint administration, Julian Amery, as Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, declared before Parliament that, with "the agreement of the Executive Council" of the Malvinas Islands, he had "been in communication with the Argentine Government about a

possible resumption of talks between our two Governments in relation to Resolution 3160 (XXVIII)". He clarified in particular that, "if talks resume, representatives of the islanders will be invited to join the delegation of the United Kingdom"<sup>39</sup>. In spite of this, on 22 August, at the United Nations, the Permanent Representative of the Argentine Republic, Amb. Ortiz de Rozas, sent a letter to the Secretary General to inform him that there were "contacts between both Governments, with a view to complying with the stipulations" in Resolution 3160 (XXVIII)<sup>40</sup>. However, a few days later, the continued rejection by a sector of the island population and its allies in London, caused the end of those approaches when the United Kingdom informed Argentina that it made no sense to continue with discussions on the basis of the proposals that had been made. Thus, once again, the United Kingdom unilaterally scuttled the negotiation process.



While the proposal for a condominium or joint administration did not succeed, concrete measures to strengthen the links between the Islands and the Argentine mainland continued and deepened. Following the world energy crisis of 1973 and 1974, the Argentine state-owned oil company Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF) settled in the Islands to supply and market its products at the same prices as in the mainland. In September 1974, two agreements had been concluded by means of reversal notes which,

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<sup>39</sup> A/9623/add.6.

<sup>40</sup>8 A/AC.109/45.



within the framework of the measures for safeguarding sovereignty, would facilitate the production activities of the archipelago and its population. Agreements were reached concerning the activities of YPF as well as measures to facilitate trade and the transport of goods between the Malvinas Islands and the Argentine mainland.



Agreements were also reached over telephone services and artistic and cultural promotion activities. With these and the other measures that had been in force for years, the social and economic life of the islanders had improved substantially as never before in 140 years.

In his speech before the General Assembly on 24 September, Foreign Affairs and Worship Minister Alberto Vignes highlighted this situation. Although he acknowledged that there were "contacts to resume" negotiations as urged by Resolution 3160 (XXVIII) and no solution had yet been reached -which is why he reiterated "unalterable sovereignty of Argentina over the territory of the Malvinas Islands"-, the concrete measures agreed upon were having a positive impact on the lives of the inhabitants. In announcing the new agreements signed with the United Kingdom, Foreign Minister Vignes noted that "the Republic of Argentine will do everything in its power to protect the interests of the inhabitants of the islands" by increasing their welfare and making it possible for them "to enjoy the benefits and progress that are enjoyed by the people of Argentina"<sup>41</sup>.

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<sup>41</sup> A/PV.2240

A few days later, following the letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of 24 October, which made some comments on the speech given by Foreign Minister Vignes<sup>42</sup>, Amb. Ortiz de Rozas addressed a note to the Secretary General. In the note, the Permanent Representative of the Argentine Republic "welcomed" the expressions of satisfaction by the British Government for the agreements reached. However, he clarified that, as the UN had recognized in several documents, the Question of the Malvinas Islands "has very special features" within the Decolonization process. Therefore, and in order to find a definitive solution to the dispute, the "negotiations must take place exclusively between the Governments of the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom" without "no presumption or claim that the settlers of the Islands should participate in the negotiations". Ortiz de Rozas emphasized that Argentina had demonstrated "at every stage of a process focused on reaching a peaceful and definitive solution to the question" its concern for the interests of the islanders, as required by Resolutions 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII)<sup>43</sup>.

Along the same lines spoke the Argentine delegate to the General Assembly, Amb. Fernando Fernández Escalante on 13 December 1974, when he presented the national position on the progress of the decolonization process. In his speech he acknowledged that the "Argentina is in favour of self-determination by the indigenous populations of colonial Territories in general" but also explained that this was not possible "in very special situations such as that of the Malvinas Islands" because "the original Argentine population was exiled and replaced by a colonial Power's population ". In addition to reiterating the bilateral nature of the dispute and the urgency of establishing negotiations, the Argentine Delegate stressed the "special sympathy" that the Republic had for the island population and its rights "which it considers, of course, to be protected by the Argentine Constitution and national legislation" just like the inhabitants of the mainland<sup>44</sup>.

The failure of the condominium or joint administration proposal, the new economic scenarios and the activity deployed by the Argentine Republic in the UN motivated

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<sup>42</sup> A/P9814.

<sup>43</sup> A/9824

<sup>44</sup> A/PV.2317

the British Government to seek new negotiation alternatives. Thus appeared the possibility of a leaseback of the archipelago: the United Kingdom would recognize Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands and, in exchange, the United Kingdom would have the right to continue administering them for a certain number of years. In addition, agreements would be established on various matters in the region, such as the situation of South Georgias and the South Sandwich Islands and oil and fishing exploitation, among others. The leaseback was taking shape during the first months of 1975 but was never raised, beyond informal conversations, at the negotiating table between the two governments.

### **New tensions**

Since 1974, and accelerated by the international situation, the United Kingdom had unilaterally begun to carry out geophysical studies around the Malvinas Islands to determine the possible existence of oil deposits. For that purpose, the British Government decided to send a mission to the archipelago, under the direction of Lord Shackleton, with the aim of conducting an economic and fiscal survey to determine its resources and future development prospects. The possible future scenario then prompted the United Kingdom to direct its diplomatic efforts towards reaching an agreement with Argentina on economic cooperation in the Southwest Atlantic.

However, faced with these unilateral actions by the United Kingdom and the new attempts to redirect the negotiation process, the Argentine Republic drew attention to the implications they had in a context of sovereignty dispute and, therefore, its open rejection to such activities. This was explained by Ambassador Fernández Escalante in his speech of 13 December before the UN General Assembly by stating that "all their natural resources must be kept in reserve until the dispute over sovereignty is settled by Great Britain's restitution of the Malvinas Islands to Argentina"<sup>45</sup>. In the same way, the Argentine Government issued a press release on 19 March 1975, which was sent to the Secretary General by Amb. Ortiz de Rozas and expressed the present and future non-recognition of the "exercise of any right relating to the exploration and exploitation of minerals or hydrocarbons" in the area of the

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<sup>45</sup> Idem

Malvinas Islands "by a foreign government"<sup>46</sup>. At the end of that year, the Argentine Delegate to the General Assembly made an intervention in which he reiterated the national arguments in favor of complying with the mandate of the Organization and permanently settling the dispute. Mr. Ortiz de Rozas reviewed the progress made in practical aspects since 1971, which had had a direct impact on the life of the population and which demonstrated "our good will and our constant readiness to take into account the interests of the settlers". He also noted the "substantial regression in the attitude of the British authorities toward the sovereignty negotiations" in that they had introduced strange elements into them: the "prior authorization of the inhabitants of the Malvinas" for their execution and substitution "by a discussion of so-called economic cooperation". This had led to a new paralysis of the process and the Argentine Republic called on its British counterpart to comply with its part and agree to reestablish full negotiations to resolve the dispute over the Question of the Malvinas Islands<sup>47</sup>.



RSS Shackleton



Corbeta Uruguay Station

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<sup>46</sup> A/AC.109/482

<sup>47</sup> A/PV.2431

At the beginning of 1976, diplomatic negotiations, virtually interrupted in terms of the core of the question, were shaken by new incidents resulting from unilateral British actions. On 3 January, the mission headed by Lord Shackleton on H.M.S. Endurance arrived in the Malvinas Islands. This provoked a diplomatic exchange that culminated in the Argentine Republic deciding to withdraw its ambassador in London and requesting the replacement of the British diplomatic representative in Buenos Aires. Barely a month later, a new incident occurred: the scientific research vessel R.R.S. Shackleton, owned by the National Environmental Research Council of the United Kingdom, was unilaterally carrying out geophysical and geological surveys in the maritime areas around South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and in Antarctic waters south of 60° S latitude. The vessel was intercepted on 4 February by the Argentine destroyer ARA Almirante Storni when it was within the 200 nautical mile limit belonging to Argentine jurisdiction. The captain of the British vessel ignored the order to stop and allow an inspection on board. In accordance with standard procedures, a warning was issued and, without any response, the vessel was pursued until it approached the Malvinas Islands. The information about the presence of explosives on the R.R.S. Shackleton hampered any possible action by the ARA Almirante Storni.

The Argentine Republic, since 1975, had made its position clear regarding unilateral actions by the United Kingdom. On several occasions it had stated that "it does not and will not recognize the right of any foreign government to explore for or extract minerals or hydrocarbons"<sup>48</sup>. In November of that year, the Permanent Representative of the Argentine Republic to the United Nations had addressed a letter to the Secretary General requesting the publication and distribution of the 22 October press release that had been issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, as an official document of the General Assembly. There, in addition to reiterating the terms of the previous communiqué of 19 March, it recalled that in order to comply with the mandates of the General Assembly resolutions, "the parties in dispute must refrain from innovating unilaterally in fundamental aspects of the issue"<sup>49</sup>. This was also reaffirmed by Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas in his speech before the General Assembly on December 8 when he stated that "obviously, initiatives such

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<sup>48</sup> A/AC.109/482

<sup>49</sup> A/C.4/804

as those I have mentioned do nothing to strengthen the mutual confidence that should preside over any negotiated solution"<sup>50</sup>. In view of the incident with the R.R.S. Shackleton, Amb. Ortiz de Rozas, complying with the instructions from Buenos Aires, sent a letter to the President of the Security Council to inform him "about the serious violation of the legislation concerning Argentine maritime jurisdiction" that had occurred a few days before. In that note, dated February 10, 1976, the Permanent Representative gave an account of what had happened as a consequence of the scientific activities that the British ship had unilaterally carried out "on the Argentine continental shelf" and annexed the note of protest that had been delivered to the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the United Kingdom to the Argentine Republic<sup>51</sup>. A few days later, he proceeded likewise before the Secretary General<sup>52</sup>.

### **Resolution 31/49 (XXXI)**

Despite the tensions that had been generated with the withdrawal of the ambassadors, diplomatic relations were not broken. The Argentine Republic did not cease in its efforts to resume the negotiation process about the fundamental matter: sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands. Although bilateral meetings were held to try to reopen the dialogue between the two States, there were still differences regarding the issues to be negotiated. While the Argentine Republic sought to incorporate the debate on sovereignty, the United Kingdom maintained its position of reaching economic cooperation agreements. The proposal of a solution involving a joint administration, although outlined, remained very vague and with numerous aspects to be resolved. The meetings thus remained informal, purely exploratory and confidential.

In the meantime, and in response to the British actions, Argentina sought -as on previous occasions- the advice and renewed support of the international community to settle the Question of the Malvinas Islands definitely and peacefully. Thus, the Argentine Republic once again took the matter to the UN General Assembly. Recent events had once again

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<sup>50</sup> A/PV.2431

<sup>51</sup> S/11973

<sup>52</sup> A/31/55

slowed down the negotiation process and created conditions that required a clear definition by the Organization.

The Fourth Committee then began to work on a new draft resolution on the Question of the Malvinas Islands. Throughout several months, the Argentine delegate tried to explain the Argentine position and to highlight the British attitude of carrying out constant unilateral acts in the area of the controversy. In particular, Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas noted, in his intervention of 8 November 1976, "the negative change in the United Kingdom position": the replacement of the term negotiations by "an ill-defined 'dialogue'". That concept, he clarified, "does not appear in the language of the Charter or the resolutions adopted by the Assembly". Dialogue "is always open and exists between two parties having normal diplomatic relations" and, on the other hand, the term negotiations had been "specifically mentioned" by the General Assembly resolutions "as the appropriate means of resolving the dispute"<sup>53</sup>. These same considerations were expressed again a few days later, when he referred to the intervention of the United Kingdom delegate, Amb. James Murray, in which he used "terms such as 'dialogue', 'contacts', and 'talks' but had studiously avoided the specific word 'negotiations' used in the resolutions"<sup>54</sup>.

On 1 December, the General Assembly adopted a new resolution on the Question of the Malvinas Islands: Resolution 31/49 (XXXI). It had 102 votes in favor -including Latin American, Asian and African states-, 1 against (United Kingdom) and 32 abstentions. This was the first resolution on the Malvinas Question that the United Kingdom voted against. Resolution 31/49 (XXXI) follows the line drawn by previous resolutions 1514 (XV), 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII). In this regard, it calls on both governments to "expedite the negotiations concerning the sovereignty dispute" over the Malvinas Islands. It also reiterates the recognition by the General Assembly for "the continuous efforts made by the Government of Argentina" in accordance with what has been expressed by that body, "to facilitate the process of decolonization and promote the well-being of the population in the Islands". In view of the recent incidents, Resolution 31/49 (XXXI) "calls upon the two parties to refrain

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<sup>53</sup> A/C.4/31/SR.18

<sup>54</sup> A/C.4/31/SR.23

from taking decisions that would imply introducing unilateral modifications in the situation" while the archipelago is involved in a sovereignty dispute<sup>55</sup>.

In short, the main points of Resolution 31/49 (XXXI) are as follows:

- a) The need to accelerate the process of negotiations provided in resolutions 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII).
- b) Recognition of the continuous efforts being made by the Argentine Republic.
- c) The insistence of the international community that the parties refrain from adopting unilateral decisions.

Resolution 31/49 (XXXI) reactivated, like the previous resolutions, the process of negotiations between the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom. At the beginning of 1977, the first bilateral meetings took place and the exchange of ambassadors was agreed upon. In February, meetings were held in the City of Buenos Aires between officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship and the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Edward Rowlands. As a result of the meetings, a joint press release was issued on 23 February: there, the two Governments indicated that "they had reached an area of understanding in talks on the future of the disputed territory and on economic cooperation in the South-West Atlantic"<sup>56</sup>.

On the basis of these premises, meetings continued to be held between representatives of both States. On 26 April 1977, a joint communiqué set the frame of reference for the next formal talks. A copy of the text agreed upon by the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom was sent to the Secretary General of the United Nations on June 8, through a letter addressed to him by the Argentine Representative. In that letter, both Governments stated that they had agreed to hold negotiations as of midyear which would include "future political relations, including sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands, South Georgias and the South Sandwich Islands and economic cooperation with regard to the said territories in particular and the Southwest Atlantic in general". This clearly revealed the full geographical scope of the Question of the Malvinas Islands. The Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom also stated that "a major objective of the negotiations" was to achieve "a

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<sup>55</sup> Resolution 31/49 (XXXI)

<sup>56</sup> A/32/23



stable, prosperous and politically lasting future for the islands" and that the population "will be consulted by the Government of the United Kingdom during the course of the negotiations". The joint communiqué again referred to the sovereignty safeguard clause by assuring that the negotiations were "without prejudice to the position of either government in relation to sovereignty over the islands"<sup>57</sup>. The same text was submitted in writing to the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, David Owen<sup>58</sup>.

### **The negotiation rounds**

In July, the first rounds of negotiations were held according to what Argentina and the United Kingdom had agreed in the first part of the year. The meeting took place between the 13th and 15th in the city of Rome. Although in the successive meetings they were not able to bring positions closer, in the joint press release, both governments stressed the "positive spirit" in which the discussions took place and that "led to a better awareness of the position of each side" from which they could "continue to seek understanding". Therefore, they had agreed to meet again in November of that year<sup>59</sup>. A few days later, the Permanent Representative of the Argentine Republic to the United Nations, Ambassador Enrique Ros, presented a letter informing the Secretary General about the meeting and the next round<sup>60</sup>. The Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Ivor Richard, acted in the same vein<sup>61</sup>.

As the scheduled meeting was approaching, contacts continued between the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom to find common ground in view of the future meeting. The highest representatives of the Argentine and British Foreign Ministries even

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<sup>57</sup> A/32/110

<sup>58</sup> A/32/23

<sup>59</sup> Idem

<sup>60</sup> A/32/168

<sup>61</sup> AA/32/169

met in New York in September, while attending the UN General Assembly. For the Argentine government, a permanent process of bilateral consultations should focus on the two central matters that had been identified: sovereignty and economic cooperation. To this end, it proposed the creation of working groups to make progress in this regard. However, the United Kingdom was reluctant to engage in any kind of discussion outside the formal round-table mechanism, waiting to establish a suitable political framework at the next meeting in November. The meeting was delayed and finally took place between the 13th and 15th of December in New York.

In successive meetings, certain agreements on the negotiations on South Georgias and the South Sandwich Islands were gradually emerging, where the United Kingdom showed a greater willingness to address the sovereignty issue. As regards the Malvinas Islands, the situation of the islanders and their way of life was once again raised. At the conclusion of the round, a joint communiqué was issued and transmitted to the Secretary General on 30 January 1978<sup>62</sup>. The agreed text notes the "positive spirit" in which the dialogue between the two delegations took place. It also recognizes that the negotiations included sovereignty issues "with regard to the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and Argentine British economic cooperation" in those archipelagos in particular and in the Southwest Atlantic in general. Argentina and the United Kingdom also expressed "that there is a wide range of issues involved which would require a detailed study" and therefore, they had agreed "to establish two official-level parallel working groups on political relations, including sovereignty, and on economic cooperation, to pursue these studies in depth and to report back to the heads of delegations". The joint communiqué finally announced that both governments would "keep under constant review the progress of the of the working groups' studies " and that a new round of negotiations would be held "within the second quarter of 1978"<sup>63</sup>.

Between the 15th and 17th of 1978, the respective working groups on political relations -which referred to the sovereignty matter- and economic cooperation met. The meetings highlighted the differences that existed between the Argentine Republic and the

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<sup>62</sup> A/33/57.

<sup>63</sup> A/33/57 Annex.

United Kingdom on these issues and their mutual implications. No joint communiqué was issued at the conclusion and the meeting was described as "preparatory to plenary round discussions scheduled to be held at a ministerial level during the second quarter of 1978"<sup>64</sup>.

The lack of progress at the working group meeting in Lima once again slowed the negotiating process. There seemed to be no possibility of reaching any kind of agreement between both States on sovereignty over the Question of the Malvinas Islands. Amb. Ros informed the Secretary General on 21 August about this situation considering the "divergent views of the two Governments about the way in which the crucial question of sovereignty should be dealt with" although, he clarified, "an attempt is currently being made to resolve it"<sup>65</sup>. In this momentary impasse, references appeared in the British press to the activities of the Argentine scientific station Corbeta Uruguay on South Thule Island, in the South Sandwich Islands group. Although until then, the British Government had kept it as a low profile issue, the press coverage called for an explanation to its actions. It was then reported that a timely protest had been made in this regard, clarifying that these activities were purely scientific and in support of the Argentine Antarctic program, in which both States were cooperating. This circumstance was again used by certain sectors in the islands to make their opposition to the diplomatic negotiations felt in the British Parliament.

However, the situation raised by the Argentine scientific activities in the South Sandwich Islands seemed to have a positive effect on the negotiation process. As a result, the British Government raised with its Argentine counterpart the possibility of reaching an agreement in this area. Argentina's response was along the same lines and proposed that it be included in the agenda of the next round of negotiations. This contributed to meetings between officials of the Foreign Ministries of both States in order to prepare for a new plenary round before the end of 1978.

The meetings were held in Geneva between the 18th and 20th of December. This round of negotiations focused on three issues: the situation of the Malvinas Islands and the proposal for a joint administration, sovereignty over South Georgias and the South Sandwich Islands and economic activities in the surrounding maritime areas, and the agreement on

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<sup>64</sup> A 33/23. A/AC.109/L1258

<sup>65</sup> A 33/210

scientific cooperation in South Georgias and the South Sandwich Islands Once the meetings concluded, a joint communiqué was issued and reported to the Secretary General on 19 January 1979. The document noted the "positive spirit" of the discussions in which they "reviewed all the matters within the scope of the negotiations". It noted that the delegations had reached an "agreement in principle on the framework for a system of co-operation for scientific research activities in South Georgias and the South Sandwich Islands". Furthermore, it noted, Argentina and the United Kingdom had agreed "to continue consideration of the various questions under consideration" and to that end, they were to hold a new meeting in early 1979<sup>66</sup>.

The new round of negotiations was decided to meet in the second half of March in New York City. The meetings resumed the issues that had been discussed in Geneva. Although the arguments of each side were clearly stated, no agreement was reached. On 28 June, the Argentine Permanent Representative, Amb. Ros sent a letter to the Secretary General to inform him about the "fourth round of negotiations on the Malvinas Islands, South Georgias and the South Sandwich Islands" that had taken place between the 21th and 23th of March. He also reported that the meeting had included "a wide exchange of views as well as consideration of the main questions embodied in the negotiations". Finally, it informed him that "the date, place and level of the next meeting" would be agreed through diplomatic channels<sup>67</sup>. The Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations communicated in identical terms<sup>68</sup>.

The outcome of the fourth round of negotiations again weakened the dynamics of the process. The United Kingdom, although it was evaluating alternatives such as leaseback, was unable to express a clear proposal to be discussed and had been conditioned by the pressure exerted by certain sectors in the islands. In the meantime, Argentina assumed that its proposals were concrete and did not find answers and, moreover, were delayed so as not to be discussed. The British Government was only interested in negotiating a cooperation agreement that would facilitate the exploitation of natural resources in the disputed area.

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<sup>66</sup> A/34/65

<sup>67</sup> A/34/342

<sup>68</sup> A/34/343

The Argentine Republic considered that in order to find a definitive and just solution to the dispute over the Malvinas Islands, the decision "cannot be unilateral" but "it has to be matched by a similar spirit on the part of the British authorities"<sup>69</sup>.

### **New attempts and old stumbles**

The process of bilateral diplomatic negotiations to settle the sovereignty dispute over the Malvinas Islands, South Georgias, South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas had gone through an arduous path since 1966, which was marked by moments of acceleration followed by moments of stalemate, but with one constant factor: the Argentine willingness to negotiate and the ever-changing British stance of progress and setbacks. The Argentine Republic had tried to support and advance the mechanism to put an end to the special and particular colonial situation of the Islands as established by the UN in different and successive documents. However, by the end of the 1970s, negotiations had worn out, weakening the concepts on which the necessary agreements could be built to achieve a definitive solution to the dispute.

In May 1979, with the political change in the United Kingdom and the election of the conservative leader Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister, alternatives were sought to reactivate the negotiating process. The new British Government inherited the dynamics of the negotiation rounds on the Question of the Malvinas Islands which, since 1977, had been periodically held: the practices of meetings, the subjects of debate and also the conditions presented by each of the parties during meetings. While the Argentine Republic tried to advance through the rounds towards a definite solution to the sovereignty dispute, the United Kingdom was at a crossroads with respect to the rounds, where different roads lead to different goals. The possibility of continuing negotiations secured progress in terms of economic cooperation but, at the same time, required definite agreements to be established over sovereignty. On the other hand, the alternative of breaking the process, while in line with the aspirations of a sector in the islands, certain economic groups and some members of Parliament, would have a negative political impact within the international community and would complicate projections on exploitable resources in the Southwest Atlantic region.

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<sup>69</sup> A/34/PV.10

The idea of continuing negotiations and attending the next round with the proposal of a leaseback for a period of 100 years and an agreement on co-management of maritime resources and economic and scientific cooperation prevailed among the new authorities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Commonwealth Office. Contacts were then made with Argentine diplomatic officials<sup>70</sup>. However, following the previous experiences and the role they had played among the public opinion and the British Parliament, the United Kingdom chose a more direct approach with the inhabitants of the Islands. This led the British Government to decide to send a mission to the archipelago, headed by the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Nicholas Ridley.

In June 1979, Ridley, before traveling to the Malvinas Islands, held meetings with Argentine Government officials in Buenos Aires on the "status of the negotiations on the Malvinas Islands, the establishment of the basis for an official meeting to be held in Buenos Aires in July 1979" [...] "and the resumption of bilateral relations at embassy level" -since both States had maintained Chargés d'Affaires since 1976-<sup>71</sup>. During his stay in the archipelago he "'took careful note of the inhabitants' views on their economic and political future'". In the face of the proposal of a leaseback by the British official, the immovable idea of a prolonged freezing of the sovereignty question was supported by an island sector. On his return to Buenos Aires in July, Ridley had new meetings with the local authorities in which they examined "different aspects of the relations between the two countries": "the level of diplomatic representation, the possible dates and modalities of the next round of negotiations on the Malvinas Islands, the renewal of bilateral economic ties and the Antarctic Treaty". A few months later, contacts continued to be fluid with conversations described as being "very warm"<sup>72</sup>. In September, a meeting was held in New York between the foreign ministers of both countries that sought to create new channels to reactivate negotiations. Although the United Kingdom prioritized other issues in its foreign policy, this allowed the necessary steps to be taken to hold a new round of negotiations that would

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<sup>70</sup> A/35/23 (Part. V)

<sup>71</sup> A/34/23 Add.7

<sup>72</sup> A/35/23 (Part. V)

make it possible to recover some kind of bilateral dynamics. Finally, on 16 November 1979, both governments simultaneously announced the official appointment of ambassadors.

With this principle of reactivation of relations, preparations began for a new round of negotiations. The British Government sought the participation of the islanders in these preparations and therefore obtain their approval in the negotiations to be carried out. The so-called island population identified by the British Government was the expression of an active local group that purported to be their representative and had strong links with the most important economic sectors of the archipelago and a strong presence in London. These were the ones who had rejected all previous negotiations and diplomatic approaches, opposing the concrete measures that Argentina had promoted and implemented with the agreement of the United Kingdom and had had a strong social, economic, health, educational and cultural impact on daily life. In addition, they cast permanent suspicion on the intentions of the Government of the United Kingdom about the negotiations with Argentina. This group and its economic links had found an echo among some parliamentary sectors and this helped to strengthen them and give them an identity as the supposed expression of the island population. In the face of this, the British official urgency to reach economic cooperation agreements -especially those related to fishing and exploitation of hydrocarbons-, stumbled on several occasions and complicated a possible solution.

In the meantime, and once the doubts on both sides had been overcome, on 15 April 1980, a new round of negotiations was officially announced in Buenos Aires and London. It would take place in New York during the last days of April. Both Governments agreed that the main topics to be discussed were the future of the Islands and fishing and hydrocarbon exploitation. On May 5, in identical letters, both Permanent Representatives informed the Secretary General that a "meeting at ministerial level was held at New York on the 28th and 29th of April to discuss the question of the Malvinas Islands and other topics relating to the South Atlantic. Throughout April 28th and 29th, discussions "covered a range of subjects" in a "cordial and positive spirit". It even highlighted the intention "to hold further meetings in the future in order to continue these discussions" that had been expressed by both governments<sup>73</sup>.

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<sup>73</sup> A/35/222. A/35/223

The New York round had made it clear to the British Government that, if it sought a settlement on economic cooperation, it had to move forward in the negotiations and reach a definitive solution to the sovereignty dispute. This led to suggest a change of approach: it was to seek to establish and maintain a scheme of secret and exploratory talks on the basis of recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands and a simultaneous lease back to the United Kingdom for a prolonged period of time.

Throughout 1980 there were talks along these lines. The Government of the Argentine Republic showed its interest in the proposal and pointed out that it was necessary to discuss the period to be covered by the lease. For its part, the Government of the United Kingdom required the approval of Parliament to go ahead with a formal negotiation process. This, in turn, implied agreement by the islanders. As such, and with the experience of 1968, it was decided that the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs should return to the Islands to report on the proposal and the implications it would have for the daily life of the population.

Nicholas Ridley travelled to the Malvinas Islands between 22 and 29 November 1980, after passing through Buenos Aires and holding meetings with the British Ambassador and officials at the San Martin Palace. Upon arrival in the Malvinas Islands, he encountered a climate markedly opposed to his mission. The Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs faced strong opposition from an island sector. His mission was to "consult with island councilors" to determine how to proceed in agreement with the local population. He set out the possible alternatives to a negotiated settlement: "freezing the dispute for a time" or exchanging sovereignty "for a long lease of the Islands" to the British Government. The official explained, even to the "Territory's Sheep Owners Association", that the "lease 'will not change the lifestyle of the islanders, and new financial benefits from fishing, tourism and oil will ensue and start to be enjoyed" in a very short time. The opposition expressed by the islanders was notorious and Ridley acknowledged that it was up to them "to recommend whether any of these options should be explored in negotiations with the Argentines". Back in London, on 2 December, he reported his visit to Parliament. In his presentation he stated that "any possible settlement will have to be sanctioned by the Islanders and by this House"<sup>74</sup>. The islanders' rejection of a settlement with Argentina

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<sup>74</sup> A/36/23 (Part. V)



through a leaseback scheme had an impact in London: the opposition was echoed in the press and in Parliament. For the population there was only one acceptable option: the freezing of the sovereignty dispute. This led the United Kingdom to abandon any negotiation proposal that would seek a leaseback and, with it, greater economic cooperation in the Southwest Atlantic.

In spite of this new setback, contacts were kept up in an attempt to maintain a bilateral dialogue that would make it possible to agree on a frame of reference for a new round of negotiations. The Argentine Republic wanted to resume negotiations once again. Faced with this insistence, the British Government agreed to hold a "meeting at ministerial level to discuss the Question of the Malvinas Islands".

On February 23 and 24, 1981, the delegations met in New York. On that occasion, there was a break in the bilateral negotiations which expressed the wear and tear they had reached as a result of a succession of attempts that had failed to bear fruit and repeated -and increasingly deeper- stumbles. Among the British delegates were an island representative and a member of the self-styled Legislative Council of the Territory<sup>75</sup>.

The meeting in New York was reported to the Secretary General of the United Nations by the Permanent Representative of the Argentine Republic, Amb. Juan Carlos Beltramino, and was identified as a "continuation of the exchanges that took place between the two Governments in April 1980". The text of the joint communiqué, which mentioned the agreement to hold "their next negotiations at the earliest possible date" although without specifying anything else, testified to the scant results of the talks<sup>76</sup>. The British position in favor of freezing the dispute had prevented the parties from coming closer together and achieving a dialogue that could resolve their differences and achieve their respective interests.

Despite the evident failure in New York, which had again stalled the process of bilateral negotiations, on 29 July, Ambassador Beltramino addressed a letter to the Secretary General to inform him of the invitation extended to the British Government "to expedite

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<sup>75</sup> A/36/23 (Part. V)

<sup>76</sup> A/36/155

resolutely the formal negotiating process aimed at settling once and for all" the dispute over the Question of the Malvinas Islands. It emphasized the Argentine Government's concern about the lack of progress and reiterated its basic positions on the controversy and, therefore, called for resolving its different aspects: economic cooperation, the interests of the population and the sovereignty dispute should be dealt with within the framework of the United Nations resolutions. The communication also stated that the Government "is determined to continue the negotiations in an extremely realistic spirit and with full confidence that reasonable and feasible solutions can be found" and that "the time has come for these negotiations" [...] "to become effective"<sup>77</sup>. A few days later, the United Kingdom replied making it clear that it did not agree with the point of view of the Argentine Republic on the results of the negotiations. It did share the desire to continue the process, although it made it clear that the representatives of the island population should be consulted. It was for this reason that a new round of negotiations could not begin until they had been elected.

In September, the Foreign Ministers of both States met in New York for the United Nations General Assembly. On that occasion, Foreign Minister Oscar Camilión addressed the international community stating the "strange paradox" of Argentina having been "in the vanguard of the struggle for national independence" and suffering "from a breach of its territorial integrity, an anachronistic persistence of colonialism". It also reported that "Argentina has addressed to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland a proposal designed to give a decisive impetus to the negotiations regarding sovereignty over the Malvinas, South Sandwich and South Georgias Islands"<sup>78</sup>.

These calls and offers by Argentina to resume negotiations were supported by concrete measures. The activities linking the Islands with the Argentine mainland continued without interruption. Even in that month of September 1981, there was active collaboration to attend to the "problem of shortages in some categories of foodstuffs" suffered by the island population. The Argentine Government sent, on the 12th and 13th, and "in

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<sup>77</sup> A/36/412

<sup>78</sup> A/36/PV. 7

accordance with the policy of according special importance to the interests" of the islanders, 24 tons of food purchased by local traders in planes of the Argentine Air Force<sup>79</sup>.

The intense Argentine activity and the election of representatives of the population of the Malvinas Islands in October contributed to the thought of a reactivation of the negotiation process. From October onwards, the British Government considered the possibility of holding a new round of negotiations. The so-called island counselors, although they maintained their position against an agreement with Argentina and demanded that the sovereignty dispute should not be on the agenda, accepted that meeting as part of the British delegation. The meeting was to be held in Geneva on December 17 and 18. The Argentine Republic accepted the proposal for a new meeting. However, in view of the repeated stumbles and stalemates that had occurred since 1966, a change in the dynamics of the negotiations was sought. The Argentine government offered the formation of a Permanent Negotiating Commission to replace the mechanism of the rounds that had been held since 1977. The aim was for both States to hold monthly meetings to deal with issues related to the sovereignty dispute over the Malvinas Islands, South Georgias, South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas and to make progress towards a definitive solution.

The change of authorities in Buenos Aires and the possibility of offering a new proposal by them caused the round to be postponed until late January or early February. Finally, between February 25 and 27, 1982, the round of negotiations was held in New York. The British delegation once again included the so-called island counselors.

Although the round was conducted with the usual cordiality of the parties, the absence of definitions and the formality of the approaches once again showed on the near horizon the lack of significant progress in the negotiations. The proposal of the Permanent Negotiation Commission was accepted by the United Kingdom with certain limitations: the parameters to organize its functioning were not established and it was relegated in the matter of the sovereignty dispute.

This new setback seemed to reiterate the previous crises that had hampered the negotiation process on the Question of the Malvinas Islands. The Argentine Government, as

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<sup>79</sup> A/36/522

had happened on those previous occasions, wanted to prevent it from stagnating and therefore a much more determined diplomatic activity was envisaged.

At the beginning of 1982, the negotiation process on the Question of the Malvinas Islands was deeply exhausted. The United Kingdom had been trapped in a logic that even clashed with its own national interests and limited any diplomatic action. For its part, the Argentine Republic, which had been pushing since 1965, and with antecedents dating back to 1833, for a diplomatic settlement based on the international concert, had begun to fall into a state of despondency. Its efforts had persisted despite all the reverses and setbacks and the vocation for a definitive solution was firm but, it seemed far away and beyond its own sacrifices. Between April and June 1982, the South Atlantic armed conflict took place which, far from finding a definitive solution, exposed the urgency of reestablishing the peaceful channels of a diplomatic negotiation that would pave the way for the benefit of each of the actors involved in the Malvinas Question.

A few months after the conflict, and with its consequences still palpable, the necessary steps were taken to recover the negotiating dynamic that should never have been abandoned. On 16 August 1982, Argentina and 20 Latin American States submitted a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations requesting the inclusion of a supplementary item entitled "Question of the Malvinas Islands" in the work program of the General Assembly, "so that the latter may urge the Parties to the dispute to resume, under United Nations auspices and at the earliest possible date, the negotiations with a view to a peaceful settlement"<sup>80</sup>. A few days later, the General Assembly agreed by consensus to include the item in the program of work for its thirty-seventh session.

In the general debate that followed that inclusion, the Latin American delegations presented a draft resolution for discussion on 1 November: the text noted the cessation of hostilities and the clear intention not to resume them, the need to take into account the interests of the island population and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations on the non-use of force in the settlement of international disputes, in addition to inviting the Secretary General to undertake a renewed mission of good offices to assist the parties in that objective. The following day, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship Juan Ramón

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<sup>80</sup> A/37/193

Aguirre Lanari addressed the General Assembly: in his speech he noted that, despite "years of fruitless bilateral negotiations", the Argentine Republic was "requesting again the attention" of that body to summon both parties to resume diplomatic negotiations leading to a peaceful solution of the dispute over the Malvinas Question<sup>81</sup>.

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**Homenaje a los caídos**

**Reclama la reanudación de negociaciones bilaterales con Gran Bretaña y la intervención del secretario general del organismo.**  
 Hubo 90 votos a favor, 12 en contra y 52 abstenciones



**ASESINARON A UN GENERAL EN MADRID**

**LACIAR DEFIENDE HOY SU CORONA**

A few days later, the Plenary of the General Assembly of the United Nations voted on the draft resolution and, with 90 votes in favor, 12 against -among which was the United Kingdom and some members of the Commonwealth- and 52 abstentions, it became Resolution 37/9. In this new document, the international community recognized that the armed conflict had not changed the nature of the dispute, which remained pending for resolution. By virtue of this, it called on "the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to resume negotiations in order to find as soon as possible a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute" over the Question of the Malvinas Islands<sup>82</sup>.

<sup>81</sup> A/37/PV. 51

<sup>82</sup> Resolution 37/9

Despite Resolution 37/9, the United Kingdom did not accept to resume a negotiating mechanism. That attitude continued throughout the following years despite the various calls from the international community to do so – as expressed in Resolutions 38/12, 39/6, 40/21, 41/40, 42/19 and 43/25 - and the proposals that have been systematically made by the Argentine democratic governments that have succeeded each other uninterruptedly since 1983.

Throughout a little more than fifteen years it had become clear that diplomatic negotiation to solve the sovereignty dispute as a mechanism to put an end to the special and particular colonial situation of the Malvinas Question required the will of both States. That will was embodied in only one of the parties: Argentina.

However, the effort and commitment of both parties to find a definitive solution to this sovereignty dispute in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions and international law is a fundamental condition. Argentina, together with the support of the international community, will continue to appeal to peaceful means of dispute settlement, taking into account the interests and way of life of the inhabitants of the Islands, in order to put an end to this anachronistic situation of colonialism -which is a remnant of the past- once and for all, in all its forms and manifestations, and to regain the full exercise of sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands, South Georgias, South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas , which is an inalienable objective of the Argentine people.

Secretariat for the Malvinas Islands,  
Antarctica and the South Atlantic



Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
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Esmeralda 1212, 10th Floor, City of Buenos Aires (C1007ABR)  
Ph: +54 11 4819 7212 | [www.cancilleria.gov.ar](http://www.cancilleria.gov.ar) | [semas@mrecic.gov.ar](mailto:semas@mrecic.gov.ar)